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HYDROCARBON CONFLICT IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON: INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES’ DECOLONIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY 
In 2008 and 2009 the indigenous peoples from the Peruvian Amazon staged 
massive protests in opposition to President Alan Garcia’s development policies, many of 
which were designed to facilitate the exploitation and development of natural resources 
on indigenous territorial spaces. Tragically, the protests ended on June 5 (2009) in the 
Amazonian province of Bagua, where, according to official reports, ten protesters and 
twenty-three police officers were killed. Many protesters were injured and others were 
reported missing. The Bagua event underscores the seriousness of natural resource 
development on indigenous territorial spaces.  
This dissertation argues that in order to move toward environmentally sustainable 
and socially equitable natural resources policies it is necessary to rethink these policies 
on indigenous territories. To make this case, I examine an environmental conflict over 
hydrocarbon development on indigenous territories between the Garcia government and 
the Indigenous Movement in the Peruvian Amazon (IMPA).   Situating this conflict in the 
broader context of the Garcia government’s development policy, the dissertation (1) 
provides a historical and institutional analysis of Peruvian hydrocarbon development on 
indigenous territories, (2) uses social movement theory to explain indigenous resistance 
to hydrocarbon and natural resource development on indigenous territorial spaces, 
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and (3) introduces an alternative theory that explains the differences between indigenous 
and state development perspectives and challenges many of the current 
neoliberal/socialist framings of indigenous/state conflicts over natural resources. In the 
end, I argue that a decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policy regime is necessary to 
create policies that are ecologically sustainable, socially equitable, and avoid violent 
confrontations.  Decolonization⎯a complex and formidable challenge⎯suggests that 
indigenous peoples gain greater decision-making control over the natural resources 
located on indigenous territorial spaces. Contrary to the opinion of the Peruvian 
government and beyond the stipulations set in International Labor Organization 
Convention 169, this means that indigenous peoples should have the power to prevent 
unwanted oil development within indigenous territorial spaces. My projects adds to the 
Political Science literature by introducing an alternative theoretical framework for the 
analysis of these issues that will encourage scholars, governments, and political 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The tragedy of Bagua and the case of hydrocarbon development  
 
On June 5 2009, a deadly clash erupted between indigenous peoples and the 
Peruvian state in Amazonian province of Bagua. Official accounts place the death toll at 
thirty-three, ten civilians and twenty-three police officers. Indigenous accounts of the 
event vary, but some reported that up to forty indigenous individuals were killed and 
bodies were thrown into the river from police helicopters (Merino, 2010).1 The clash 
came on the heels of nearly three months of intense and widespread indigenous protest 
throughout the Peruvian Amazonia, the result of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the 
United States and development policies designed to open up the region to foreign capital 
investments in oil, mining, logging and agriculture development on indigenous territories. 
More specifically, these protests, and similar protests that took place in August of 2008, 
were designed to force the government to repeal a series of legislative decrees that were 
enacted by President Alan Garcia as part of special powers delegated to the executive to 
facilitate the implementation of the FTA with the U.S. For indigenous activists, leaders, 
and local villagers, these decrees place at risk the territorial integrity of indigenous lands 
and the environmental sustainability of the entire region.  
In response to the tragedy, the Peruvian government, led by President Alan 
Garcia, put together a short video that frames indigenous peoples as “extremists and 
                                                
1 Since the time of this writing there have been several reports that highlight the 
government’s responsibility surrounding the events in Bagua, both long and short term.  
2 
 
savages” who had “brutally massacred innocent, humble policemen.” The one minute 
video displays a news clip of Alberto Pizango, the president of the Interethnic 
Association of Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP) and leader of the 
protests, declaring insurgency against the government. It proceeds to stage images of 
what appear to be “war-crazed” indigenous protestors, holding spears, juxtaposed against 
photographs of brutally beaten and massacred police officers. As these graphic images 
are displayed in the foreground, the video boldly announces that indigenous peoples want 
to hold Peru back, they want to prevent “Peruvians” from benefiting from the gas and 
petroleum from “their” subsoil. The spot ends with “May the Fatherland not forsake 
progress.”2  
President Garcia, in addition to the video, made a series of declarations explaining 
the conflict and violence. For Garcia, indigenous manifestations against the government 
are due to the influence of outsiders: “It is really quite simple,” says Garcia, “who 
benefits from this situation?” Suggesting that the conflict was created by petroleum 
exporting countries, Garcia argues that “these the countries [i.e. Venezuela and Bolivia] 
want to keep Peru from becoming a Petroleum exporting county. They want to detain 
Peru!” President Garcia’s comments, moreover, were also pointed at indigenous peoples 
from the Amazon region: 
These [native] persons are not first class citizens. 400,000 natives cannot tell 
twenty-eight million Peruvians that they do not have the right to come to the 
Amazonia [to develop natural resources]. This is a terrible error. Whoever thinks 
like this wants to take us to irrationality, to the primitive backwardness of the 
past.3  
 
                                                
2 This video spot can be accessed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDVgw4pbHEk.  
3 This video can be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rlj6XBa7pAE.  
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Garcia’s framing of indigenous peoples as primitive, irrational, and backwards suggests 
that this tragic event was the fault of “irrational natives,” who are not only manipulated 
by outsiders, but are patently anti-development and against the “progress” of Peru.  
 Not surprisingly, the indigenous version of the tragedy at Bagua differs 
dramatically. An interview conducted by reporter Milagros Salazar with Awajún leader 
Salomon Aguanash, the president of the regional protest committee that led to two-month 
demonstration in Bagua, reveals not only a distinct account of the event, but a categorical 
rejection that indigenous peoples are anti-development. For Aguanash, the National 
Police Force (and, DINOES4, the special forces unit) had express orders to “shoot to 
kill.” For the Awajún leader, more than three thousand protesters were tricked by the 
police. General Víctor Uribe, the local police chief, had promised the night before to give 
the protesters until 10:00 a.m. the next morning to end the blockade and return to their 
villages. “They wanted to catch us off guard,” Aguanash reported to Salazar. 
Paraphrasing the indigenous leader, at 5:00 a.m. the police surrounded the hillside and 
started to shoot. Two Awajún brothers and a prominent leader from Alto Marañon were 
shot. Then, ten to fifteen minutes later, three helicopters arrived and started shooting, 
throwing tear gas and devices to set fire. “If you look at the photos, you can see bodies 
are burnt,” Aguanash told Salazar. The indigenous leader agreed that some indigenous 
protesters did react violently, but it was only after they witnessed the “killing of their 
brothers.”  
                                                
4 This is the National Direction of Special Operations of the Peruvian National Police, in 
Spanish, la Dirección Nacional de Operaciones Especiales de la Policía Nacional del Perú 
(DINOES). This special unit was sent in to break up to blockade.  
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 In the interview, Salazar asked Aguanash to respond to Garcia’s claim that the 
death of the police officers at the hands of Amazonian natives was “extreme savagery.” 
His answer is telling: Indigenous people feel “marginalized and indignant after loosing so 
many indigenous brothers and sisters and so many brothers among the police, who we 
had nothing against.” He emphasizes that it was not the fault of the policemen, but of the 
central government, who gave the orders. Moreover, Aguanash rejects the idea that the 
tragedy happened because of the influence of other countries: “if that were true, we 
would have been armed. We are poor people, and with these words the government is 
mistreating us.” According to Aguanash, the culprit is a “stubborn government” that 
refuses to repeal the decrees.  
 Aguanash, in addition, categorically rejects the notion that indigenous peoples are 
anti-development or opposed to progress. His answer not only exemplifies indigenous 
perspectives on development, but draws attention to many of the issues surrounding the 
broader conflict between indigenous peoples and the Peruvian government over natural 
resource development in the Amazon region:  
We are not opposed to development, and we want progress. But for a long time 
they have ignored and marginalized us as if we belonged to other countries; they 
have not taken us into account. They have brought us neither agriculture nor 
economic development with their projects and initiatives. The country has 
committed a huge mistake by electing Alan Garcia for the second time. With his 
policies, he treats us as if we were terrorists. I repeat, we are not opposed to 
development, but it cannot be designed by the men in suits and ties in the cabinet 
of ministers, but must take into consideration the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the ILO (International Labor Organization) 
Convention 169, and the Constitution. We do not accept the kind of 
“development” that the president offers us, because it is not sustainable and it 
threatens the Amazon rainforest, which is humanity’s heritage (Salazar 2009a).  
 
The difference between Garcia’s framing of indigenous protest and Aguanash’s response 
foreshadows the main questions that this dissertation addresses: Why does the Peruvian 
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government frame indigenous peoples as anti-development? What is the government’s 
approach to natural resource development? What are indigenous perspectives on 
development? And, most importantly, is there room for reconciliation in order to create a 
development approach that is more humane and sustainable?    
To answer these questions, this dissertation examines the case of hydrocarbon 
development policy in the Peruvian Amazon. Hydrocarbon development is an especially 
useful topic to address these questions for a few important reasons. First, the extraction of 
oil on indigenous territories is symbolic of modern development and, consequently, 
elicits intense feelings of support and opposition. The government, for example, 
frequently touts their plans to turn Peru into an exporter of oil so that Peru can join the 
ranks of modern, industrialized countries. For indigenous peoples (and 
environmentalists), oil development conjures up images of greedy transnational 
companies that see the Amazon region as a place to enrich themselves at the expense of 
indigenous culture and the environmental integrity of the area. And, as this dissertation 
will explain, much of the protest against the legislative decrees (much broader in scope) 
revolved around images and symbols of hydrocarbon development.  
 Secondly, the Peruvian government is currently engaged in the most aggressive 
expansion of hydrocarbon development in the country’s history, which is largely 
concentrated in the Amazon region. For example, in a relatively short time span 
government policy has led to a staggering increase in hydrocarbon development in the 
Amazon region. In 2004, approximately 13 per cent of the region was slated for oil and 
gas exploration, where by 2007, that number had skyrocketed to 70 per cent. Today it is 
near 80 per cent. In 2009, there were 92 oil and gas contracts in force. Private 
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investments amounted to U.S. $797 million5 (also see Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010a). 
The majority of oil and gas concessions overlap indigenous titled territories, indigenous 
reserves for “isolated peoples,” territorial reserves, and other environmentally protected 
areas. (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010b, p. 1-2). This, not surprisingly, has created a 
backlash amongst indigenous groups, who feel particularly threatened by the 
government’s aggressive hydrocarbon agenda.   
 Thirdly, hydrocarbon policy is part of Peru’s natural resource (extractive) policy 
regime, which includes a much broader set of development policies, including mining, 
forestry, and bio-fuel exploitation. The legislative decrees, the source of indigenous 
protest in 2008 and 2009, were designed to open up the region to private investment to 
better utilize the region’s natural resources for national development. Therefore, both the 
government’s advancement of its hydrocarbon agenda in the Amazon region and 
indigenous resistance to government policies are part of a larger debate on modern 
development in the region. An examination of the conflict over hydrocarbon development 
in the Amazon region is, as a result, linked to broader issues of development throughout 
Peru and Latin America.    
 Finally, hydrocarbon development, similar to other extractive industries, provides 
the opportunity to learn about how development works at different levels (and scales) of 
public policy implementation on indigenous territories. Given that hydrocarbon 
concessions are awarded to private entities by the Peruvian state that are located on 
indigenous territorial spaces (villages, protected areas, etc.), this provides fertile terrain to 
study how the government interacts with indigenous peoples at theses distinct levels. It is 
                                                




also the place where important international conventions and agreements like the ILO 
Convention 169 (1989) and the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights (2007) are 
implemented. For example, these agreements, both to which the Peruvian government is 
a signatory, require that indigenous peoples obtain Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) 
before development takes place on their land. Hydrocarbon development, thus, provides 
an important venue to study these development-related issues.   
Theoretical approach 
 
 The ultimate objective of this project is to push for an alternative development 
approach, one that is more environmentally sustainable and humane. The government’s 
approach to hydrocarbon development, I argue, is based on a historic (mis)treatment of 
the Amazon region as an empty space to be utilized for the benefit of national 
development. Indigenous peoples, currently, are seen by the government as obstacles to 
modern development, not only manipulated by outsiders, but fundamentally misguided in 
their approaches to development. This viewpoint, I argue, is an example of the 
government’s logic of development, one that has in fact been alive within the Peruvian 
state since colonial times. This logic has led to a development policy that is 
environmentally unsustainable, that marginalizes indigenous viewpoints, and that is 
ultimately responsible for the violence described in the opening paragraph.  In this 
context, my project contends there is an urgent need change the paradigm of natural 
resource extraction on indigenous territories.    
This change requires an alternative theoretical approach to development, one that 
is capable of de-colonizing public policy. This, I argue, is especially important for any 
development-related issue or problem that involves the indigenous peoples of Latin 
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America. Such a realization is not lost on contemporary indigenous observers. According 
to Marin Edward Anderson, the president of the Midwest Association of Latin American 
Studies and contributor to U.S. State Department reports on indigenous rights:  
The struggle for the liberation of the estimated two hundred and fifty million 
individuals belonging to five thousand distinct indigenous communities in 70 
nation-states around the world is arguably the final frontier, and the unfinished 
business, of more than a century long⎯or more than two centuries long, if the 
U.S. revolution is the starting point⎯process of global de-colonization (Anderson 
2010 p. 1) 
 
Anderson argues that much of the work of de-colonization still needs to been done and 
criticizes the Obama government for, in effect, “sitting on the sidelines” on the some of 
the most pressing issues relating to indigenous peoples and modern development. Mostly 
importantly, Anderson points out that the legacies of colonialism are still very much 
present in contemporary development problems and issues. With Anderson, my project 
takes the position that in order to resolve contemporary conflicts over modern 
development on indigenous territories it is necessary to engage in a de-colonizing of 
public policy decisions surrounding natural resources.  
 In this context, the theoretical optic of this dissertation is multifaceted. I combine 
the use of an alternative decolonial approach to sustainable development of natural 
resources with an understanding of indigenous voice in the context of New Social 
Movement Theory (NSMT).  This approach re-frames the political and environmental 
debate around extractive development and explains why (and how) the government 
misrepresents indigenous peoples. It then identifies promising policy directions and 
alternative notions of sustainable development. In this case, I ague that it is essential to 
redirect contemporary framings of development as a left (socialism) versus right 
(neoliberalism) problem towards an approach that emphasizes the colonial legacies of 
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natural resource development. Here I turn the modernity/coloniality as an alternative 
theoretical lens to explain the conflict (and tension) between indigenous peoples and the 
state (or government) and to highlight an alternative conceptualization of sustainable 
development.6  Modernity/coloniality and its logical extension, decoloniality, thus 
provides an analytical bridge to connect the study of social movement conflicts to the 
application of more sustainable public policy in natural resource development.   
To carry out this bridge-building exercise, I draw from various threads within the 
subfield of comparative political science. In line with much of the state-society literature, 
this project rejects the idea that states can be reduced to aggregates of individual actors in 
which political outcomes are explained simply by cultural values (Almond and Verba 
1963), class conflict (Lipset 1960), and elite rule (Dahl 1961). As such, with much of the 
literature that sought to “bring the state back in” to political analysis (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), I treat state institutions as an analytical tools and, at 
times, as (semi) autonomous actors. However, because state-society interactions are, 
indeed, complex (see Mitchell 1991, 2002) my project identifies closely with neo-
institutional approaches to the study of politics. Sensitive to the critiques of an all 
powerful state, these approaches recognize the microfoundations of political behavior and 
the influence of institutions and structures on political behavior. In other words, agents 
and structures are both independent and dependent variables, which suggests that it is 
                                                
6 Here I use, sometimes interchangeably, both the term government and state. The 
government (i.e. the Alan Garcia government) refers to the administration currently in 
power. Garcia is the president, head of the executive branch, and thus able to direct 
public policy. In this case, as head of the executive, he controls the bureaucratic 
apparatus that directs hydrocarbon development policy. The state, from a basic Weberian 
notion, includes the institutions that, in theory, have a monopoly of violence and coercion 
over a geographically bounded territory. The Garcia government is part of the Peruvian 
state, but is, of course, not the entirety of the state apparatus.  
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important to study the relationship between individuals, groups, and institutions, yet 
maintain a close eye on the political context in which both individual and collective 
actors operate (see Ostrom 1990, 1993; Lane 1997, Thelen 1999, Kohli, Moon et al. 
2003, Kohli 1986, 2004).  
 The ultimate goal of pursuing a decolonization of public policy in natural resource 
development requires a more comprehensive understanding of indigenous social 
movements. Here I draw from literature on contentious politics and social movements.  
Tarrow defines contentious politics as “collective activity on the part of the 
claimants⎯or those who claim to represent them⎯relying at least in part on non-
institutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state.” Within this context, 
social movements, according to Tarrow, are defined as “sustained challenges to 
powerholders in the name of a disadvantaged population living under the jurisdiction or 
influence of those powerholders” (1996, p. 874). Social movement literature, as these 
definitions indicate, treat movements as significant players in the social order that, given 
the right circumstances, could affect policy change and represent a serious challenge to 
powerholders (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1998).  
 In this study, the IMPA, a “new social movement,” represents a fundamental 
challenge to the ability of the Garcia government, “the powerholders,” to carry out its 
development policies in the Peruvian Amazon. New Social Movement Theory (NSMT), 
influenced by European scholarship (Torrain, Melucci, Habermas), concentrates on the 
newness of collective action, arguing that many contemporary movements and issues are 
not simply based on the redistribution of material resources, but on the new structures in 
post-industrial society (see Buechler 1995, 2000). New social movements, as such, are 
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elusive and diffuse in character, often organized around identity claims. For NSMT 
scholars, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, environmental concerns, and age are 
more accurate ways to identify these movements than class-based descriptions  (Melucci 
1980, 1984; Offe 1985; Melucci, Keane et al. 1989; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Buechler 
1995).  
 From the perspective of NSMT, the existence of the IMPA is largely due to 
cultural variables. However, different than the early behavioralists (i.e. Almond and 
Verba, Lipset), for NSMT, indigenous “culture” is multivariate and thus related to 
postmaterial values concerning territory, natural resources, and the environment. In fact, 
as many scholars of indigenous movements have suggested, indigenous claims are often 
difficult to categorize given their diverse nature, which frequently include ethnicity, land, 
environment, and political autonomy (Lucero 2003, 2008; Dean and Levi 2006; 
Andolina, Radcliff, Laurie 2005; Laurie, Andolina, Radcliffe 2003; Laurie, Andolina, 
Radcliffe 2005). In this dissertation, recognizing the contributions of NSMT to explain 
important aspects of indigenous movements, I use SMT to help articulate the emergence 
of the IMPA, its principal values, and the strategies and operational mechanisms that it 
has used to challenge to state’s hydrocarbon development policy. Following the tradition 
of Charles Tilly (1978), I focus on the “political opportunity structures” that help to 
understand the conditions for mobilization and the framework for collective action and 
then, in terms of strategy, examine the way that the IMPA has been able to frame 
conceptualizations of territorial rights. As a result, with SMT scholars that examine the 
relationship between movements and states (McAdam 1982, 1996; Tarrow 1998; Della 
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Porta and Diani 2006), I argue in Peru that the emergence and continuity of IMPA 
depends on certain kinds of institutional arrangements.   
 Because the central focus of this dissertation is the IMPA, I am heavily indebted 
to the work of scholars, especially political scientists, that have studied indigenous 
movements in Latin America. Three of the most important contributions here are from 
Alison Brysk (2000), Donna Lee Van Cott (2000; 2005; 2008) and Deborah Yashar 
(1998; 1999; 2005, 2007). Brysk demonstrates how indigenous actors have been able to 
exercise influence when they project meaning across international borders. Drawing from 
social movement theory, international relations, and ethnic studies literature she argues 
that indigenous people have “used global symbolic appeals and normative reconstructions 
of international forces to transform their own lives and to pioneer a new form of politics” 
(2000, 2). These identity-based movements, she asserts, do more than just inspire, they 
have been able to rewrite power relations and transform state practices. Van Cott, who 
directly addresses the incorporation of indigenous political actors into the modern state, 
examines how and why some indigenous movements have “evolved” into political 
parties, while others have not. Similar to much of the literature, she finds that institutional 
changes, party system changes, and social movements factors were all part of the reason 
that ethnic parties emerged (Van Cott 2005). Yashar, who pays close attention to 
institutional factors, finds that indigenous movements succeeded in part because of what 
she describes as changes in citizenship regimes. In addition to institutional factors, like 
Brysk, Yashar argues that indigenous movements emerged because of transcommunity 
networks, and political associational space, suggesting a give and take between local 
resources and political opportunities (2005, p. 8).  
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Whereas the emphasis of this literature is on explaining the success or failure of 
indigenous movements to emerge as viable political actors within the modern political 
system, the objective of this dissertation is to think about how indigenous resistance (and 
concerns) might translate into public policy. That said, within the context of this conflict, 
I turn to modernity/coloniality to examine state and indigenous perspectives on 
development, which, I argue, is necessary in order to rethink natural resource 
development in the Peruvian Amazon. This approach, as mentioned, offers a necessary 
refraction of conceptualizations of development that in Latin American political debates 
often get placed on a left/right continuum, with socialism and (neo) liberalism as the 
extremes. The problem, especially relevant for indigenous peoples, is that this left/right 
spectrum does not adequately address the contemporary colonial legacies that are still 
very much a part of Latin America’s (extractive) natural resource development paradigm.  
The modernity/coloniality approach is inspired by a diverse group of Latin 
American scholars, many of whom work in U.S. and European universities. Walter 
Mignolo (an Argentine theorist currently at Duke), Anibal Quijano (a Peruvian 
sociologist), and Enrique Dussel (an Argentine historian teaching in Mexico) are three of 
the group’s most prominent contributors, but several others, including Arturo Escobar, 
Santiago Castro-Gomez, Ramón Grosfoguel, and Catherine Walsh have made significant 
contributions. I address, in more detail, the theoretical underpinnings of 
modernity/coloniality in Chapter V. However, as Escobar states, the driving force of the 
group is “a continued reflection on Latin American cultural and political reality, 
including the subaltern knowledge of exploited and oppressed social groups” (Escobar 
2007, p. 180). Modernity/coloniality is consequently an attempt to examine Latin 
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America’s political and social problems from the perspective of the subaltern Other, a 
concept introduced by Gramsci, but most recognized by the work of postcolonial scholar 
Gayatri Spivak (1988).  
It is important to emphasize, however, that, more than merely paying attention to 
subaltern perspectives, the modernity/coloniality approach works towards what Mignolo 
describes as un paradigma otro (an Other paradigm).  This approach directly challenges 
the linear history of modern thought and scholarship, suggesting that another way of 
thinking is possible (i.e. new epistemologies), one that does not owe its origins to the 
great metanarratives of Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism. As Escobar writes, “it 
locates its own inquiry in the very borders of systems of thought and reaches towards to 
possibility of non-eurocentric modes of thinking” (Escobar 2007, p. 180). This project 
turns to modernity/coloniality precisely because of its potential for relocating the 
discussion of modern development away from the socialism/liberalism spectrum towards 
a perspective that highlights the colonial legacies of development.  
The most relevant example of how the modernity/coloniality approach can be 
used to examine indigenous politics in Latin America is the work of Catherine Walsh, 
who examines indigenous and Afro-descendent movements in Ecuador. Walsh argues 
that new forms of indigenous politics have emerged in Latin American that are 
fundamentally different from the past political articulations that were based on class (and 
class-consciousness): According to Walsh:  
the new politics of mobilization in discussion here depart from the agency of 
indigenous and black peoples themselves, taken as central are ethnic and racial 
differences as well as the recognition and rearticulation of what Mignolo refers to 
as colonial difference, that is, the intertwinedness of colonial legacies, 




It is not ethnicity per se that defines these movements, rather it is a “strategic politization 
of difference–cultural difference but also the epistemic difference within it–focused on 
recognition, construction, confrontation, and transformation” (Walsh 2002, p. 63).  
Walsh agrees that in Latin America indigenous social movements are identity-
based, but more than reclaiming their own identity, they are constructing and shaping 
national identities. She includes the demands of the Zapatistas who are fighting for new 
conceptualizations of democracy, the Mapuches in Chile, and the Uw’a in Colombia and 
other groups that are fighting the “transnational extractivist (oil, mining, and timber) 
companies” in places like the Amazon river basin (Walsh 2002, p. 64). For Walsh, these 
movements are challenging the “very concepts, constructs, and institutions of the state, 
citizenship, democracy and the nation” and, at the same time, are disrupting ethnographic 
and development-based paradigms (Walsh 2002, p. 65).   
It is from this vantage point that I apply the modernity/coloniality lens to the 
current conflict between the Peruvian government and indigenous peoples over 
hydrocarbon development in the Peruvian Amazon. Specifically, I use this lens not 
merely to examine indigenous perspectives on development, but rather to explain how the 
Peruvian government misrepresents indigenous viewpoints on development. More 
generally, modernity/coloniality helps to explain the history of indigenous resistance to 
the state’s extractive development policies, which is based on a dominant Eurocentric 
ways of thinking about natural resource development. Indeed, a decolonization of Peru’s 
natural resource development polices requires an inclusion of indigenous perspectives on 
development, however, it also obliges an understanding of the relationship between 
Eurocentric and non-Eurocentric perspectives. Modernity/coloniality provides this, which 
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then, I argue, opens up possibilities to advance alternative visions of sustainable 
development in Peru.   
Broader impact and sustainable development   
 
 The Peruvian case is important from an environmental and policymaking 
perspective. The Amazon river basin is, of course, well-known for its global importance 
as the rainforest plays a critical role in regulating the world’s climate. Deforestation, 
perhaps the single most important environmental issue facing indigenous peoples in the 
Amazon region, is responsible for more than 600 million tons of carbon per year or more 
than 25 percent of all carbon emissions, more than the U.S. automobile. Some scientist 
warn that, given current rates of deforestation, up the 50 percent of the could be severely 
damaged by 2020, which places in danger the sustainability of the entire world. In this 
context, the Peruvian Amazon is critically important, representing the fourth largest 
country in tropical extension on Earth and has the second largest national Amazon region, 
after Brazil (Finer and Orta-Martinez  2010a, p. 1). It is clearly one of the most 
biodiverse regions on the planet, containing multiple species of birds, primates, 
amphibians, and plant life. Further, the Peruvian Amazon still contains large, contiguous 
areas of primary rainforest (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010b, p. 1).  
 More than 60 different groups of indigenous peoples live in the Amazon region of 
Peru, between 14 and 15 of which live in “voluntary isolation.” Given Peru’s biological 
and cultural diversity, the Peruvian Amazon currently has a vast system of 35 protected 
areas across the Peruvian Amazon. The desire to protect Peru’s rich biological and 
cultural diversity, according to several studies, are related. Given the role of indigenous 
peoples in protecting the forests, some have argued that the loss of cultural diversity 
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translates into a loss of biological diversity (Toledo 2001; Sobrevilla 2008). According to 
these studies, this is not simply because indigenous peoples are considered good stewards 
of the environment (i.e. the “noble savage” argument), but because as marginalized 
peoples they generally lack advanced technology and access to capital markets are less 
reluctant to over-consume, as in Western societies or cultures (See Finer and Otra-
Martínez 2010a, Toledo 2001, and Hames 2007). This dissertation specifically addresses 
the role of indigenous peoples in biodiversity protection and, more generally, in 
sustainable development policy in the Amazon region.  
Achieving a balance between indigenous peoples rights, natural resource 
development, and environmental sustainability, while certainly not a new issue, is now 
recognized as part of sound public policy surrounding natural resource development. The 
latest United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), for 
example, recognizes that “indigenous knowledge, culture and traditional practices 
contribute to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the 
environment.” In addition, as Loomis notes, not only good stewards of the environment, 
indigenous peoples’ holistic development perspectives might provide important insights 
into operationalizing sustainable development (2000, p. 893; Howarth 2007). In some 
parts of the world this is already happening. Fidler, for example, documents a case study 
in British Columbia, Canada where the Tahltan Nation is actively participating in 
environmental impact assessments (EIA) and negotiated agreements (NA), with the 
Canadian government and transnational mining companies and, as a result, they are 
producing more sustainable mining practices (2010, p. 234-244).   
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The case of hydrocarbon development in the Amazon region is an excellent 
opportunity to study the problem of operationalization of sustainable development 
policies and practices. For many reasons, governments often privilege short-term 
economic objectives over long-term sustainable development goals. Garcia’s argument, 
to be detailed throughout this dissertation, is that modern development in Peru cannot be 
detained because of outdated ideologies held by indigenous peoples and 
environmentalists, who at all costs will prevent the use of natural resources in the 
Amazon region to the detriment of the nation. Hydrocarbon development, in other words, 
is a means to development for the government, while indigenous peoples are obstacles. In 
fact, inscribed in the Peruvian Constitution, the state is obliged to promote hydrocarbon 
development for the “achievement of the wellbeing of the human being and for national 
development (Law No. 26221). This issue is not limited to Peru as the fluctuation of 
commodity prices, the advent of new technologies, and the increasing pressure to acquire 
needed resources for development purposes dictate that governments will increase their 
attempts to search for natural resources in indigenous territorial spaces (Ross 2004a, 
2004b, 2008, Schubert 2006).  
In terms of oil development, many argue that the majority of the world’s 
hydrocarbon resources have been discovered (the peak oil argument). Given the increase 
in world demand and consumption since the 20th century (China and India) and 
decreasing oil reservoirs, the potential for a peaking of conventional oil production 
increases the prospects for a world wide shortage of oil supply and, in turn, skyrocketing 
oil prices. To prevent a world wide crisis, the oil industry argues for major investments in 
new technologies and easier access to promising and remote territories. These territories, 
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often deemed as “commodity frontiers,” include regions like the Amazon rainforest, 
which, in relative terms, have remained largely unexplored for hydrocarbon resources. 
Consider the Peruvian Amazon. Peak oil was reached in 1979 (129,000 barrels/day) and 
since there has been a steady decline in oil extraction. However, the rise in oil prices in 
2003 to 2008 caused a “second oil exploration boom” that led to a significant increase in 
oil exploration and, most importantly, a re-evaluation of the Amazon region as an area of 
financial feasibility. As Finer and Orta-Martínez argue, as oil prices rise, more and more 
of the Peruvian Amazon is likely to be set aside for hydrocarbon exploration and 
exploitation in the future (2010a, p. 2).  
As this scenario indicates, government hydrocarbon policy will likely lead to 
increased conflict between indigenous peoples and the state in the Peruvian Amazon. 
Furthermore, as the government’s hydrocarbon policies are part of his larger development 
objectives, conflicts over natural resources will not be limited to hydrocarbon 
development projects. These conflicts must eventually be resolved. Furthermore, if 
sustainable development objectives are ever to be met, the resolution of these conflicts 
must be based on improved public policy that not only involves more desirable 
environmental outcomes, but includes indigenous demands and concerns. However, 
given the Peruvian government’s (colonial) history of natural resource development in 
the Amazon region, as stated, there is a need for an entirely new paradigm of resource 
extraction in indigenous regions. This dissertation argues that government’s approach to 
development has always been based on the need to pacify and, in a sense, “tame” the 
region for development. In this context, Amazonian peoples, seemingly always in the 
way of development or progress, have been subject to harsh and cruel labor practices, 
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they have been the object of Christian missionaries desires to “save” their souls, and 
currently they are seen as objects to Garcia’s plans to modernize Peru. This dissertation 
works toward a new development paradigm, one that is more humane and sustainable.  
Intellectual merit  
 
 While a significant piece of this dissertation advances the value of an alternative 
theoretical lens, the intellectual merit of this project is tied its practical application of the 
implementation of sustainable development policies. In a recent review of the literature 
on sustainable development, Jabareen notes that there is a “lack of a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for understanding sustainable development,” and that there is little 
agreement on how it might be translated into practice. In some cases, sustainable 
development is used as “symbolic rhetoric,” so that particular interests are able to utilize 
it to serve their own interests, rather than to create sound public policy (2008, p. 180). 
This kind of rhetoric is quite evident in the Peruvian case especially as it relates to the 
inclusion of indigenous peoples in the hydrocarbon development process. While this 
point will be explored in detail throughout the dissertation, my project is designed to fill 
what many scholars describe as an “implementation gap” between sustainable 
development objectives (including indigenous rights) and policy implementation.  
 This implementation gap is evident in the literature on development. It is 
important to note that the issue of development has been tackled from multiple 
perspectives, leading to an understanding that development is not only a contested 
concept (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, Peet and Hartwick 2009), but that actors 
understand the notion of development differently (Gow 2008, Wainwright 2008). 
However, while scholars have explored the multiple meanings of modern development, 
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little work has been done on the impact of these development notions on the formation 
and implementation of natural resource development policy. Much less work, 
furthermore, has been done that explains how these different development concepts affect 
the incidence of environmental conflict. In this case, how do distinct conceptualizations 
of development relate to Garcia’s misrepresentation of indigenous viewpoints on 
development? As such, the study of distinct visions of development opens up the 
potential to link critical theoretical discussions on development to practical policy 
solutions, thus, dealing with this implementation gap.  
 This project also seeks to fill a gap in the literature related to Peruvian indigenous 
social movements. The literature on indigenous social movements in Latin America tends 
to place Peru in the category of “weak” or “failed” indigenous movement, especially 
when compared to similar movements in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala.7 Peru, like 
these countries, has a significant indigenous population8 (40 percent or more), but has not 
developed large-scale national indigenous organizing. According to Yashar, despite a rich 
history of indigenous organizing and resistance, “Peru has experienced no comparable 
period of widespread indigenous movement organizing”9 (2005, p. 224). Equally, Van 
                                                
7 For an interesting discussion, and a recent PhD disseration, on weak indigenous 
movements and parties see Rice, Roberta Lynne (2006).  
8 According to the Economic Commission on Latin America, in 2000, there were 8.5 
million Peruvians that identified themselves as indigenous, which represents 32 per cent 
of the population. Some studies place the population much higher.  
9 Yashar describes the impact of organized guerrilla movements supported by large 
indigenous populations such as Sendero Luminoso and the Tupak Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement (MRTA), which were Marxist/Maoist-inspired, did not advance indigenous 
claims, and largely sought to eliminate indigenous identity (p. 224, 247; Also see Van 
Cott p. 151). Yashar explains weak indigenous movement in Peru as a result of the 
weakness of transcommunity networks and political associational space (p. 225). 
According to Van Cott (2005), weak movements were the result of the lack of resources 
to take advantage of a open political and institutional environment (p. 140).  
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Cott states that despite cases that resemble indigenous movements in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, “no viable ethnic party has emerged in Peru to represent the politically excluded 
population” (2005, p. 140; 2001). Brysk, also places indigenous movements in Peru in 
the category of weak movement, suggesting that the predominance of class-based 
identities, trumping ethnic ones, have led to policies that adversely affect indigenous 
peoples, including partly why the government has been able to open up the Amazon 
region to foreign national oil companies (2000, p. 268). In short, according to the 
majority of the literature, Peru has not developed a viable indigenous movement at a 
national level10 (see also Warren and Jackson 2002; Langer and Muñoz 2003). 
Interestingly, however, while the indigenous movement is portrayed weak at a 
national level, the indigenous movement in the Peruvian Amazon region is framed as a 
success at a regional (or subregional) level, where ethnic identities take a formidable role. 
Yashar, for example, describes the indigenous movement in the Peruvian Amazon as a 
“subnational variation,” arguing that the Amazon region has provided a regional enclave 
for indigenous organizing. Citing Dandler (1998), Yashar reports that up to 85 percent of 
indigenous peoples in the Amazon region are affiliated with organizations that belong to 
some type of ethnic federation (p. 251). Following the demographic patterns of Ecuador 
and Bolivia, the indigenous population in the Peruvian Amazon is relatively small, but 
extremely diverse. According to the latest census, there are at least 60 ethnic groups in 
                                                
10  There are scholars that disagree with this framing. For example, Garcia and Lucero, in 
“Un País sin Indígenas?: Rethinking Indigenous Politics in Peru,” argue that the Peruvian 
“failure” in more the result of “frameworks and models used by scholars and advocates of 
indigenous movements” rather than a precise description of the complexity of indigenous 
politics in Peru (2006, p. 158-159). Van Cott also contends that the “weakness” of a 
national indigenous movement in Peru is an exaggeration (2001, p. 143.) In personal 
interviews with indigenous peoples from the Amazon region, many, in fact, agreed that 
the indigenous movement nationally was an abject failure.  
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the region, approximately 333,000 indigenous individuals, which constitutes around nine  
percent of the Amazonian population. For Van Cott, indigenous peoples from the 
Amazon region have successfully been able to integrate these multiple ethnic 
communities in the region into a single, modern social movement organization (p. 158).  
Today, the Amazonian indigenous movement is grouped into two large 
decentralized federations: the Interethnic Association of Development for the Peruvian 
Amazon (AIDESEP) and the Confederations of Amazonian Nationalities (CONAP). 
AIDESEP is the more formidable organization, including fifty seven federations and 
territorial organizations, grouped into 16 linguistic families, which represent 1,350 
communities.11 According to Yashar, at one point, these federation could speak on behalf 
of 93 percent of all titled communities in the Peruvian Amazon (p. 251). AIDESEP was 
also instrumental in creating COICA (Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the 
Amazonian Basin) in 1984, which is a trans-regional indigenous organization made up of 
Amazonian indigenous organizations from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, the 
French and English Guayanas, Surinam, and Venezuela. As of 2002, CONAP, the 
relatively weaker organization, had approximately 35 affiliated federations (Van Cott 
2005, p. 159.)  
While the objective is not to challenge the existing literature on the “success” or 
“failure” of the Peruvian indigenous movement, this dissertation does highlight the 
remarkable success of the IMPA to impact development policies at the national level. 
This will be detailed throughout the dissertation, but here are a few important 
achievements that are worth mentioning here. The Amazonian protests of 2008 and 2009 
                                                
11 See AIDESEP’s website at http://www.aidesep.org.pe/index.php?id=2. Assessed 
January 2010.  
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pressured the Peruvian government (and the Congress) to repeal at least nine of the 
legislative decrees and certain “special projects” that, according to indigenous groups and 
legal experts, were in violation of ILO 169, the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights 
(2007) and several of Peru’s own constitutional provisions. These massive protests in the 
summers of 2008 and 2009 included the participation of thousands of Amazonian 
indigenous peoples, but also Andean indigenous groups, multiple NGOs (environmental, 
human rights, workers, church, etc.), and many other Peruvians, including some state 
institutions, that sympathized with the IMPA. Thus far the IMPA, with the help of 
multiple sectors of Peruvian society, has been able to repeal four of the most 
controversial decrees. Furthermore, the AIDESEP has (formally) entered into a strategic 
alliance with Andean indigenous peoples, which included the Peasant Confederation of 
Peru (CCP), the National Agrarian Federation (CAN), and the Confederation of Peasant 
Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), which could turn the Peruvian 
indigenous movement from a weak to a strong movement. According to Gerardo 
Rénique, the Amazonian uprising has “redrawn Peru’s political landscape” and “made the 




 The relative success of the IMPA, however, must be juxtaposed against the 
formidable challenge of decolonizing natural resource policy in Peru. As Anderson 
suggests, much of the work of decolonization is still pending. In this vein, the conflict 
between indigenous peoples and the Peruvian state (and the Garcia government), very 
much a product of history, continues to define indigenous-state relations today. As a 
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result, in spite of the IMPA’s successful protests, hydrocarbon and other natural resource 
development projects continue and, most importantly, indigenous peoples are still very 
much marginalized in Peru’s development policies. In other words, in spite of the 
IMPA’s recent success, the fundamental relationship of a dominant state and a colonized 
peoples remains intact.   
In this context, the objective of this project is to fully engage in the case of 
hydrocarbon development not only to explain government and indigenous perspectives 
on modern development, but to suggest alternative natural resource policy designs that 
work to change this relationship. The pathway towards this goal starts with the historical 
and institutional legacies of extractive development in the Peruvian Amazon and ends 
with policy recommendations that will advance alternative visions of development in 
Peru.  
Chapter II and III, drawing from neoinstitutional insights, establish the historical 
and institutional context of extractive development in the Amazon region of Peru. Similar 
to Migdal’s “state-in-society” approach, the idea here is to examine the Peruvian state 
within its social setting, to disaggregate the way that the state works to implement 
hydrocarbon development on indigenous territories, and then to rethink conceptual 
categories related to the state (Migdal 2001, p. 1). I argue that, in this case, it is necessary 
to examine the (long) history of extractive development in the Amazon region, which 
demonstrates that, in fact, there is much continuity between the historical legacies of 
extractive development and the current natural resource development regime in place 
today. Moreover, as these two chapters argue, the modern institutions surrounding 
hydrocarbon development are a product of the historical relationship between the state 
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and the Amazon region, where the state has historically envisioned the region as space 
for national development. This, of course, has had a profound impact on the lives of 
indigenous peoples living in the region.  
Chapter II focuses on the history of extractive development in the Amazon region, 
especially as it relates to the institutions surrounding “modern” development and their 
impact on indigenous peoples. More specifically, this chapter explains the fundamental 
tension between “modern” development and indigenous territorial rights, which began 
with the first colonial encounters between Europeans and Amazonian peoples and, in 
many respects, continues to define the relationship between indigenous peoples and the 
state. Crucially, the institutions that regulate modern development today in the region are 
the product of this very tension and largely explain why indigenous peoples are still 
marginalized and excluded from Peru’s natural resource policy regime today. Again, the 
emergence of these institutions is the result of a (historic) national agenda that has 
permanently envisioned the Amazon region as an empty space for “modern” 
development.  
 Chapter III, also based on a neoinstitutional approach, examines the Garcia 
government’s development agenda in the Amazon region, focusing on the institutions 
that are responsible for implementing hydrocarbon development and, critically, on the 
impact that hydrocarbon development has had on indigenous territorial spaces and on the 
environmental sustainability of the region. Again, drawing from Migdal’s insights that 
argue for a “disaggregation of states as objects of study,” here one is able to explain how 
Peru’s institutional framework to implement hydrocarbon development is part of Peru’s 
colonial legacies that emphasize extractive development. In this context, though Garcia’s 
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policies are consistent with a neoliberal agenda, in reality, they are simply an extension of 
Peru’s colonial development logic. This disaggregation, as Migdal argues, then permits a 
rethinking of conceptual categories related to the state (Migdal et. Al. 1994).  
 In this context, chapter III details how this colonial logic, based on the notion that 
the Amazon region is an “empty” space for national development, explains a history of 
indigenous marginalization from Peru’s development policies in the region. As the IMPA 
argues, this development logic has led not only to the progressive deterioration of 
indigenous territorial rights, but has created policies that place at risk the environment 
sustainability of the region. This chapter explains how the current institutional framework 
to implement hydrocarbon policies on indigenous territorial spaces, in reality, works to 
marginalize indigenous peoples from the entire decision-making process of hydrocarbon 
development. In some ways it is remarkable how the Peruvian state, on the one hand, 
claims to regulate the social and environmental impacts of hydrocarbon development, 
yet, on the other hand, violates indigenous rights to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) 
(established in ILO 169) and undermines the necessary safeguards to protect the 
environmental integrity of the region.     
Chapter IV explains the indigenous response to the government’s development 
agenda and to hydrocarbon policies in the region. In this chapter, using the social 
movement literature, I detail the emergence of the IMPA, demonstrate the importance of 
indigenous conceptualizations of territory, which I argue are the main thread for 
understanding the motives (and identity) of the indigenous movement today, and engage 
in thorough discussion of the IMPA.  
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I look specifically at the protests of 2008 and 2009, detailing the tactics and 
actions to confront the government’s hydrocarbon development polices.  
 Chapter V introduces, in detail, modernity/coloniality as an alternative theoretical 
lens, which I argue explains the government’s development approach and details why the 
government misrepresents indigenous perspectives on development. Here, moving 
towards a possible decolonization of natural resource policy, I suggest ways in which an 
alternative development policy notion of decoloniality is expressed in indigenous society 
and in the IMPA. Decoloniality, I argue, challenges Eurocentric development and reveals 
a more sustainable approach to modern development.  
Chapter VI examines some of the current obstacles and political opportunities to 
advance indigenous development goals in Peru as well as ways in which the state might 
begin the process of decolonization of the natural resource policy regime in Peru. Here I 
will examine the current political landscape, suggesting possibilities and opportunities to 
change the laws and practices that might affect indigenous autonomy in the making and 
implementation of development policies. I will also look specifically at some of the work 
in which the indigenous movement is currently engaged as suggest opportunities, 
roadblocks, and leverage points in the policy system that might advance indigenous 
goals.   
Methodology (research design)  
 
 This research is based on a single, in-depth case study that provides a detailed 
examination of the conflict between indigenous peoples and the state over hydrocarbon 
development in the Peruvian Amazon. Peters (1998) defines a case study as “anytime a 
researcher investigates a single instance of a phenomena within a single setting,” the 
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boudaries of which are notoriously “fuzzy” (p. 142). Gerring generally describes a case 
study as an in-depth study of a relatively bounded phenomena, where scholars arte able to 
say something about a larger phenomena. In this context, a case study “is an intensive 
study of a single unit for the purposes of understanding a large class of (similar units)” 
(Gerring 2004, p. 342). Following this methodology, I will use this case to understand the 
broader theoretical context of relations between indigenous peoples and states in Latin 
America. More specifically, this case, “a single case study” about hydrocarbon 
development can be used to better understand cases related to other extractive 
development (i.e. mining and logging) and other cases about indigenous social 
movements throughout Latin America.  
Much of the fieldwork was carried out on several trips to the Amazon region in 
2007 and 2008. I engaged in participant observation in several meetings (and workshops) 
with indigenous groups (federations, regional organizations, and village-level 
organizations); conducted a series of  interviews (structured, semi-structured, and 
individual, and group) with indigenous leaders, environmental activists, human rights 
leaders, and others; and carried out an extensive revision of a wide range of documents 
(policy statements, public pronouncements, newspaper articles, internet sites, etc.). As 
participant observer, I also traveled to Houston, Texas to study an indigenous protest of a 
government-organized promotional event to market Peru’s hydrocarbon investment 
opportunities.  
 It is also important to note that the conceptualization of this dissertation stems 
from nearly three years of working directly with indigenous peoples of the Ucayali region 
of the Peruvian Amazon. As a representative of the Fort Collins-based NGO, Village 
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Earth, I have taken several trips to the region, where I have conducted participatory 
development workshops, helped to facilitate the making of a participatory-documentary 
of the Shipibo, and worked with several development organizations to help the Shipibo 
deal with some of their most pressing needs. In 2008, on a Colorado State University 
research grant (the Gardner Travel Grant), I traveled to the region to conduct interviews 
with indigenous leaders, Peruvian NGOs, university professors, and others involved 
directly in the present conflict over hydrocarbon development in the region.  
Defining “indigenous peoples”  
 
 Throughout this dissertation, to the extent that it is possible, I use “indigenous 
peoples” to describe the “original” Amazonian peoples of Peru. With José Martínez-
Cobo, the special rapporteur of the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, I rely (or agree) on the following definition: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit 
to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identities, as the 
basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.12  
 
This definition, consistent with ILO 169 and the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights, 
importantly states that indigenous peoples are “indigenous” because of the historical 
experience of colonization. In Latin America, indigenous peoples are members of “non-
dominant” sectors of society precisely because of the violent process of colonization, 
which not only dispossessed people of their land, but marginalized them as distinct (and 
inferior) cultures. It is therefore recognized that implicit in the term “indigenous,” largely 
                                                
12 This definition can be found at http://www.iwgia.org/sw310.asp.   
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a political concept, is the notion of self-identification as an oppressed group that is 
immersed in a struggle for self-determination (ECLAC 2006, p. 156).13  
 I also conscientiously use, when appropriate, the term indigenous peoples, as 
opposed to indigenous people (without the “s”). As Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues in 
Decolonizing Methodologies, the term peoples is related to the right of peoples to self-
determination, which also emphasizes that there are differences within the indigenous 
collective (Tuhivai Smith, p. 7). This is especially relevant in the Peruvian Amazon 
where there are more than sixty ethnic groups. In this dissertation, therefore, indigenous 
peoples (with the “s”) is meant to refer to the possibility of multiple indigenous groupings 
(i.e. Shipibo, Asháninka, Ashéninka, Machiguenga, Piro, Bora, Achuar, etc.). Although it 
is sometimes redundant, I try to stick with the term “indigenous” as opposed to “Indian” 
or “native,” given that for some indigenous people these are pejorative terms. In this case, 
given that the Peruvian government defines indigenous peoples from the Amazon region 
as “natives,” the use of “native” peoples is sometimes difficult to avoid.  
                                                
13 In nearly all Latin American countries, “self-definition” is the principle criteria for 
establishing indigenous identity in censuses between 1970 and 2000 (ECLA, p. 158).  
32 
 
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF EXTRACTIVE 
AND HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT IN PERU 
 
Underlying this dream of tropical development, there is the classical political notion that 
the social and economic problems at home can be conveniently dealt with through the 
conquest of new territories. To justify this conquest, an official myth is created which 
demonstrates the existence of a vast, bountiful, productive, empty territory⎯the Amazon 
Basin⎯which awaits the enterprising individuals to settle it and harvest its riches.” 




This chapter examines the historical and institutional context of extractive 
development in the Peruvian Amazon region and explains how Amazonian indigenous 
peoples have been marginalized in and excluded from Peru’s national development 
policies. The story of indigenous resistance to extractive development in the Peruvian 
Amazon dates back to the first encounters between European colonists (and conquerors) 
and Amazonian peoples. The tension between colonial attempts to extract natural 
resources in the Amazon region for the benefit of “National Development” against 
indigenous peoples’ desires to protect the territorial spaces where they live is the main 
thread that still today continues to define relations between indigenous peoples and the 
state. The institutions that surround extractive development in the Amazon region emerge 
from this very tension. Consequently, in order to understand the present conflict between 
the Indigenous Movement in the Peruvian Amazon (IMPA) and the Garcia government it 
is necessary to examine the history of extractive development in the region and the 




This chapter draws on insights from Migdal’s state-in-society framework in a two 
important ways. First, Migdal helps to understand the key relationship between the image 
of a state and state practices. Here he defines the state as  
a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the 
image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a 
representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices 
of its of multiple parts (Migdal 2001, p. 16).  
 
The key conceptual distinction here is the image of a state placed against the actual 
practices of the state. The image reflects the state’s (Weberian) character as a dominant, 
integrated, and autonomous entity that controls the population of a given territory, 
whereas the practices of the state reflect the actual performance or action of state 
agencies and actors.  
 This chapter, thus, pays close attention to the relation between the image of the 
Peruvian colonial state and the actual practices that colonial institutions performed in the 
Peruvian Amazon. In the Amazon region, this relation between image and practice is 
especially important for indigenous peoples who were often victims of colonial practices 
that were based on the need to extract resources for development purposes. Undoubtedly, 
these practices, reinforced  indigenous peoples’ image of the state as an exploitative 
entity. Migdal, in this context, writes that state practices sometimes reinforce the 
“mythicized abstraction” of the state (Foucault’s notion of govermentality), but at other 
times state practices “batter the image of a controlling state” (Migdal 2001, p. 18-19.) 
This approach, therefore, enables one to negotiate the boundary (often fuzzy) between 
state and society, which is inherently complex. In the Amazon region, the relationship 
between practices and image is important because, while the state never gave up the 
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mission of colonizing the region (i.e. exploiting its natural resources), the practices that it 
employed to achieve that end changed quite radically.   
 Secondly, the state-in-society framework suggests that it is important to 
disaggregate states as objects of study. Given that states must be studied in the social 
contexts, Migdal writes that “it is important to study not only the peak organizations of 
states and key social groups, often located at the center of the polity in the capital city, 
but also state-society interactions at the periphery” (Migdal et Al. 1994, p. 3). This 
insight is critically important in this chapter given that, in the Amazon region, extractive 
development, especially in the colonial era, occurred precisely at the periphery of state-
society relations. This is, in part, because of Amazonian resistance to the state’s endless 
colonization attempts, but also because it reveals the specific ways in which the state, in 
the name of extractive development, interacted with (and exploited) indigenous peoples. 
More importantly, given that this dissertation consists of the study of state hydrocarbon 
policy, it is crucial to examine (historically) the institutions that are responsible for 
carrying out hydrocarbon development.  
Extractive development in the Amazon region: the “the myth of emptiness”  
 
From the perspective of the Spanish crown, the Amazon region was a space to 
extract wealth, gain prestige, and save souls. Historically the “jungle” region has been 
associated with the idea of an empty, uncivilized space, inhabited by “wild Indians.”14 
However, for Europeans, the process of colonizing the Amazon region was difficult and 
complicated, due in large part to a history of indigenous resistance, which kept the 
                                                
14 Peter Gow (1993) in “Gringos and Wild Indians Images of History in Western 
Amazonian Cultures” discusses the imagery of the “wildness and savagery” that the 
region and its peoples took on. Much of this history was written by missionaries and 
travel writers, who have obviously influenced this imagery.  
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Amazon region generally free from European domination until the rubber boom in the 
late 1800s. This relative isolation undoubtedly reinforced preconceptions of the Amazon 
as an empty space, inhabited by uncivilized, inferior peoples.15 
Early attempts at European colonization (as early as 1538) fuelled by the 
prospects of gold (el Dorado)16 for the most part failed due to indigenous resistance. 
According to historical accounts, indigenous peoples from the Amazon region (both the 
foothills and the lowlanders), were interested in trade with European (especially iron 
tools), but when Spanish settlers or missionaries attempted to colonize them, either 
through economic control (via slavery) or religious control, indigenous peoples strongly 
resisted.  Taylor describes this process at the southern foothills of the Andes:  
All along the southern frontier, the Indians tolerated new settlements with the 
hope of forcing the Spaniards into unequal trading relations, as they had done 
with the Inca17, and thereby obtaining iron tools. But as soon as the whites tried to 
enslave natives or push them back toward the interior, they were immediately 
expelled and frontier trade turned into pillage” (p. 209).  
 
                                                
15 See Taylor (1999) for an interesting discussion on the influence of academia in this 
separation between Andes and Amazonian peoples (196).  
16 According to Taylor, the first attempts to colonize the Amazonian region were 
motivated by gold prospecting (209) in the Zamora Valley and the Condor massif. 
According to Reeve (1993), the Diaz de Pinera in 1538-39 carried out an expedition in 
search of gold and cinnamon, to be followed by Francisco Orellano, to went down the 
Napo to the mouth of the Amazon in 1540-42 (114). According to Santos Granero and 
Barclay (1998), in the north  (Jaen de Bracamoros) was founded in 1536 and Santiago de 
los Ochos Valles de Moyobamba was founded in 1540 and San Juan de Oro between 
1540 and 1553 (p. 15).  
17 Indigenous groups from the Amazon region had, to a large, degree successfully resisted 
the encroachment of the Inca empire into Amazonian land, which represents a source of 
pride for many indigenous Amazonian peoples today.  
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This pattern of resistance was consistent throughout the region: Amazonian peoples were 
interested in trade, as they had with the Incas, but as soon as they sensed white 
colonization attempts, they fought to protect their territorial spaces.18  
In spite indigenous resistance, however, Spanish attempts at colonization of the 
region gradually took place from about 1537 until the rubber boom in the early twentieth 
century when a much more intense colonization process occurred. Based on extractive 
development, the first “successful” attempts at European colonization of the Amazon 
region were undertaken in the northeastern region between 1540 and 1580, surrounding 
the Marañón river basin, much of which is currently Ecuador. In this era, perhaps the 
most important colonial practice was the distribution of encomiendas. In this region, 
hundreds of encomiendas were distributed, bringing in a substantial influx of immigrants 
to the region.19 Taylor describes this “high level of colonization,” marked by “squalid and 
ephemeral boom towns” that likely resembled the garampiros of present day Brazil. 
These initial colonizers set the stage for what would represent a historical pattern of 
extractive development based on plundering, slaving, and the search for unfound riches 
(p. 211).  
The defining feature of the colonial economic model at this moment was the 
extraction of the region’s natural resources through colonial practices that were based on 
                                                
18 According to Reeves, the earliest recorded revolts in the region occurred in response to 
forced encomiendas led by Quijos shaman-caciques in 1579 in the northeastern Napo 
region. The Spanish, in this case, responded forcefully by capturing the leaders, taken 
them to Quito, where they were publicly tortured and hanged. Reeves writes about the 
constant indigenous responses to slave raiding in the Marañon region, where indigenous 
groups attacked Spanish towns. Between 1595 and 1615, accordingly, much of area was 
characterized by intermittent and hostile contact with the Spanish (p. 115) 
19 Reeves describes Spanish colonization of the upper Hualla area in 1537 and other sites 
of early Spanish colonization in the Napo region in the 1560s (p. 114).  
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the harsh exploitation of indigenous labor. In the first years of contact (1538-1628) 
between Amazonian peoples and the Spanish, which produced Spanish towns along the 
base of the Andes (the moñtana or frontier region), indigenous populations were either 
forced into the encomienda system or were subject to constant slave raids. As Reeves 
alludes, during this period indigenous peoples came into contact with “explorers, soldiers, 
traders, slavers, and colonists bent on exploiting their labor” (Reeves 1993, p. 116-118).   
The practice of distributing encomiendas was the foundation for the modern 
hacienda system in the Amazon. Different from in the Andes, in the Amazon the 
encomienda was designed to control indigenous labor. To be sure, colonists needed 
indigenous labor to extract natural resources, but indigenous peoples in the Amazon 
region were nomadic. Colonists either were forced to follow indigenous groups or to 
secure a land base. As a result, encomenderos and missionaries began to appropriate large 
areas of territory from where they were able to control and exploit indigenous labor.  
Taylor comments: 
The encomienda thus turned into a highly flexible, and hence durable, cover 
institution for the control of native labor, and many of the forms of exploitation 
developed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries⎯the reparto system, the 
hacienda, and the outright or barely disguised slavery that resurfaced during the 
rubber boom⎯were in fact initially experimented with in the framework of the 
Amazonian ecomienda (Taylor 1999, p. 214). 
 
The origins of the modern hacienda system, therefore, were based on highly exploitative 
practices in a quest to extract region’s natural resources.  
For indigenous peoples, the Christian missions did provided refuge against slave 
raids and the entire system of exploitative and dehumanizing labor. In fact, the 
exploitative nature of the colonial system, exposed by Bartolomé de las Casas, led to a 
new law, Ordenanzas sobre nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones (Statue on New 
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Discoveries and Settlements), which established in 1573 “peaceful means” as the most 
efficient and effective means for both conversion and colonization (Santos-Granero and 
Barclay 1998, p. 19). None of this, of course, ended the slaving raids (or slavery in 
general), but it did lead many indigenous peoples to turn to the missionaries as a form of 
protection against slave raids and the abuses of the encomienda system.  
However, the missionaries, even if they did provide some refuge for indigenous 
peoples, were directly tied to the extractive colonial system and, in reality, employed 
equally exploitative practices designed to control indigenous labor. In order to support 
themselves economically, for instance, missionaries engaged in salt, coca, and other 
extractive enterprises, which relied on indigenous labor. According to Taylor, for 
example, the role of the missions was to set the groundwork for the establishment of 
colonial institutions by “indoctrinating the Indians in the pedagogic virtues of work and 
riding them of their habits of ‘laziness,’ the root of their condition as savages” (1999, p. 
219). Put differently, whereas the missions may have provided refuge, they engaged in a 
distinct colonial practice, one that was based on the conversion of indigenous peoples 
into Christian subjects so that they could become productive workers. In short, the 
missions became an integral part of a colonial economic system based on exploitation of 
indigenous labor and control of natural resources (Reeves 1993; Santos-Granero and 
Barclay 1998, 2000; Taylor 1999).  
There were multiple attempts at establishing missionary conventions throughout 
the region (most unsuccessful)20, but the Jesuits and the Franciscans dominated the 
                                                
20 According to Reeves, in one of the earliest missionary attempts, the Augustinians 
accompanied Diego de Vega in the first attempt to colonize the lowlands east of the 
Andes in 1618 (p. 116). According to Sanchez Majin, the Augustinians made an attempt 
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process after 163521 until the Jesuits were expelled in 1768. While these missionary 
attempts did not create, as the Jesuits hoped, a nation of indigenous Christians22, they 
were able to establish many missionary villages along the major rivers. Described by 
Santos-Granero and Barclay as a “semi-forced concentration in mission posts,” the 
missionaries were obsessed with concentrating and settling indigenous populations in one 
spot (1998, p. 26). This, eventually, led to the creation of villages, towns, and haciendas 
that were heavily influenced by European political, social, economic, and cultural traits 
that in many ways continue to define indigenous Amazonian communities (Taylor 1999, 
p. 225-226).  
It is also important to mention that demographically indigenous peoples were 
devastated by the spread of epidemics of European origin. Here is the case of the 
“relatively successful” Jesuit mission in Mainas. Taylor describes the effects:  
The Jesuits determination to make their victims live in villages on the banks of 
great rivers, thereby exposing them to the full fury of the epidemics that hit the 
mission at least once a generation, as well as a very low birth rate and high 
endemic mortality rate linked to psychological stress, unhealthy living conditions, 
and malaria, all help to explain why the population in the missions region fell 
from some 200,000 in 1550 to 20,000 or 30,000 in 1730 (1999, p. 225).  
 
Indicative of a general pattern throughout the region, in the Central Selva measles, 
smallpox, and influenza hit the mission populations, where in 1709, 1711, 1713, 1715, 
                                                                                                                                            
in 1568, the mercedarios  in 1572 to 1650, the Jesuits from 1650 to 1768, the Dominicans 
from 1768 to 1798, the Franciscans from 1750 to 1821 (p. 1-2).   
21 Santos Granero and Barclay describe the process in the following way: the process 
from 1635 to 1742. The archbishop of Lima visited the city of Huánuco in 1626, where 
he baptized the chief of the Panatahua. This led to a succession of events that led to the 
missionary advance of the Amazonian frontier. In 1631, the Franciscans took on the task 
of converting indigenous peoples in the Huallaga basin. In 1635 the Franciscans entered 
the Selva Central via the Pozuzo River, later extending to Huánuco, Tarma, and Juaja (p. 
27).  
22 Taylor writes about the Jesuit desire to form a completely autonomous “Republic of 
Indians” (p. 227).  
40 
 
1718, 1721-1724 and 1736 – 1737 outbreaks with decimated entire populations, 
especially children (Santos-Granero and Barclay, 1998 p. 27).  
Given these dire implications, it is not surprising that indigenous peoples resisted 
missionary life.23 In many cases, indigenous peoples were initially attracted to the 
mission given that they provided food, shelter, and especially “modern” iron tools, which, 
considered by indigenous peoples as something that could improve their lives, were often 
used to lure native peoples into the missions. However, after time, many indigenous 
peoples found life in missions intolerable, not only because of the association of mission 
outposts with disease, but, given the imposition of daily life based on a rigid division of 
time and labor, it was for many what Brown and Fernandez describe as a negation of the 
“essence of Amazonian life” and a violation of their personal liberty.  One indigenous 
runaway told a Jesuit priest that he ran away “so as not to endure many things such as 
asking for permission all the time for every little thing…and not to suffer my children 
being taken away by the priests such as you, so that I have not company when I walk in 
the forest because my children are in the convent” (Brown and Fernández 1991, p. 29-
30). 
One of the most successful cases of indigenous resistance was that of Juan Santos 
Atahualpa, who in 1742 effectively ended Spanish presence in the Central Selva for 
nearly a century.  In a move against the monarch and the religious missions, Juan Santos 
declared himself the “true” Inca, descendent of Atahualpa, and manifested that he would 
expel the Spaniards and reestablish the Inca Kingdom throughout Peru.  Educated in a 
                                                
23 In “rebeliones nativas en la amazonia peruana,” Dávila describes the process of 
indigenous resistance from 1579 to 1603, where in major and multiple rebellions 
occurred throughout the Amazonian region (1980).   
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Jesuit seminary, Juan Santos was not anti-Christian, declaring that he would put an end to 
the abuses of the Spanish overlords and the missionaries so that Indians could propagate 
their own version of Christianity (Brown and Fernández 1999, p. 44). The rebellion was 
supported by many indigenous groups throughout the Amazon region (especially the 
central region), where Ashánikas, Piro, Amuesha, Conibo, Shipibo, Yashena, and even 
some mestizos provided support (Brown and Ferdández 1999, Santos Granados and 
Barclay 1998). Pursuing an aggressive campaign against the Spanish, Juan Santos in fact 
startled the Spanish in a series of military defeats. Within ten years, according to Varse, 
all of the traditional territories of the Ashánika, Piro, and Yanesha peoples had returned 
to native control (from Brown and Fernández, p. 49).  
 The rebellion of Juan Santos provides a glimpse of how throughout history 
indigenous peoples were willing to resist the forced imposition of European culture and 
the extractive development model. The degree to which this rebellion is etched in the 
colonial memory amongst indigenous peoples in the region is debatable24, however, this 
story is part of a long history of the colonizers failure to understand indigenous peoples 
resistance, not simply to “modernity,” but more specifically to colonial attempts at the 
Europeanization of indigenous peoples. However, it was also an example, albeit brief, of 
a successful effort at indigenous decolonization. As Brown and Fernández explain, for 
many years,25 the Spanish were worried that the movement might spread to the Andes 
region and therefore gave up on an aggressive reconquest of the central jungle. 
                                                
24 Brown and Fernández (1991) discuss the indigenous legacy of Juan Santos, especially 
among Asháninka stories.  
25 Drinot writes that after the rebellion of Santos Atahualpa the jungle was sealed to 
outside intervention for a century of more (2000, p. 170).  
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Discouraged by the success of the rebellion, one friar explained in particularly racist 
terms:  
The damages caused by Juan Santos Atahualpa with his rebellion were 
innumerable….. One of the worst was that the native returned again to his 
primitive state of fierceness and savagery (Brown and Fernández 1991, 52). .  
 
The Franciscans, obviously dejected, were not able establish a stable mission among the 
Ashánika until the mid-nineteenth century.  
The rubber boom and the Peruvian state in Amazonia 
  
In the late 1800s and early 1900s the Peruvian state, as an independent 
Republican state (1821), made if first major attempt to control, dominate, and colonize 
the Peruvian Amazon. In many ways, this period laid the foundations for the modern 
development model for the region, which continued to rely on the natural resource 
exploitation. The rubber boom was foreshadowed by a renewed interest of the state to 
colonize the region, marked by a “modernist” or “frontierism” zeal of the nineteenth 
century. It was also the period when the most brutal practices were employed to extract 
rubber. This left a mark on the entire region and, undeniably, reinforced Amazonian 
peoples’ image of the state as an exploitative entity. Set on exploring and rediscovering 
the Amazon region, the government sponsored exploratory expeditions designed to chart 
the area, describe the navigatibility of the rivers and tributaries, and document the extent 
of indigenous populations in the region.26 This was preceded by several “pacifying” 
                                                
26 In 1867, for example, Peru created the Amazon Hydrographic Commission, 
administered under the Ministry of War and Navy, to chart the major northern and 
southern tributaries of the Marañon and Amazon rivers. (Santo Granero and Barclay 
2000, p. 170-171). In a similar vein, the Sociedad Geográfica de Lima, founded in 1884, 
had set out to map the country’s natural resources, venturing into the “unexplored” 
Amazonian rivers and some of the highest peaks in the Andes (Drinot 2000, p. 155).  
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missions to the jungle, which, according to Drinot, would lay the foundations for the 
violence that marked the rationale of natural resource extraction (p. 170).   
In this context, the government in 1800s began to create an institutional 
framework that would facilitate a policy for control and state occupation of Amazonian 
territories. In 1845 President Ramón Castilla passed a law that was designed to colonize 
the region. Amazonian lands were offered to nationals and foreigners to “civilize” 
indigenous populations and colonize the region. Indigenous people could, thus, remain on 
the land if it was properly cultivated and, if desired, it could be sold to more enterprising 
individuals. In 1893, the Law of Immigration and Colonization was passed to encourage 
only white people, mostly foreigners, to colonize the region. The Organic Law of 
Mountain Lands and the General Law of Mountain Lands (Nº1220), passed in 1889 and 
1909, respectively, were again designed to provide Amazonian lands to nationals and 
foreigners for commercial purposes in order to pay to foreign debt or “services to the 
country.” These laws, which declared that the state is the owner of all Amazonian lands, 
as The International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWIGIA) argues, did not 
even recognize the existence of Amazonian indigenous peoples as humans. Importantly, 
these laws were not overturned in the Amazon region until 1974, when the first 
significant attempts to create a legal framework for indigenous territorial rights took 
place (IWGIA 1995, p. 32-33; see Hunefelt 2004, p. 209).27   
The rubber boom, however, was largely determined by international events and 
markets. Originally used to produce raincoats and rubber shoes in the 1830s, the 
                                                
27 In Spanish, Ley Orgánica de Tierras de Montaña and la Ley General de Tierras de 
Montaña. In addition to this, Simon Bolivar, via the decree of 1824, pushed for the 




discovery of the vulcanization process, which made rubber resistant to temperature 
changes and thus could be used to produce pneumatic tires (automobiles, bicycles, etc), 
led to an increased world demand for rubber. Consumption in the US rose from 400 tons 
in 1850 to between 50,000 and 60,000 tons in 1900. During this period, the Amazon 
region was producing nearly 50 percent of world rubber, creating a “rubber-rush” similar 
to the gold rushes in many parts of the world (Drinot, p. 171; Thorp and Bertram 1978, p. 
67; Klarén 2000, p. 211). This, along with the opening up of the steam navigation, first in 
Brazil, then later in Peru, led to the internationalization of the rubber industry, and to 
highly exploitative labor practices that would characterize the region for years to come. 
An example of this was the rapid rise of the city of Iquitos, a tiny fishing village with 
only 200 people in 1851, that had grown to 20,000 inhabitants by WWI (Klaren 2000, p. 
211).   
Drinot describes a change in logic of rubber extraction with the increasing prices 
of rubber around the turn of the century.  In the early years (before the 1890s), rubber, 
like other natural resources (i.e. zazarparrilla, quinine, plants for medicinal purposes) was 
extracted for the local economy and, to a certain extent, represented an extension of a 
regional economic trading system. However, as the international demand increased in the 
late 1800s, rubber barons like Fitcarrald and Arana, who were seen as national heroes in 
Peru, began to dominate the industry. This led to the participation of foreign merchant 
houses, backed by international banks, who began to take control of the 
commercialization of rubber. By the 1900s, large foreign companies began to arrive, the 
two most important being the Inca Rubber Company, an offshoot of the U.S.-owned Inca 
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Mining Company, and Peruvian Amazon Company, backed by British interests28 (Drinot 
2000, p. 171).  
Given the economic potential of the industry, in the late 1890s the government of 
Peru made an attempt to regulate the industry. In 1898 it passed a law that would grant 
land concessions to rubber companies in exchange for a lease and a royalty on the rubber 
produced. The government also regulated the practice of cutting down trees to extract 
rubber. In spite of these changes, however, the industry remained an industrial relic. 
Described by Thorp and Bertram as “wild rubber” producers (in both South America and 
Africa), rather than establish rubber plantations as they did in Far East British colonies, in 
the Amazon region, workers simply collected rubber from scattered wild rubber trees 
throughout the jungle (1978, p. 67). As Drinot argues, foreign enterprises were never 
capable of implementing a “capitalist mode of production” in the jungle and breaking the 
“patron-client” relations that characterized the rubber industry in Peru (2000, p. 172).  
“Patron-client” relations, however, do not adequately describe the violent and 
dehumanizing labor practices that characterized of the rubber economy. In reality, rubber 
extraction was based on an institutionalized racially-marked social hierarchy29 that 
exploited indigenous peoples in horrific ways.  For Hvalkof, these “systems of labor” 
were in reality “systems of slavery.” Due to the rapid expansion in demand for rubber on 
the world market, initially, there was always a chronic shortage of labor, which made the 
ability to control workers critical (2000, p.88-89). While there were several ways to 
                                                
28 The Peruvian Amazon Company was founded by Julio C. Arana in 1904.  
29 Gow describes the hierarchical system, where at the top were the white major rubber 
barons like Carlos Fitzcarrald and others. Below them were other whites, often called 
“lieutenants.” And below them came the workers, who were either called peons or mozos 
(mostly indigenous workers), that were involved in transport or rubber protection (p. 41) 
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control labor, the most common was the aviamento or habilitación system, which was 
based on a hierarchical chain of debt. In this system, cash played no part as all 
transactions took place through the creation and cancellation of debt. The large 
commercial houses, financed by U.S. or European companies, would facilitate goods to 
an aviado, or supplier, who would then advance those goods to a cauchero, or rubber 
boss, who would pass on goods to workers in exchange for rubber (Gow 1991, p. 39).  
The most notorious example of widespread, systemic violence, terror, and torture 
as a means to secure indigenous labor is in the Putumayo case in a region that borders 
Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. In 1907, two young American travelers30 exposed the 
horrific practices of the Peruvian Company Casa Arana, owned by the London-based 
Peruvian Amazon Company (Hvalkof, p. 93-94). Their revelations created an 
international scandal and forced a full investigation by the British government. In 
Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (1987), a powerful narrative of colonial 
exploitation of indigenous peoples, Michael Taussig quotes the lead British investigator, 
Roger Casement, who encapsulates the violence that indigenous peoples faced during this 
particular period (1908-1912):  
The number of Indians killed either by starvation⎯often purposely brought about 
by the destruction of crops over whole districts or inflicted as a form of death 
penalty on individuals who failed to bring in their quota of rubber⎯or by 
deliberate murder by bullet, fire, beheading, or flogging to death, and 
accompanied by variety of atrocious tortures, during the course of those 12 years, 
                                                
30 Walter Hardenburg and W.B. Perkins, working as railway engineers in the Cauca 
valley of southern Colombia in 1907. They quit their jobs to do some traveling 
throughout the region. Traveling down the Putumayo region, they ran into the Casa 
Arana operations. At this precise moment the company, who had been awarded a land 
concession in the region, was engaged in a violent raid of  an indigenous village in the 
region. The two North Americans were taken captive by the company, but managed to 




in order to extort these 4,000 tons of rubber, cannot have been less than 30,000 
and possibly came to many more (from Taussig 1987, p. 20).   
 
Whereas this only represents only one example, it is important not to underestimate the 
degree to which these practices were based on exploitation, terror, and dehumanization of 
indigenous communities. As mentioned, many of these methods of exploitation existed 
until the 1980s, when indigenous organizations uncovered modern day examples of 
indentured servitude.31  
 Similar to any “boom and bust” economy, the rubber economy in the Amazon 
region ended as quickly as it began. Although the production of rubber reached its high 
point in 1912, by that time rubber plantations in the Far East British colonies (Ceylon, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia) were rapidly increasing their production levels and would soon 
replace the “wild rubber producers” of the Peruvian Amazon.  The plantations increased 
production to meet the world’s demand for rubber, drastically lowering its price and 
making wild rubber production uneconomic. According to Thorp and Rosemary, by the 
1920s the South American countries, which depended on wild rubber producing, had all 
but disappeared from the world rubber scene (1978, p. 68).32  
                                                
31 For a powerful narrative of examples of modern day slavery in the Ucayali region of 
Peru see Garcia-Hierro, Hvalkov and Gray’s Liberation through Land Rights in the 
Peruvian Amazon (1998). Discussing the events in the Atalaya region, Garcia-Hierro 
provides powerful testimonies of indigenous peoples who worked as slaves for timber 
companies and individual families as late as 1986. The role of AIDESEP (la Asociación 
Indígena de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana) was critical in exposing the “hidden” 
practices of outright slavery.  
32 Drinot provides some interesting statistics on the decline of the rubber industry: Peru’s 
share of the world rubber production fell from 2.4% in 1910 to .05% in 1925. Rubber 
exports by value fell 87% in 1920-25 and by 64% in 1925-30 (p. 173).  
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 Thorp and Bertram point argue that rubber industry, like other extractive 
industries, does not always benefit the local or national economy. The profits from rubber 
typically benefit a small elite:   
[t]he central fact about the rubber boom of the 1890s and 1900s is that it had very 
little effect indeed on the remainder of the Peruvian economy, except in so far as 
high profits in rubber influenced the expectations of politicians and businessmen 
concerning the future of the region” (1978 p. 69).  
 
While the rubber boom did turn the city of Iquitos into a typical boom town, the industry, 
characteristic of monocultural economies, was directly tied to the global economy, 
controlled by foreign merchant houses and international companies, and for all practical 
purposes was delinked from the local and national economy.  
 With the collapse of the rubber economy, former rubber barons turned to 
agriculture, which helped to solidify the modern hacienda system, based on debt-
peonage. Former indigenous trading networks were destroyed by the violence and the 
disruption of the rubber industry, forcing indigenous peoples, in a sense, to follow their 
former patrons, or do without trading goods altogether. For Gow, the hacienda system 
was, in fact, an extension of commercial relations that were created by the rubber 
industry. Agriculture, based on cash crops, worked through the same transport 
mechanisms and commercial enterprises as the rubber industry. Further, different than the 
Andes system, the hacienda system in much of the Amazon region was based on the 
practice of controlling of indigenous labor through ties of debt33 (Gow 1991, p. 46). 
                                                
33 It is important to recognize that this is a complex story. Many indigenous people, as 
several authors point out, did participate as active agents in the system. In some cases, 
indigenous individuals sold workers to the rubber barons, participated actively in slave 
trading, and benefited from the system. However, the overwhelming majority of 
indigenous peoples throughout the region were victims of a horrific system of brutally 
forced labor.  
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  In summary, colonial and early republican development in the Amazon region 
was based on the extraction of natural resources. To a large extent, the Peruvian state (in 
both its colonial and republican forms) has always envisioned the region as an empty 
space, full of potential for national development. The fact that Amazonian colonization 
was a complicated process, due to indigenous resistance, certainly added to the 
naturalization of Amazonia as space waiting to be conquered, civilized, and developed. 
For much of history, Amazonian indigenous peoples were considered less than human 
(savages, barbarians, etc.) and were, thus, used as slaves to extract the region’s resources. 
It is worth underscoring that Amazonian peoples were treated as objects (similar to the 
resources that they extracted) that were put to use for the benefit of national development. 
As mentioned, Christian missionaries, in spite of their publicized mission to “civilize” 
indigenous peoples, also used them as a source of labor. In this context, colonial practices 
were build around the exploitation of indigenous labor to extract the region’s natural 
resources.  
 Yet Amazonian indigenous peoples since the very first encounters resisted 
European attempts to colonize the region. As mentioned, this tension between the state’s 
(colonial and republic) attempt to extract natural resources and indigenous efforts to 
protect their territorial spaces continue to define the relations between “modern” Peruvian 
governments and indigenous peoples today. Crucially, the state institutions that surround 
extractive development today in the region emerge as a result of this very tension. To a 
degree, the state’s desire to extract natural resources has proved much more powerful 
than indigenous peoples’ capacity to resist. Equally important, the state’s vision of the 
Amazon region as a space of untapped resources, continues to sustain development 
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policies in the region. In the following section, I examine the modern institutional context 
in the Amazon region, specifically in regards to the relation between extractive 
development, indigenous resistance, and indigenous representation in Peru’s development 
policies.   
The modern conquest of the Amazon, institutional development, and indigenous 
representation before the state  
 
 While the rubber boom is an extreme example of the insidious effects of 
extractive development, in many respects, the modern conquest of the region represented 
a more intense process of colonization.34 During this time period (post 1956) the idea of 
Amazonia as an empty space, full of natural resources, waiting to be developed for the 
benefit of modern Peru, became entrenched in the mindset of Peruvian policymakers. 
However, it is also during the modern conquest of the Amazon that indigenous peoples 
from the region obtained certain juridical and territorial rights, which, still today, provide 
the institutional framework for indigenous representation before the Peruvian state. 
Chapter IV will detail the emergence of the Indigenous Movement in the Peruvian 
Amazon (IMPA), which is closely related to state-led efforts at colonization of the 
region. In this section, I explain how indigenous peoples from the Amazon region were 
officially recognized before the Peruvian state, which paradoxically, also led (or 
contributed) to their marginalization in Peru’s development policy regime.  
 As Chirif and Garcia-Hierro write, as colonized peoples, indigenous groups are 
part of a “transculturation,” and “acculturation” process, in which both the colonized and 
                                                
34 One could argue that the modern extractive era in the region starts in the early 1920s 
with the discovery of oil in the Ucayali region. Laws in 1922 and 1937 were passes to 
facilitate extraction and in 1933 the first oil company, “the Ganso Azul,” was established 
in the area. However, large oil development did not pan out as the government has 
intended. This is the subject of the following chapter. (see IWGIA 1995, p. 34).  
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the colonizers are affected. Indigenous peoples, as dominant relations were established, 
began to search for certain institutions that fit (or work with) their own institutional 
framework. This is, in effect, a mechanism of self preservation. In the case of the 
Amazon region, the process of incorporation in the juridical and institutional framework 
of the state has, according to these authors, always been met with a certain level of 
uneasiness (and distrust). Amazonian peoples, in many respects, were given the choice of 
“civilization,” or “extinction,” and their rights appeared as “exceptions to free access to 
Amazonian spaces,” which were normally provided to third parties (Chirif and Garcia-
Hierro 2007, p. 102-103). In other words, indigenous territorial rights in the region 
represented the exception not the rule. State-led colonization policies and the dream of 
developing Amazonia to its full potential was the norm throughout Peru’s modern 
history.  
State led colonization and the dream of Amazonian development  
 
 The idea of the Amazon region as an empty space waiting to be developed 
became particularly manifest in the governments of Manuel Manuel Prado (1956-1962) 
and Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968 and 1975-1980). While the presidency of 
Belaúnde represented an extreme example of Amazonian state-led colonization, during 
the government of Prado, several initiatives took place that set the stage for the modern 
colonization of the region. In the late 1950’s, the Peruvian government, like others 
throughout Latin America, responded to the Cuban Revolution of 1958 by making 
national development a top priority.35 As such, as early as 1956, Prado had set up a 
                                                
35 The urgency of the need for a new development approach, given the success of Castro 
in 1958, also led to increased involvement by the US in Peru’s development agenda. 
Between 1956 and 1962, for example, over $70 million in military aid was received by 
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commission to study agrarian reform as a long term solution to the country’s 
development ills and to the possibility of a Cuban-style revolution (Klarén 2000, p. 315). 
As such, the Amazon region started to play a more important role in the country’s 
development ambitions.  
 In this time period, a second, more aggressive, conquest of the Amazon began. 
This was due to several factors, including regional colonization policies (i.e. Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador), a postwar economy and the desire for new Amazonian productions, 
and the increased migration of poor Andean communities to the region. The Prado 
government initiated an aggressive road building project throughout the region, signed an 
agreement with the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) to “acculturate” indigenous 
peoples through language programs (i.e. the translation of bibles), and passed laws to 
promote agricultural and industrial development. Although the Prado government was 
interested in attracting large capital investments, it was largely unsuccessful. However, 
the building of new roads opened up the way for a massive immigration that would 
eventually lead to an uncontrolled, chaotic migration process to the region.  Furthermore, 
during this period, the US government initiated the conformation of the Peruvian 
Corporation of the Amazon, which helped to create the financial system (concessions, 
loans, leases, etc.) and clientelistic relations that still define the economy of the region36 
(IWGIA 1995, p. 35-36).  
                                                                                                                                            
Peru from the United States. This amounted to one of the highest figures in Latin 
America at the time (see Klarén 2000, p. 315).  
36 The road projects were extensive: the north (Olmos-Marañon), the center (Oroya-
Pucallpa) and the south (Cuzco-Puerto Maldonado). The Prado government passed the 
Industrial Promotion Law of 1959 and created the Institute for Agrarian Reform in 1960 
and Colonization. In this period, the government also issued the Supreme Decree 03 of 
1957, which for the first time Amazonian indigenous peoples appeared. They were 
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 Although the Prado years initiated a state-led colonization process, the most 
radical manifestation of the state’s mentality towards the Amazon region was embodied 
in the government of Belaúnde (1963-1968 and 1975-1980). Belaúnde’s vision was first 
articulated in his book, conspicuously titled, “The Conquest of Peru by Peruvians,” which 
detailed his desires to conquer the region by building a highway, running along side the 
Eastern flank of the Andes, which was then to be sustained by feeder roads that would 
deeply penetrate the Amazon forest. This would open the way, he argued, for the 
penetration of not only new colonist settlements, but also of agriculture and extractive 
industries (Smith 1982, p. 3). As such, extractive development in the Amazon region 
became a key element in his development agenda. In this vein, his government designed a 
2,400-kilometer road project, the Carretera Marginal, that would connect important 
colonist towns along the Andean lowlands and, through the Institute of Agrarian Reform 
and Colonization, he initiated several colonization projects in the Selva Alta (High 
Jungle) region, providing free lands and credit services to potential colonists. 
Colonization of the High Jungle region was, in theory, designed to provide an outlet for 
thousands of landless peasants, who could develop the region’s agriculture resources. In 
the Selva Baja (Lower Jungle), he focused on promoting industrial activity, which 
included tax incentives to attract capital investments. Furthermore, he passed a moderate 
Law of Agrarian Reform (1964) that instituted mechanisms to expropriate unproductive 
land in the Andes and Amazon region (Santos-Granado and Barclay 2000, p. 213-214; 
Klarén 2000, p. 332).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
denominated “jungle tribes” and were then able to receive land for subsistence use 
(IWGIA 1995, p. 36).   
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The 1974 Law of Native Communities, progressive state practices, and indigenous 
territorial rights  
 
  While the state’s colonization plans for the Amazon region continued, the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and the state significantly changed in 1968 with 
the military coup of General Juan Velasco Alvarez (1968-1975). Critically important, it is 
during the Velasco regime that Amazonian indigenous peoples became officially 
recognized as citizens with distinct characteristics as indigenous peoples before the 
Peruvian state. In this time period, the state engaged in relatively progressive practices 
that provided the foundation (and institutionalization) of indigenous rights in the region.  
In short, the institutionalization of indigenous territorial rights in the Amazon region is a  
result of official policies and practices that were developed during this period and were 
articulated in the 1974 Law of Native Communities. Specifically, the 1974 Law created 
the legal framework for “native communities,” which today represents the main legal 
entity through which Amazonian indigenous peoples access territorial rights. Before 
moving forward, it is important to describe the historical conditions under which these 
changes took place.   
The military dictatorship of Velasco, different than many right-leaning 
dictatorships throughout the region, embraced left-leaning policies, nationalized many 
Peru’s most important industries, and engaged in the most far reaching land reform in the 
history of Peru. Velasco, as such, assumed power amidst heavily anti-imperial, anti-
oligarchic, and highly nationalist sentiment. To a large degree, the government set out to 
the break the monopoly of the traditional oligarchy (landed and industrial), to reduce 
Peru’s dependence on foreign capital, and to redistribute the country’s wealth. It is 
important to note that, in spite of its left-leaning policies, the Velasco government was 
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decidedly anti-communist. As Hunefeldt wrote, it was a government that wanted to 
implement “a socialism from above,” to prevent a “socialism from below” (2004, p. 229).  
Economically, the Velasco government initiated a period of state-led 
development, similar to other Latin American countries at the time, heavily informed by 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). The state, accordingly, would replace the 
dominant class, intervene more directly in the economy, and assume the leading role in 
national development. Only a few days following the coup in 1968, for example, the 
government expropriated the US-owned International Petroleum Company (IPC) and 
began to reorganize the old state company into Petroperú, which took control of IPCs 
operations in the region.37 As such, the government created state enterprises in mining 
(Mineroperú), fishing (Pescaperú), steel (Siderperú), and industry (Moraveco) (Klaren, 
342-345).38  
 Socially, the Velasco regime was intent on dealing directly with the longstanding 
problem of oppression of the indigenous population. It is important to note that Velasco, 
different than many of his predecessors, embraced Peru’s indigenous heritage, declaring 
that Quechua was officially the second language of Peru. And, although schools 
throughout the Andes region were ordered to teach Spanish, they were also encouraged to 
allow instruction in their native languages. In short, Velasco sought to integrate 
indigenous peoples into the national economy, which would be achieved by a sweeping 
land reform program that would forcefully turn over landed estates to peasants. The 
                                                
37 The government, at this time, also began to explore for new oil deposits in the Amazon 
region. This will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.  
38 The ideological foundations of the state-led development model were found in the 
state’s master plan, known as “Plan Inca.” (Santos Granero and Barclay, p. 218.)  
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program sought to eliminate the hacienda and land-owning elite (including foreign 
companies) as the dominant actors in the agrarian system39 (Hunefeldt 2004, p 229).  
In 1969, somewhat ironically, Velasco announced his land reform program on the 
“Day of the Indian,” declaring that indigenous peoples should now be called peasants:  
“The Agrarian Reform Law gives its support to the great multitude of peasants 
who today belong to indigenous communities and from this day forward–
abandoning unacceptable racist habits and prejudices–will be called Peasant 
Communities … To the men of the land, we can now say in the immortal and 
liberating voice of Túpac Amaru: Peasants: the Master will no longer feed off 
your poverty” (Cited in Garcia and Lucero 2004, p. 162-163; also see Garcia 
2005, p. 73-77).  
 
According to Yrigoyen, Velasco’s agrarian reform responded largely to the 
modernization policies of the 1950s and 1960s in which indigenous peoples were to be 
integrated in the nation and market as Peruvian citizens. While these policies recognized 
indigenous cultural rights, the intent was to move them from the backward condition of 
“Indian” to a modern condition of peasant. As peasants, indigenous peoples could then be 
converted in productive workers for the national society.40  Here the “Indian problem” 
was characterized as a socioeconomic problem of marginalization produced by 
traditional, feudal, and servile relations (Yirigoyen-Fajardo 2002, p. 160).   
                                                
39 According to Hunefelt, by 1979 3.68 million acres of land had been expropriated, 
about 30% of Peru’s cultivable land, which affected about 16,000 property owners (See 
Hunefelt p. 235).  
40 These policies were very much in line with mainstream thinking, at the time, 
surrounding indigenous peoples. For example, the 1957 ILO Convention No.107 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations, a precursor to ILO 169, established that indigenous 
rights should not affect the “integrationists” policies of individual states. Is also important 
to note that the Velasco reforms did recognize Quechua as an official language and, 
according to Yrigoyen-Fajardo, this was a certain “vindication of autochthonous culture” 
(p. 160). See also Chirif and García-Hierro (2007, p. 103, 156).  
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For indigenous peoples from the Amazon, however, the state’s approach was 
distinct. In 197441 the government enacted the Law of Native Communities42, which 
categorized Amazonian indigenous peoples as “natives,” not peasants.  This established 
two regulatory orders, one referring to “peasant communities” in the Andes region and 
the other referring to “native communities” in the Amazon region. Critically, the 1974 
Law provided a juridical foundation for a new social unit subsequently called a “native 
community.” In this context, Amazonian indigenous peoples were officially represented 
before the state via the figure of native community, which, among other things, obliged 
the state to issue a land title to each legally recognized community (Smith 1982, p. 5). 
This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV, but this law created a new set of 
state practices in which state officials would interact directly with indigenous peoples 
from the Amazon region.  
It is important to note that, at the time, the 1974 Law of Native Communities was 
considered to be the most advanced in all of South America43 (see Smith 1982, p. 5). Not 
                                                
41 According to IWGIA, the first time that indigenous peoples from the Amazon appear 
in a legal context is in 1957 with DS (Decreto Supremo) 03 , which referred “selvatic 
tribes” in order to provide 10 hectares of land to Amazonian indigenous people for 
subsistence (IWGIA 1995, p. 36).  
42 La Ley de Comunidades Nativas y de Desarrollo de la Regiones de Selva y Ceja de 
Selva de 1974 (Decreto Legislativo Nº 20653).  This law replaced the “Ley de tierras de 
Montaña Nº 1220,” passed in 1909 that rendered tropical rainforests the exclusive 
property of the state.  
43 See R.C. Smith, who writes, “This law [referring the Law 20653], while clearly the 
most advanced legal document dealing with natives peoples in South America, in none-
the-less the result of a compromise between those in the government who advocated one 
variant or another of the current Brazilian model of economic development in the 
Amazon which would either eliminate or detribalize and deculturate the native peoples, 
and those who advocated the rights of native peoples to their own way of life, and their 
own autonomous territories, while guaranteeing them some of the benefits of the 
economic development of the region without making them either its victims or 
instruments (Smith 1982, p. 5).  
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only did the law, for the first time in Peruvian history, recognize Amazonian peoples 
territorial rights, making their land “inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptable,”44 
but it even (originally) granted them subsoil rights. Further, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, it institutionalized the juridical existence of native communities, provided a 
legal basis for communal (as opposed to individual) property, recognized a certain level 
of autonomy for native communities, and utilized broader criteria for describing the use 
of indigenous territories (hunting, fishing, and recollection). It is important to reiterate 
that this marked the “native community” as the legal basis for indigenous representation 
before the state and created, in this context, a set of official practices that would link 
indigenous peoples from the Amazon to the Peruvian state  (Yashar 2005, p. 253; Smith 
1982, p. 5; Chirif and Garcia 2007, p. 105; IWGIA 1995, p. 38).  
 As such, the 1974 Law also established a model of organization for new 
communities and provided a legal path for indigenous peoples at the village level to 
resolve minor civil disputes through their own elected authorities. Elected authorities, for 
example, were assigned the task of keeping local civil registers issuing birth and death 
certificates, which were necessary personal documents that, in theory, enabled indigenous 
peoples to vote, sign contracts, and apply for credit (Santos Granero and Barclay, p. 221). 
As mentioned, these practices established a critical political link between “native 
villages” and the state. Under SINAMOS (el Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la 
Mobilización Social), the corporatist popular mobilization agency under Velasco, the law 
catalyzed the process of titling of indigenous territories, which marked the beginning of 
                                                
44 It is important to note that the Peruvian Constitution of 1920, for the first time, 
recognized the legal existence of indigenous communities and, in 1933, indigneous land 
became “inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptable.” However, indigenous groups 
from the Amazon were not included (See Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 2007, p. 103).   
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the movement’s long and arduous struggle for the recuperation of indigenous territorial 
spaces (Dean 2002, p. 210). While the issue of territorial rights will be examined in detail 
in Chapter IV, here it is important to note that practice of titling of indigenous territories, 
made possible by the 1974 Law, in many respects, represents the cornerstone of the 
indigenous territorial rights.    
The archipelago syndrome: indigenous marginalization in development policies  
 
 State policies and practices throughout Peru’s history and especially in the 
modern era have been based on colonization and natural resource development. 
Indigenous territorial rights, albeit advanced in some respects, have not fundamentally 
challenged this development paradigm in the region. Critically, the implementation of the 
1974 Native Communities Law, described by some scholars as a “watershed” in state 
relations with indigenous peoples (Dean 2002, p. 210), occurred alongside state 
colonization practices that in reality further eroded indigenous territorial spaces. 
Consequently, these practices, in conjunction with certain advances in indigenous land 
rights legislation, have led to the “archipelago syndrome”: indigenous land, while legally 
recognized as such, became fractionated, amounting to small, disconnected islands in a 
sea of state-owned or controlled territory that remains wide open for development 
purposes.  
First, while the 1974 Law was the result of genuinely well-intentioned 
professionals within the Velasco government (this will be detailed in Chapter IV), the 
arbitrary separation of indigenous “peasants” from the Andes and indigenous “natives” 
from the Amazon worked against the entire process of the uniting the greater indigenous 
community in Peru (indigenous population in Peru) into a significant contemporary 
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political force (see Yashar 1998, Van Cott 2000). Furthermore, the legal figure of the 
“native community” was an exact replica of the “comunidades campesinas” statue in 
1970 and was therefore foreign to most Amazonian indigenous peoples, who had systems 
of governance and decision-making mechanisms quite different from Andean peoples (p. 
Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 2007, p. 37-38, p. 103). In other words, similar to the imposition 
of artificial communities by missionaries in the 17th Century, the state imposed the figure 
of “community” upon indigenous groups from the Amazon region.  
Second, and perhaps most relevant, given the constant pressure on indigenous 
territorial spaces, it became critically important to title indigenous lands, which, in effect, 
forced indigenous peoples into the state’s legal framework. As Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 
explain, in many cases, indigenous people had little option but to rescue and consolidate 
“small islands” that remained after successive waves of colonization (2007, p. 104). In 
this context, the state never gave up the idea to occupy the region via colonization 
projects, timber and oil concessions, and other economic activities (p. 105). Accordingly, 
at the same time as the state engaged in practices to provide indigenous peoples with 
land, it promoted colonization projects that, in effect, eroded indigenous territorial 
spaces. Even the Velasco government, generally less interested in the Amazon region,45 
implemented colonization projects and initiated new oil exploration in the region (Yashar 
2005, p. 256).46 According to Smith, Velasco thought that oil from the Amazon region 
                                                
45 Smith (1982, p. 5) alludes to the fact that Velasco, for a variety of reasons, de-
emphasized the Amazon region as a solution to Peru’s problems, which lessoned the 
pressure on native land base in the high jungle areas.  
46 Velasco established the “Peru Model,” based on a recently nationalized oil and gas 
industry, and between 1971 and 1973, 16 new contracts were signed for the exploration 
and development of the Peruvian Amazon. Additionally 8 blocks were given to 
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would bring in new resources to pay for his ambitious social agenda and to repay Peru’s 
national debt (Smith 1982, p. 5). Velasco awarded large concessions (based on the model 
of the 1891 rubber concessions) to companies to explore large areas. According to 
Stocks, oil exploration in this period affected nearly every indigenous group in Eastern 
Peru as gangs of brush cutters covered nearly the entire region to mark survey lines 
(Stocks 1984, p. 51).  
From this perspective, indigenous land rights, based on the 1974 Law, worked in 
conjunction with state-led colonization policies. It is important to reiterate that this law 
did provide indigenous peoples with the legal means, for the first time in Peruvian 
history, to obtain a title for their land, which created a new institutional framework for 
indigenous territorial rights in the region: 1) The state recognized the legal existence of 
“native communities,” 2) indigenous land (in the form of native communities) was 
considered “inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptable,” 3) native communities 
enjoyed a certain level of political autonomy, and 4) a new criteria that included the 
multiple uses of a forest (hunting, fishing, collection) was created (IWIGIA 1995, p. 37-
38).  
However, in spite of these relatively positive attributes, the practice of the titling 
of “native communities” actually worked to disintegrate indigenous territorial spaces. 
This is because, while some groups were able to title their land, anything that was not 
titled became patrimony of the state. Furthermore, the titling process require institutional 
support (from SINAMOS) that depended on the willingness of the particular government 
in power. For example, while indigenous titling was carried out with some diligence 
                                                                                                                                            
Petroperú, the state-owned oil company, which led to significant findings in Northern 
Peru (Dandler, p. 33).  
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during the Velasco administration, after 1975 the process came nearly to a standstill (see 
Chapter IV).  One thus might regard the practice of the titling of indigenous territories as 
a sort of trap that, in reality, opened up the region to colonization projects (IWGIA 1995, 
p. 37-38; Chirif and Garcia-Hierro 2007, p. 104-105).   
Perhaps most troubling, the 1974 Law (20653) marked, to a certain extent, the 
high point of indigenous territorial rights in the Peruvian Amazon. As Chirif and Garcia-
Hierro remarked, in spite of the contemporary, cutting-edge concepts surrounding 
indigenous rights, curiously, many of the “novel” ideas that indigenous rights advocates 
are proposing today are based on reestablishing concepts that were originally proposed 
during the first iteration of the 1974 Native Communities Law (2007, p, 107). However, 
this is not necessarily because of the progressive nature of the 1974 Law, but rather 
because, since 1974, indigenous peoples from the region have seen a continuous 
deterioration of these rights.  
For example, the 1974 Law of Native Communities (20653) lasted just a few 
years before it was replaced, in 1978, with a modified version of the Law (22175). The 
new law promoted large-scale capitalist exploitation of Amazonian forests, opening up 
the region to large land and forest concessions. For Stocks (2005), it basically replaced 
the radical provisions of the 1974 Law, rescinding the ownership of forest and subsurface 
resources for all native communities. In short, the state (under the Burmedez government) 
argued that forest lands, in fact, were property of the state, not of  “native” peoples. 
Furthermore, it claimed that “native communities” were subject to the greater social 
interests, allowed “right-of-way” passage for all state constructed roads, and even 
allowed free passage, without indigenous consent, to oil and gas installations, 
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telecommunication and/or energy electric lines, and public irrigation channels (2005, p. 
96).  
According to Smith (1982, p. 7), these changes were largely due to pressure from  
conservative ranks of the military government for Velasco to temper his reforms. In 
1975, in a “quiet palace coup,” the more conservative General Morales Bermudez 
replaced a physically ailing Velasco. Pressured by the IMF and under the constraints of a 
financial crisis, Peru returned to a pro-capitalist based economy that would contradict the 
abovementioned reforms (Smith 1982, p. 7). For Stocks (1984), the idealism of certain 
elements within the Velasco regime was at always odds with the long-term policy trend 
of forest conquest and economic development. For instance, even before the 1978 
change, in 1975 the Forestry and Wildlife Law (21147) was passed, which established 
that the state was the owner of all forestry resources, including those on indigenous 
territories. This opened the way not for environmental conservation, but natural resource 
exploitation, especially in the extraction of forestry resources. 
Peru’s emphasis on extractive development in the Amazon region exemplifies the 
government’s longstanding vision of treating the Amazon as an empty space, in a sense, 
waiting to be developed and colonized. Smith, a US anthropologist with over 40 years of 
experience working with Amazonian communities, writes about this in a 1982 paper 
fittingly titled “The Dialectics of Domination in Peru: Native Communities and the Myth 
of the Vast Amazonian Emptiness.” Discussing the government’s 1980s plans to 
implement a USAID-sponsored colonization project, the “Pichis-Palcazu Special 
Project,” Smith alluded to the mentality (and strategy) of Peruvian development 
initiatives in the Amazon:  
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Underlying this dream of tropical development, there is a classical political notion 
that social and economic problems at home can be conveniently dealt with 
through the conquest of new territories. To justify this conquest, an official myth 
is created which demonstrates the existence of a vast, bountifully productive, 
empty territory–the Amazon Basin–which awaits the enterprising individuals to 
settle it and harvest its riches (Smith 1982, p. 1).  
 
It is precisely this myth of “emptiness” that sustains the government’s philosophical 
approach to development. Accordingly, the Amazon region is seen as an unproductive, 
chaotic, empty space that is available for “National Development.” As part of this myth, 
indigenous peoples that live in the region, tagged as “natives,” primitive, and 
undeveloped, are seen as literally as part of nature, like the animals and plants that 
characterize the region.  
 This trend (the progressive deterioration of indigenous rights) has continued 
throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s. In 1979, for example, as Peru was 
preparing the transition from military to civilian rule, the new Constitution established 
territorial guarantees (Articles 161 and 163) for indigenous peoples declaring their land 
inalienable. However, the constitution left open that possibility that private interests 
could dissolve community land holdings with two-thirds community approval. As 
indigenous organizations (“native” and “peasant”) pointed out, while indigenous  
communities finally had constitutional grounds for defending their lands, there were also 
constitutional grounds for their dissolution. This opened the way for interested parties to 
reestablish the landed-estate system or create new multinational agribusiness industries 
(Smith 1982, p. 7-8). This 1979 Constitutional provision that provided a certain opening 
for extractive development (two-thirds community approval) became the center of the 
current debate on indigenous land rights when President Garcia, via Legislative Decree 
1073, proposed to change it from two thirds community approval to only 50% of 
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community members at a community assembly (see Chapter IV). This is just another 
example of how indigenous land rights have progressively deteriorated.  
 In 1980, the second government Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), not 
surprisingly, emphasized colonization of the Amazon region as an essential part of his 
development policy. Belaúnde’s inauguration speech is interesting in that it details, again, 
this idea of the Amazon region as an underutilized, “empty” space for national 
development:  
A basic task (of our government) will be the expansion of food producing areas 
for Lima into the region between Mazamari and Tambo River, and Villa Rica [the 
central Amazon region], but way of a trail under construction at this moment 
towards Puerto Bermudez which will eventually connect with the road to 
Pucallpa. We propose to carry forward an exhaustive colonization study for the 
most promising settlements along the 300 kms of new highway”(Smith 1982, p. 
8).  
 
As part of his colonization plans, the Belaúnde government passed Legislative Decree Nº 
2, the Promotion and Agriculture Development Law, which extended the amount of land 
concessions that large companies could be granted in the Amazon region, offered credit 
to private investors, promoted private agro-industrial and forestry projects, and promoted 
colonization through the development of infrastructure and development projects 
(IWGIA 1995, p. 41-42; Stocks 1984, p. 53). According to Stocks, some of the most 
troubling aspects of LD Nº 2 were that large land adjudications were no longer required 
to be “national priority” (this was a change from DL 22175), and workers could be 
awarded small plots within the land concessions, which was similar to the colonial small-
landholding (minifundistas) system (1984, p. 53).  According to Stocks, by 1983 Peru 
had eight special projects underway in the eastern foothills of the Andes region, all done 
without indigenous consent. In general, the Belaúnde government engaged in aggressive 
66 
 
colonization policies that included highway construction projects and top-down 
development schemes, financed by international financial institutions (the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and USAID) such as the Pichis-Palcazu Special 
Project (Dean 2002, p. 211).  
To some extent, the emphasis on colonization of the Amazon region subsided 
during the first Garcia presidency (1985-1990). In part, this was because of the failure of 
many of the mega-development projects that were initiated in the previous government, 
which caused many of the international financial institutions to back out of these 
development initiatives, leaving behind a large foreign debt (See Hvalkov 2002, p. 96). 
Furthermore, during the 1980s the region (and country) experienced and economic and 
political crisis, unprecedented in Peru’s history. Between 1980 and 1995 a violent 
conflict between the Peruvian government and Sendero Luminoso (and MRTA, 
Movemiento Revolucionario Tupac Amarú) plagued the country. According to official 
reports nearly 70,000 people died in the conflict, most of whom were indigenous.47 For 
indigenous peoples in the Amazon, the armed conflict was especially difficult. By the late 
1980 insurgent groups were operating in the Amazon region (especially the Central and 
Northern regions). Many indigenous peoples (as well as mestizo campesinos) were 
coerced to support either insurgent groups or the counterinsurgency groups and the 
killing (massacres) of indigenous peoples, both by insurgents and the government forces, 
was widely reported. Without entering into details, for these reasons (and others) 
colonization efforts slowed down in the region (see Dean 2002, p. 205). To make matters 
worse, in the 1980s, the Amazon region also saw the influx of illegal drug production and 
                                                
47 See http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Report.  
67 
 
trade (especially coca), resulting in violence, insecurity and, for indigenous peoples, 
another example the pernicious effects of extractive (illegal) development.   
In the 1980s, however, indigenous movements throughout Latin America began to 
call international attention to many of the issues that indigenous peoples had been facing 
for years. In the Peruvian Amazon, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, indigenous leaders, 
with the help of NGO and international organizations, began the process of organizing 
into national federations to apply pressure on the Peruvian government to deal with 
pressing issues. In Chapter IV, I will detail the emergence of the movement, nevertheless, 
it is worth noting here that this pressure helped to significantly increase the land titling 
process throughout the region, as well as to call attention to issues such as slavery in the 
Atalaya region (see Garcia-Hierro, Hvalkov, and Gray 1998). During this time, the 
General Law of Peasant Communities (24656) and the Law of Delimitation and Titling of 
Peasant Communities (24657) were passed, which recognized the national importance of 
the titling of communities, established rights over land that had not been titled, and 
introduced the figure of river communities in the Amazon region. Furthermore, under 
international pressure to protect the Amazon region, the Peruvian government passed the 
Environmental Code of 1990 (LD 613), which was relatively favorable to indigenous 
interests, especially those that were located in National Protected Areas (Chirif y Garcia-
Hierro 2007, p. 178; IWGIA 1995, p. 45-46).  
Fujimori, ILO 169, and a multicultural shift 
 
 In many respects, the contemporary institutional (development) framework in the 
Amazon region begins with the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Chapter III 
will examine Peru’s transition to neoliberal economic policies, which began under the 
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Fujimori government. Here, I will focus on how Fujimori affected the institutional 
framework related to indigenous peoples and national development in the Amazon 
region. In short, during the Fujimori period not only was there a renewed interest in 
indigenous land rights issues in the region, but Fujimori also used indigenous themes as 
part of his campaign to promote Peruvian national identity. However, similar to other 
periods in history, in the Amazon region, national development trumped indigenous 
territorial rights. In fact, part of Fujimori’s legacy was the dismantling of the 1974 
Velasco land reforms, which has clearly worked against indigenous territorial rights. 
Here, again, to understand the contemporary institutional framework in the region, it is 
important to briefly discuss the historical context of the Fujimori regime.  
 In 1991, along side neoliberal economic reforms, Fujimori’s main priority was to 
eliminate the threat of Sendero Luminoso, something that his predecessor Alan Garcia 
was unable to accomplish. Turning to authoritarian measures, by 1991 Fujimori had 
declared more than half of the country an emergency zone, which meant the suspension 
of all civil liberties. By 1992 he established an “emergency government of national 
reconstruction,” dissolved congress and the supreme court, disbanded the country’s 
twelve regional governments, and suspended all articles of the constitution that were not 
compatible with the government’s interests. He also established close ties with the 
military, legitimized peasant patrol units (rondas campesinas) to fight against Sendero 
and, with that end, began to use indigenous peoples as allies in the fight against insurgent 
groups (see Yrigoyen-Fajardo 2002, p. 165-166). In 1992, in a psychological and tactical 
victory, Fujimori’s national intelligence agency captured Abimael Guzman, the enigmatic 
leader of Sendero (Garcia 2005, p. 44-45).   
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Fujimori relied on a populist and authoritarian practices that used Amazonian and 
Andean indigenous peoples as centerpieces in his campaign to prevent political violence 
and develop the nation. According to Dean, Fujimori relied on the “time-honored policy 
of doling out state resources on the basis of political patronage” (2002, p. 202). He 
established the Ministry of the Presidency, which controlled over forty percent of the 
annual budget and, as such, was able to target social spending. Indigenous peoples and 
peasants were the direct beneficiaries of many of these practices as he provided roads, 
schools, medical centers, agriculture infrastructure and electricity. Furthermore, 
promoting his (populist) vision of inclusiveness, he often traveled around the country 
using traditional indigenous garb to emphasize the indigenous component of Peru (Garcia 
2005, p. 48-49).  
Fujimori-style populism, a renewed emphasis on indigenous issues, and neoliberal 
development reforms all helped set the stage for a new institutional framework for 
dealing with indigenous issues. Critically, in 1993, Peru established a new constitution 
that, in many respects, represented a positive step for indigenous peoples throughout 
Peru. Perhaps more importantly, in 1994 Peru ratified the International Labor 
Organization Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) 
(hereafter ILO 169), which is arguably the single most significant legal document that 
works on the behalf of indigenous peoples. It is worth noting that the inclusion of 
indigenous rights in the 1993 Constitution and Peru’s subscription to ILO 169 were the 
result of direct pressure from indigenous organizations, NGOs, and the international 
community, much more than from the Fujimori government.  
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For Yrigoyen-Fajardo, the 1993 Constitution affirmed the multicultural content of 
the nation and, to a certain degree, sought to change the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and state. This was especially important in terms of the state’s institutional 
framework towards indigenous peoples, which, in theory, was now informed by a 
multicultural political (and constitutional) model rather than the previous integrationist 
model.48 As mentioned earlier, the integrationist model, somewhat paternalistic, valued 
the (European) hegemonic culture as superior, even though it had sought to integrate 
indigenous peoples into the Peruvian national identity. Different than the 1979 
Constitution, which intended to promote the “cultural advancement” of native and 
peasant communities (Article 161), the 1993 Constitution stipulated that the state should 
“recognize” and “respect” the cultural identities of native and peasant communities. In 
theory, the state established individual and collective rights to cultural difference (Article 
2), committed itself to protecting cultural difference, made official indigenous languages, 
and recognized specific rights for native and peasant communities (Yrigoyen-Fajardo, p. 
167).  
Here ILO 169 is key. Signaling this shift away from cultural assimilation, in 1989 
the ILO revised Convention 107 (1957) and drafted ILO Convention 169, which 
explicitly recognized the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples to exist as their own 
particular cultural entities within the confines of the nation-state. ILO 169 established  
indigenous rights to practice their own culture and to determine their own development 
path and granted specific rights to territorial spaces. To be sure, ILO 169 was the result of 
                                                
48 According to the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 
2006), between 1987 and 2001, many Latin American countries were swept with a wave 
of “multicultural constitutionalism,” which reflected a significant change from the liberal 
doctrines instituted during the formation of Latin American republics (p. 151).  
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the changing international environment, which forced nation-states to recognize and 
respect indigenous peoples special relationship to territory. Importantly, ILO 169 stressed 
the importance for national government to work with indigenous peoples on national 
development projects that might impact their territories. In short, ILO 169  provided 
indigenous peoples with a powerful tool, supported by a plethora of multilateral 
organizations (Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN 
Development Program) to challenge national governments hegemonic pretensions 
(Garcia 2005, p. 53). Peru ratified ILO 169 in 1994 through Legislative Resolution Nº 
26253. As I will discuss in the following chapter, ILO 169 has played an important role 
in shaping the actual practices that surround the implementation hydrocarbon policy on 
indigenous territories.   
 To a certain extent, the constitutional changes in Peru led to a new institutional 
framework. Congress, for example, approved a new government commission designed to 
work on exclusively on indigenous issues and the Ministry for the Promotion of Women 
and Human Development (PROMUDEH) assumed the responsibility of overseeing 
programs related to indigenous peoples. In 1993, the Defensoría del Pueblo (the National 
Ombudman’s Office) was created to defend the constitutional rights of individuals and 
communities. This organization, as a state institution, has been quite instrumental in 
advocating for indigenous rights throughout the years.  In 1998, under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fujimori created the Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs (SETAI), which 
received financing from the World Bank. Fujimori also initiated Special Project of Land 
Titling (PETT), a program funded by the World Bank that by the end of 1999 has 
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demarcated some 1.7 million lots, 700,000 of which were inscribed in the government’s 
official registries (Dean 2002, p. 203).  
 However, in spite of these relatively progressive changes, Fujimori’s policies, this 
time under the realm of a neoliberal development agenda, did not advance indigenous 
causes, but in fact led to the further deterioration of indigenous rights. In a sense, like in 
previous governments, Fujimori’s state-led economic imperative took priority. As Yashar 
points out, for Amazonian communities one of the most damaging aspects of Fujimori’s 
tenure was the changes to the 1993 Constitution that, in effect, reversed the inalienability 
and nonmortgageability of native lands and weakened the imprescriptibility of 
community lands by declaring that the state could claim “abandoned” lands for 
development purposes (2005, p. 257). According to IWGIA, the 1993 Constitution placed 
indigenous lands, “without exception,” within the realm of absolute liberty of civil 
property, thus, turning them into commercial objects (1995, p. 49). To this end, the so 
called “Ley de Tierras” (Law of Lands) in 1995 effectively opened the way for further 
fractionation of indigenous lands by re-categorizing some land as “agriculture” land or 
“abandoned” land, and facilitating the sale of communities lands to third parties (Dandler 
1998, p. 22-23).  
Furthermore, in order to attract capital interests, Fujimori took steps to dismantle 
the Environmental Code passed under Garcia. For example, he enacted the Law for 
Growth in Private Investment (LD 757), which eliminated the need to carry out 
Environmental Impact Assessments, centralized decision-making power over protected 
zones, eliminated the chapter that contained environmental sanctions, restricted the power 
of, then, independent environmental authorities by giving environmental control to the 
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respective ministries (Agriculture, Energy and Mines, etc.), and permitted that foreign 
enterprises use their own court systems in cases of environmental disagreements. In the 
same vein, the government promulgated the Law for Promotion in the Investment in the 
Hydrocarbon Sector (LD 655) and the Law for Promotion in Investment in the Agrarian 
Sector (LD 653), both of which were intended to attract foreign investment.  
 As Dean suggests, this led to a proliferation of oil, mining, and timber projects 
throughout the Amazon region. It is not surprising that during the Fujimori government, 
native and peasant communities saw a dramatic increase in the privatization and 
parceling of their lands. This will become more evident in the following chapter as I 
discuss the government’s efforts to attract private capital to the Amazon region, which 
included tax abatements, lax environmental standards, and territorial concessions (Dean 
2002, p. 211). Peru’s structural adjustment program with the IMF also helped to create a 
weak atmosphere for the agriculture sector (i.e. liberalization of agriculture markets) that 
led to a general weakening of prices, downward pressure on wages, the cutting off of 
agriculture credit, a reduction of consumption all produced a fall in production and 
employment in the agriculture sector. This, not surprisingly, negatively affected 
indigenous farmers. As mentioned, during this time period the region also saw increased 
migration due to new opportunities in coca production, which brought a new set of actors 
to the region and was especially harsh on indigenous peoples who seemed to get caught 
in the middle of disputes between narco-traffickers and the military (IWIGIA 1995, p. 
47-48).   
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After Fujimori’s disgraceful exit from office,49 the interim presidency of Valentín 
Paniagua seemed like a (brief) turning point to indigenous advocates. In February of 
2001, responding an indigenous delegation from the Central Amazon region, Paniagua 
formed a commission to study some of the urgent problems (much of them related to 
extractive development) of indigenous peoples. The commission elaborated policy 
recommendations and opened up spaces for continued negotiations to discuss some of the 
important issues facing indigenous peoples. This, as Garcia mentions, suggested that the 
government might take indigenous issues more seriously (Garcia 2005, p. 54-55).   
 The government of Alejandro Toledo initially appeared that it might follow in the 
direction of Paniagua. However, much like Fujimori, many of Toledo gestures to 
indigenous peoples proved to be more symbolic than substantive. He campaigned on his 
“Andean” ancestry and in his inauguration he included a symbolic ceremony at Machu 
Picchu, even addressing the crowd in Quechua. Perhaps most importantly, his wife, 
Eliane Karp, a Belgian anthropologist who spoke Quechua was determined to make 
indigenous issues the driving force of her duties as first lady. She, in fact, she became 
president of National Commission for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples 
(CONAPA). Many would argue that, while imperfect, Karp at least helped to bring 
visibility to indigenous issues. Perhaps more importantly, however, she began the process 
of institutionalizing indigenous participation within the government. According to 
indigenous leaders and advocates, CONAPA was an essentially paternalistic organization 
with little or no autonomy from the larger government structures. CONAPA leaders were 
                                                
49 Fujimori was forced to leave the country after the release of a series of videos that 
showed Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s chief spy, bribing a number of Peruvian 
politicians. Montesinos was captured in Venezuela, extradited to Peru, where he was 
jailed on corruption charges. Fujimori fled to Japan, the homeland of his parents.  
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handpicked and funds, many of which came from the World Bank, were often selectively 
doled out. For Garcia, however, independent of whether Karp’s work was considered 
positive or negative, the political climate had clearly changed for indigenous peoples and 
their relationship to the Peruvian state (Garcia 2005, p. 55-57).     
Conclusion  
 
 Examining the historical and institutional context of extractive development and 
indigenous peoples in the Peruvian Amazon, the main point throughout this chapter has 
been that the Amazon region, since colonization and throughout history, has been viewed 
as an empty space, waiting to be developed. The Amazonian space, for successive 
governments, has been a place to extract natural resources for national development and, 
most always, to colonize. To a large degree, both colonial and state practices were 
directed toward this end. This, with a few slight modifications, continues to be the 
dominant development paradigm today. Indigenous territorial rights, while progressing to 
a certain degree, have been “achieved” against this state-led economic imperative and, 
undeniably, have been limited by it. In other words, Peru’s institutional framework to 
advance indigenous rights has emerged from this dominant extractivist development 
paradigm. In the following chapter, I will examine Peru’s hydrocarbon development 
policies in the Amazon region, which will provide a closer look at Peru’s institutional 




CHAPTER III. HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE PERUVIAN 
AMAZON: ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND INDIGENOUS 
TERRITORIAL RIGHTS 
 
“The Amazon has always been considered a backyard to be tapped when necessary.” 




This chapter examines Alan Garcia’s hydrocarbon agenda and its impact on 
indigenous territorial rights and environmental sustainability in Amazonia. I argue that 
Peru’s hydrocarbon policy, characterized for its unprecedented aggressiveness,50 weakens 
indigenous territorial claims, violates indigenous rights, and places in jeopardy the 
environmental sustainability of the region. Most importantly, Peru’s hydrocarbon policy, 
while consistent with a neoliberal development regime, is part of Peru’s colonial legacy 
where the Amazon region is seen as an empty (uncivilized) space waiting to be developed 
for the good of the nation. Garcia policies are, thus, nothing new, but rather an extension 
of the colonial logic of extractive development. Similar to past governments (both on the 
left and right), economic incentives, based on the exploitation of the region’s natural 
resources, trump policies that might advance indigenous territorial rights and, in this case, 
protect the environmental sustainability of the region. In this vein, in spite of the 
government’s lofty claims to support ILO 169, here I document how state practices 
exclude indigenous peoples from policy making and implementation processes 
                                                
50 In a recent study, a Peruvian environmental organization observed that the Peruvian 
Amazon is suffering a new cycle of private and public investment that is characterized for 
its “volume, diversity, and aggressiveness that is without precedents” (Dourojeanni 
2009).   
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and, consequently, as I will argue later, place at risk the environmental sustainability of 
the region.  
 This chapter, like the previous one, is informed by Migdal’s state-in-society 
approach, especially as I examine that the way that Peru’s hydrocarbon institutional 
framework (and the institutions that are used to implement policy) has led to the 
marginalization of indigenous peoples. As Migdal argues, disaggregating the state can 
help to understand how different elements within the state engage in society in different 
ways, which can then reveal “unanticipated patterns of domination and transformation” 
(Migdal et Al., 1994, p. 8). After placing Peru’s hydrocarbon policy in historical context, 
this chapter offers a detailed look at the institutions and practices that surround the state’s 
hydrocarbon development on indigenous territories. Furthermore, this approach suggest 
that a historical treatment of power is important and that patterns of domination are 
determined by what Migdal calls “societies multiple arenas of domination and 
opposition” (1994, p. 9). From this point of view, hydrocarbon policy is one area of 
domination and opposition that, to a large degree, reflects Peru’s larger development 
agenda and its historically oppressive impact on indigenous peoples in the Peruvian 
Amazon.  
That said, in order to gain a broader understanding of hydrocarbon politics in the 
Peruvian Amazon, in the first section, I trace the history of oil development in the region. 
The second section, given the importance of the current political and economic context of 
Garcia’s development policies, details Peru’s shift to a neoliberal development model, 
which, albeit insufficient, helps explain the intensity of the government’s hydrocarbon 
agenda. Specifically, this section will explain how Peru’s free trade agreement with the 
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US is intertwined with the government’s desire the carry out institutional reform, which, 
given its implications for indigenous territorial rights, represents another example of how 
indigenous peoples rights are sacrificed at the expense of extractive development. The 
following section concentrates the institutional context and legal structure of hydrocarbon 
development agenda, the Garcia government’s current policies, and the Camisea Gas 
Project, a critical piece of Peru’s larger hydrocarbon development agenda. Finally, the 
last section provides a detailed understanding of state practices surrounding hydrocarbon 
development in the Amazon region and, concretely, the way that they reflect specific 
patterns of domination, resulting in the de facto exclusion of indigenous peoples in the 
present hydrocarbon policy regime.    
The history of the oil development in the Peruvian Amazon 
 
 In Peru, petroleum was originally discovered in the 1860s, but did not become a 
major industry until the early 1900s (Drinot 2000, p. 169). Isolated from the Amazon 
region until the late 1960s, early 1970s, oil production was limited to the costal region in 
the far northwest of Peru. The industry started slow, but then began to steadily expand 
between 1900 and 1930. By 1924, oil was Peru’s leading export and in 1929 it accounted 
for 30 percent of the country’s export earnings (Thorp and Bertram 1978, p. 98). Similar 
to the rubber industry, the petroleum economy offered little benefit to the larger Peruvian 
economy. As a classic oligopoly, it was dominated by three private companies, one 
controlled by British interests, one by US interests, and another by an Italian immigrant, 
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Faustino Piaggio.51 The oil industry, in this context, became an important symbol of 
foreign domination sustained by complicit and often corrupt state policies and practices.  
 The International Petroleum Company (IPC) provides an illustrative example of 
the way that state, at this time, worked in conjunction with private interests. IPC was a 
product of the giant oil company Standard Oil of New Jersey, which began to purchase 
oil fields shortly after World War I, and by developing Peru’s major oil fields (Negritos, 
Lobitos, and Zorritos), became the major exporting firm in Peru and an important player 
in global industry (Thorp and Bertram 1978, p. 100; Drinot 2000, p. 169). Again, similar 
to other extractive industries in Peru, the oil industry provided little benefit to the local 
economy. In 1922, for example, a new petroleum law was implemented to deal with 
exceedingly high foreign profits, which imposed a 10 percent royalty on crude oil output. 
However, the Peruvian government negotiated a deal with ICP to make the company 
exempt from royalty payments in exchange for one million dollars in cash and assistance 
in purchasing US petroleum bonds (Drinot 2000, p. 169).52 Not surprisingly, these 
practices stirred up public sentiment against the company, eventually leading to its 
expropriation in 1968 by the military regime of Juan Velasco.  
                                                
51 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, these three oil fields were controlled by foreign 
interests: 1) Negritos, located on the hacienda La Brea y Parinas, in 1899 became the 
property of the British company, London and Pacific Petroleum. 2) Lobitos, discovered in 
1901, was developed by another British firm, Lobitos Oilfields. 3) Zorritos was originally 
controlled, from 1883, by Piaggio. In 1913 the Negritos oilfield was taken over by 
Standard Oil of New Jersey (Thorp and Berthramn 1978, p. 97-98).  
52 According to Thorp and Bertam (1978), oil companies and other foreign companies to 
a certain extent had the attitude that they were the rightful owners of the subsoil, in spite 
of Peruvian Law that by 1877 established the state as the owner of the subsoil. Initiated in 
1824 by Simon Bolivar granting ownership of the subsoil to one of his followers on the 
Brea-Pariñas hacienda, foreign companies inherited this position, considering themselves 
except from taxes. In 1911, for example, the IPC was paying taxes on only 10 out of 
41,600 claims (p. 108). 
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 In the mid 1930s the petroleum industry gradually started to decline. From an 
production standpoint, short term gain and a complex political environment led to the  
exhaustion of IPC’s most productive oil field at Brea-Parinas. Furthermore, these 
oligopolistic type practices produced a nationalist backlash, led by the left of center, anti-
imperialist political party APRA (The American Revolutionary Popular Alliance)53, who, 
along with other nationalist forces in the country, discouraged exploration, especially if it 
meant than more of Peru’s oil would be in the hands of foreign interests. Consequently, 
oil production declined from a high of 15 million barrels in 1936 to a low of 10 million 
barrels in 1940, a trend that would continue throughout the decade (Klarén 2000, p. 284).  
 In 1943 international interest in exploration for oil in the Amazon river basin was 
increasing as foreign companies began to seek concessions in Ecuador, Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Peru. Both the Prado (1939-1945) and Bustamante (1945-1948) 
governments, in spite of this, refused to open up the Amazon region to foreign 
exploration. The problem, however, was not a lack of interest in exploiting resources, but 
rather creating a more conducive political environment so that the state, not foreign 
interests, would benefit. The state, in fact, as early as 1934 had begun searching for new 
oil fields in the northeast jungle region.54 In other words, the reason that the Peruvian 
state did not open up the region to foreign oil companies was only because the state did 
not have the capacity to exploit the oil, not because it was reluctant in any way to 
exploiting oil in the region.  
                                                
53 APRA. Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Américana 
54 In 1934 a Petroleum department had been set up and by 1936 it had begun to explore in 
areas close to the Zorritos oil field. In 1944 state operations were organized as 
Establecimientos Petroleros Fiscales (EPF).The state conducted several exploratory 
missions in this time period, many of which failed. In 1944 the state failed to find oil on a 
jungle reserve zone near the Ucayali (Thorp and Berthram 1978, p. 167).  
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 The period from 1948 to 1970 was defined by a rising demand for oil products, 
the subsequent search for sources, and the ultimate failure to find new productive oil 
fields. This, again, was not from a lack of effort. A new petroleum law in 1952 attempted 
to provide a clear legal framework that would attract both domestic and foreign investors. 
This law (No. 11780) authorized the government to grant exploratory and production 
concessions, opened up new areas to foreign and domestic investment, and abolished the 
old system of export taxes and production royalties and implemented an income tax on 
oil companies. After successive attempts at exploration in the desert and offshore regions, 
in the early 1950s foreign companies began to explore the Amazon region. Results were 
less successful than anticipated. Out of fifteen exploratory wells, only one, in Maquia 
near Iquitos, led to the discovery of a commercial oil field. However, this find did lead to 
further exploratory efforts in the Amazon region, including efforts from Mobile and 
Union Oil, but, in the end, they did not result in substantial findings (Thorp and Bertram 
1978, p. 224).  
 Because of these lackluster results and increasing costs, the Peruvian companies 
were essentially forced out of the industry, leaving EPF (Establecimientos Petróleos 
Físcales), the Peruvian state company, as the only national company remaining. 
Furthermore, at this time there was a strong nationalist campaign to expropriate IPC’s 
Brea Parinas oilfield, which came to fruition in October of 1968 when Velasco took 
power. Following nationalist sentiments, the military government refused to compensate 
IPC,  took control of its Northern facilities, and reorganized the old state company EPF 
into Petroperú. The new state-led enterprise played an important role in the 1970s and 
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1980s in the exploration and exploitation oil resources in the Northern Amazon region, 
often working in joint ventures with foreign companies (Klarén 2000, p. 344).   
 The period before 1970, the beginnings of a much more aggressive penetration of 
oil exploitation in the Amazon region, was marked by three important factors. First, the 
petroleum industry in Peru, similar to the rubber industry, became symbolic of 
oligopolistic practices that were isolated from the rest of the economy and ended up 
benefiting foreign companies and local politicians. This understandably created a national 
backlash and the eventual expropriation of IPC facilities in the north of Peru. Second, in 
economic terms, Peru never became a major (or successful) exporter of petroleum, which 
meant that Peru was (and remains) a net importer of oil. In a constant effort to reverse 
this, especially during the 1950s, there were consistent attempts (mostly unsuccessful) at 
exploration throughout Peru. Third, at this time, the Amazon region remained relatively 
isolated from Petroleum oil development. While there were a few attempts and 
consequently a few relatively minor (i.e. Maquia) commercial fields in operation, the 
Amazon region remained largely unexplored.  This would change drastically in the early 
1970s.  
The 1970s and the impetus of the oil boom in the Peruvian Amazon  
 
 As mentioned, up until the late 1960s and early 1970s oil exploration in the 
Amazon region had been largely unsuccessful. Given the failed attempts in desert and 
offshore regions, for the government, the vast untapped resources in Peru’s jungles were 
the best hopes for returning Peru to its position as a net exporter of oil. The were a few 
attempts in the 1960s. Mobile Oil discovered a large gas field at Aguaytia, but because of 
the lack of a pipeline, they did not pursue the discovery. Mobile Oil and Union Oil did 
83 
 
explore in the Amazon region in the mid 1960s, but failed to find commercial fields. It 
was not until massive discoveries in the Ecuadorian Amazon region that renewed interest 
in the Peruvian Amazon took hold (Thorp and Bertram 1978, p. 227-229).  
 In the 1970s, as a result of new exploratory efforts, the Northern Amazon region 
became a major producer and supplier of hydrocarbons in Peru. Discoveries in the upper 
basins of the Pastaza, Corrientes, and Tigre rivers (the north central departments of 
Loreto and Alto Amazonas) and the middle and lower basins of the Corrientes rivers by 
Occidental Petroleum Company (Oxy) and Petroperú led to an intensive exploration and 
production process for nearly thirty years, at one point generating approximately 65 
percent of the oil consumed in Peru (La Torre 1999, p. 39). This led to an exploration 
boom, between 1973 and 1977, in which more than 20 private companies invested in oil 
exploration in the region. However, aside from Oxy and Petroperu’s important finds, 
there were no significant discoveries (Campodónico-Sánchez 1999, p. 11). As a result, oil 
development in the Amazon region was limited to this particular area. Petroperú and 
Oxy, nevertheless, built massive infrastructure, including airports, heliports, hangars, 
control towers, mess halls, offices, health centers, maintenance workshops, and 
everything necessary for a long-term oil production operations (La Torre Lopez 1999, p.  
53). Oxy built a pipeline that was completed by 1977 (Campodónico-Sánchez 1999, p. 9).  
 From the perspective of the state, this region became the most important oil 
producing region in Peru. Between 1971 and 1986, in Lot 1AB, Oxy operated more than 
100 wells, produced nearly 43 percent of all the petroleum in Peru, and became the most 
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productive oil lot in Peru’s history (p. 41).55 Known as the “jungle operations,” Petroperú 
in block 8 and 8x in Corrientes and Cambira river basins, in 1971, discovered the highly 
productive Trompeteros oilfield,56 which became the second most important oilfield in 
Peru. Petroperú made other important discoveries in the area, totaling 102 wells drilled 
by 1983 (La Torre 1999, p. 41-42; Finer and Orta-Martínez and  2010a, p. 1).  
In Chapter IV, I will deal more specifically with the present political 
consequences of the history of oil development for indigenous peoples throughout 
Amazonia. However, for indigenous peoples living in the region (mostly Achuar, 
Quichua, and Uraria) the consequences of petroleum development were devastating. 
Many environmentalist, human rights groups, and even organizations within the state 
claim that the Oxy and Petroperú’s operations during the 1970s and 1980s led to one of 
the most severe cases of environmental contamination in the history of Peru. In terms of 
this dissertation, the clearly negative experience of oil development is important in that it 
marks a reference point when indigenous groups consider the prospects future of oil 
development in the region. It is worth noting that in May of 2007, twenty-five indigenous 
Achuar plaints brought suit against the multinational company in the state of California 
for what they claim was  
egregious harm caused by Oxy over a thirty-year period in the Corrientes River 
basin during which Oxy contaminated the rivers and lands of the Achuar 
communities, causing death, widespread poisoning and destruction of their way of 
life57  
                                                
55 During this period, La Torre estimates the daily production at 52,479 barrels of crude 
per day (41).  
56 La Torre estimates that Lot 8 was producing 26,000 barrels per day (42) 
57 This is taken directly from the Earth Right International (ERI) website. Go to 
www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/indigenous_peruvians_sue_occidental_petroleum.html. 
ERI and the law firm, Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris and Hoffman LLP, together, 
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In short, the history of oil development in the Northern Peruvian Amazon reflects, 
to a large degree, the tensions that exist between indigenous peoples and the state over 
extractive development in the Peruvian Amazon. Extractive oil development is an 
example, consistent throughout history, the government’s view of the Amazon region as a 
space of untapped natural resources for national development. This pattern does not 
change in the contemporary, neoliberal period of hydrocarbon development in Peruvian 
Amazon.  
Peru’s neoliberal turn  
 
Like other Latin America nations, Peru experienced a shift from state-led 
development to a neoliberal development model. Somewhat ironically, Alan Garcia’s 
first term as president (1985-1990) marked the end of state-led development in Peru. 
Garcia, then young and charismatic, represented the anti-imperialist (populist) party, 
APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), limited debt payments to 10 
percent of national earnings, implemented a heterodox program of wage increases, price 
controls, and tax breaks, and nationalized Belco, a United States-based oil company. 
These policies led to hyperinflation, the collapse of wages, severe economic contraction, 
and Peru’s ostracism from the international financial community (Roberts 1995, p. 93; 
Mauceri 1995, p. 17; Wise 1994, p. 83). This scenario set the stage for a neoliberal shift 
in Peru, embraced by the governments of Fujimori (1990-2000), Toledo (2001-2006), and 
Garcia (2006-present). Natural resource development in Peru, since 1990, therefore, has 
taken place within the context of neoliberal reforms that, consistent with past extractive 
policies, seek to use Amazonian resources for national development.  
                                                                                                                                            
filed the class action lawsuit on behalf of the Achuar in Los Angeles California. The case 
is still pending.  
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Peru’s move to neoliberal economic policies occurred under what many scholars 
describe as “neoliberal populism” (Barr 2003, Arce 2003, Mauceri 1997, Kay 1996, 
Roberts 1995), where all three presidents (Fujimori, Toledo, and Garcia) campaigned 
against orthodox neoliberal policies, yet, once in office, shifted towards neoliberal 
economic prescriptions. Fujimori, campaigning as political outsider, ran against the 
famous novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who openly advocated a neoliberal shock program. 
By mid 1991, Fujimori had implemented what Gonzales de Olarte describes as “an 
extreme variant” of the policies advocated by the so called “Washington Consensus” 
(Williamson 1990), the World Bank, the IMF, and much of the international financial 
powers (Gonzales de Olarte 1993, p. 52).  Peru’s reform included both a short term 
economic stabilization package and long-term structural reform in which the state shifted 
from state-led development to a market-based model that focused on liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation (Roberts, 1995, p. 93; Mauceri 1995, p. 17; Wise 1994, p. 
83).  
As explained in the previous chapter, Fujimori’s economic agenda was 
accompanied by an authoritarian, anti-democratic political agenda. On April 5 of 1992, 
he carried out a coup d’état against his own government, closing congress, ordering 
judicial reform and essentially abolishing all political opposition (Gonzales de Olarte 
1993, p. 52). These economic reforms, therefore, were undertaken outside the realm of 
democratic, institutional politics.58 The coup led to a new congress, the Congreso 
                                                
58 It is important to note that Fujimore carried out antidemocratic practices, in part, to 
defeat the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the smaller MRTA (Movimiento 
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) guerrilla movement. The movement was particularly 
devastating for indigenous peoples throughout Peru, some claiming, that up to 45,000 
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Constituyente Democrático (CCD), which crafted the 1993 constitution to provide the 
legal framework for market based development initiatives (Arce 2003, p. 340). Fujimori’s 
political discourse was anti-establishment, specifically attacking what he called the 
partidocracia (Roberts 1995, p. 98). Fujimori turned to a group of civil technocrats to 
implement his economic development agenda. For example, Hernando de Soto, the 
director of a neoliberal think thank based in Lima, played an important role in negotiating 
the foreign debt and designing an anti-narcotics strategy (Mauceri 1995). Other key 
orthodox thinkers were Carlos Boloña, the Minister of Finance and Carlos Montoya, who 
was placed in charge of privatization efforts (Arce 2003, p. 341).   
To a large extent, the Toledo government embraced the free market policies 
initiated by Fujimori. While Toledo campaigned on his indigenous ancestry and a “rags 
to riches story” (born poor in a village in the Andes), he had close ties to the international 
financial community, studying at Stanford and Harvard, and working as a consultant for 
the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Inter-American Development Bank (Patrón-
Galindo 2004, p. 118). During his campaign he also made gestures against the neoliberal 
model, yet once in office he turned immediately to the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the World Bank to implement infrastructure projects and a neoliberal style 
reform process. Moreover, promising a favorable climate for investors, he appointed free 
trade and privatization advocates Pedro Pablo Kuczynski as Finance Minister and Robert 
Dañino as Prime Minister. He actively sought free trade agreements with Andean Nations 
and South Korea and proposed what the IMF called “an ambitious privatization program” 
                                                                                                                                            
indigenous peoples lost their lives in the midst of the government’s war against Sendero 




(Barr 2003, p. 166). In this context, Toledo’s administration was characterized by a 
“broadly orthodox economic policy” (Villarreal 2007, p. 9).  
Alan Garcia, similar to his predecessors, did not campaign on a neoliberal agenda, 
but ran as a centrist against the free market candidate, Lordes Flores, and ultranationalist 
Ollanta Humala (McClintock 2006, p. 95).  Once in office, however, Garcia not only 
continued with these neoliberal policies, but he intensified them. According to Crabtree, 
Garcia, worried about repeating the mistakes in his first administration, “has gone to the 
opposite extreme in an attempt to bury all vestiges of his earlier preference for a leftwing 
agenda” (Crabtree 2008). During the election, Garcia moved to the right, allying himself 
with National Unity and Alliance for the Future, two right-leaning political groups and 
putting together development agenda that was decidedly neoliberal. He appointed fiscally 
orthodox technocrat Luis Carranza as prime minister59 and relied on Toledo’s Minister of 
the Economy, Pedro Kuczynski, as one of his principal advisors.  
Broadly speaking, Garcia’s development policies focused on creating favorable 
economic conditions to attract large-scale capital investments in Peru, which required 
significant institutional and constitutional changes. This approach was welcomed by the 
international financial community, the United States, and other free market-oriented 
governments in the region. As such, Garcia distanced himself from Venezuela, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador, all of whom have engaged in strong critiques of neoliberal development and 
the US government. In this context, one of Garcia’s defining achievements was a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, which went into effect in February of 
                                                
59 See “Garcia’s choice of Prime Minister Cheered” Financial Times, July 22, 2006.  
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2009.60 Extolling the virtues of free trade in Latin America, at the singing ceremony in 
Washington DC Garcia commented, “It’s a great day for democracy and social justice 
and freedom. On the contrary, it’s a bad day for authoritarianism and those who are 
against democracy and free trade” (AFP 2007). Reflecting his faith in market-based 
policies, Garcia has also pursued FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Canada, and China and 
has initiated negotiations with European Union.  
Free trade, institutional reform, and Garcia’s “legislative decrees”   
 
The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States is, perhaps, the single 
most important piece of legislation in this conflict. It is important because it marks not 
only Garcia’s push toward free trade, but it has set the foundation for institutional reform 
in Peru, and Garcia’s broader development agenda in which extractive development (oil 
and gas, mining, hydroelectric, biofuels, forestry, etc) plays a central role. More 
importantly, Garcia’s legislative decrees, the centerpiece of indigenous critiques, are the 
direct result of “special powers” given to the executive branch to implement the FTA. 
After the passage of the FTA, the Garcia administration argued that the executive branch 
needed special powers to adapt Peruvian legislation to the terms of the agreement with 
the US. In this context, in December of 2007, Congress approved a law (Nº 29157) that 
granted the executive branch the faculty to legislate for 180 calendar days. As a result, in 
the first semester of 2008, the Garcia government promulgated ninety-nine legislative 
decrees that, in theory, were linked to the FTA (Barandiarán-Gómez 2008a).  
                                                
60 Negotiations for the FTA started in May of 2004 under the Toledo government. It was 
signed by both parties in the US on December 8, 2005, ratified by Peru on June 29, 2006 
and by the US, definitively, on December 4, 2007. The FTA is formally known as the 
Trade Promotion Agreement between the US and Peru.  
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Some observers (Ruiz Molleda 2009; Eguiguren 2008; Bandariarán-Gómez 
2008b), however, argued that the legislative decrees went beyond legal reconciliation 
between Peru and the US and, more boldly, were used as a pretext to implement profound 
institutional change in Peru.61 In a 2008 editorial, in reference to the legislative decrees, 
President Garcia wrote,  
thanks to the legislative faculties granted by Congress, a great juridical 
transformation has been carried forth that will permit our country to advance on 
the road to modernity, administrative celerity, investment and employment. As 
such, Peru will take advantage of the extraordinary market conditions in the 
world” (Garcia 2008a).  
 
These legislative decrees, in this case, exemplify the Peruvian government’s longstanding 
colonial development mentality towards to Amazon region. Within the context of a 
neoliberal development agenda, Garcia argued that the Amazon region was an essentially 
undeveloped or underdeveloped region that lacked the necessary ingredients not so much 
to develop the region, but to provide needed resources to Peru.  
 More specifically, Garcia argued that the Amazon region lacked the necessary 
financial capital, modern technology, and legal framework to development the region. In 
a legal sense, the idea was not only attract foreign investment, but to re-categorize the 
much of the land from it’s current “protected” status to one that is more apt for 
“productive,” economic purposes. This would require a legal framework to open up land 
that was considered (by Garcia) as unproductive, much of which was categorized as 
protected land, whether it be indigenous titled land, indigenous reserves, or 
environmentally protected lands. Environmental activists and indigenous leaders referred 
to this legislative package as the “law of the jungle,” given that it would undermine the 
                                                
61 Several legislative decrees have been found, in Peruvian Courts, to be unconstitutional. 
See Ruiz Molleda (2009).  
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collective property regime in the region (to some extent, already undermined in the 
Andes), open up “uncultivated lands” to lumber, mining, and oil companies, privatize the 
use of public water (irrigation projects), lower the restrictions on transgenic seeds and 
promote bio-fuel plantations, and weaken environmentally protective measures in 
national parks and other specially protected areas (Rénique 2010, p.118). Some argued 
that it would transfer over forty-five million hectares of the protected Amazonian spaces 
to be re-categorized as agriculture land and/or extractive lands for “productive” purposes 
(Hughes 2010, p. 87).   
I discuss the specific content of these decrees in the following chapter within the 
context of indigenous resistance to them and to Garcia’s broader development agenda. 
Consequently, there is no need (here) to explain the content of the decrees in detail. 
However, it is important to point out that hydrocarbon development takes place within 
the government’s broader attempt to implement a new legal structure to develop the 
natural resources in the Amazon region.  
Institutional context of hydrocarbon development  
 
The institutional framework is especially critical in the case of hydrocarbon 
development policy. According Barandiarán-Gomez of the Peruvian environmental 
NGO, Derecho, Ambiente, y Recursos Naturales (DAR), Peru does not have a clear, 
coherent, natural resource policy, but instead relies on sectorial policies. In Peru, this 
creates a situation in which the Executive branch is able to prioritize his (or her) 
development agenda, given the “political moment” or the specific interests of any one 
particular government. As Barandiará-Gomez states:  
In Peru, we do not have, with any certainty, the existence of a policy–or policy 
directions–in hydrocarbons or energy in which we are clearly able to identify to 
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the country. [We do not have] a long-term, medium-term, or short-term vision. 
What everyone knows is that within our state apparatus there is no public 
institution capable of developing an integral, holistic, and systematic method of 
planning that might define our public development policies. What we have is a 
practice that gives each sector must respond to decisions based on [political] 
situations and independent priorities (Barandiarán-Gómez, 2008a, p. 11).  
 
The problems, as Barandiarán-Gómez points out it that natural resource policy (and 
hydrocarbon policy) are subject to the whims of each government, who gives specific 
sectors power in accordance with the government’s specific interests. In the case of 
hydrocarbon development in Peru, given Garcia’s interest (or obsession) with turning 
Peru into a net exporter of oil, he has give extraordinary power specifically to those 
institutions that surround hydrocarbon development: the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
and Perúpetro.  
 In Peru, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) is responsible for 
elaborating, proposing, approving, and implementing hydrocarbon policy (Article 3, Law 
26221). It is also important to mention that MINEM approves rules and regulations that 
govern industrial security, environmental protection, and relations with indigenous 
peoples. Under MINEM, the General Office of Environmental Issues (DGAA) is 
responsible for  addressing environmental problems that result from energy and mining 
activities (Gurmendi 2008).  
Also under the direction of MIMEM, Perúpetro SA (Autonomous Society) is the 
state hydrocarbon entity that is in charge of promoting private investments in the 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon activities (Article 4, Law 26221). Perúpetro, 
not to be confused with Petroperú, represents the state in its dealings with private 
companies and is in charge of negotiating, signing, and overseeing all hydrocarbon 
contracts with private entities and provides important data to oil companies interested in 
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investing in Peru. Perúpetro as an “Autonomous Society” is organized and promoted as a 
private stockholding company and is able to operate under free market principles. Its 
mission, based on a neoliberal approach, is to “situate Peru as an attractive country for 
the investment and development of the hydrocarbons exploration and production 
activities” (Perúpetro: “Literature for Investors”).62  
  The Supervisory Entity for Investment in Energy (OSINERG), created within the 
framework of privatizations63 (Law 29864), is responsible for regulating and supervising 
the activities in the hydrocarbons and electric sectors. OSINGERG ensures that private 
companies comply with the legal, technical, and environmental provisions of 
hydrocarbon development. The organization also provides investors with access to 
resources and information regarding market conditions (Gastelumendi 2003). 
Interestingly, Vladimir Pinto of Racimos de Unguragui points out that OSINERG has 
never in its history shut down an petroleum or gas operation for environmental 
contamination (or violations), even in the most egregious cases of Rio Corrientes in 
Northern Peru (Pinto-Lopez 2007) .  
In terms of protecting indigenous rights, several state organizations play a role. 
For example, the National Ombudsman’s Office (el Defensoría del Pueblo) is responsible 
for ensuring that citizen rights are protected, specifically responding to indigenous 
denouncements and complaints. In the case of the Peruvian Amazon, el Defensoria has 
been relatively active and, to some extent, critical of Garcia’s aggressive agenda. The 
                                                
62 The is from literature that was given to potential investors at Perupetro’s the “Houston 
Road Show” in February of 2008.  
63 Another important organization in terms of the neoliberal reforms is Proinversion, 
whose objective is to make Peru an attractive place for private investment. It seeks to 
increase Peru’s competitiveness through the formulation and implementation (working 
with other agencies, to encourage investment and reduce investment costs.  
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Ministry of Health provides some vigilance for potentially contaminating hydrocarbon 
activities and The National Institute of Natural Resources (INRENA), under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, is in charge of protecting Peru’s natural renewable resources and 
biodiversity, ensuring that development takes place in a sustainable manner.  The 
National Institute of Andean, Amazon, and Afro-Peruvian peoples (INDEPA), where 
nine indigenous representatives (three from the Amazon) serve, should in theory be 
active in the formulation and approval of hydrocarbon policy. Finally, regional 
governments also have  the power to promote and regulate activities that affect their 
departments and provinces, including environmental regulations and indigenous rights 
(Pinto-Lopez 2007). The Ministry of the Environment was created in 2008 and Antonio 
Brack, a well known Peruvian environmentalist (also an oil consultant on environmental 
issues), was named as minister.64  
The legal framework of hydrocarbon policy in Peru 
  
Reflective of these broader neoliberal changes, Fujimori began the process of 
moving from a state-led hydrocarbon development model to a market based approach that 
encouraged private investment, relaxed government intervention, and created a new legal 
framework for the oil and gas industry in Peru (see Schreck 1996, Sterner 1991, 
Hogenboom and Fernández-Jilberto 2009). The state’s role changed from strategically 
producing and regulating hydrocarbons to promoting hydrocarbon opportunities and 
                                                
64 President Garcia announced the creation of the Environment Ministry in December of 
2007. He gave Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo and environmentalist Antonio Brack 
only three weeks to design the institution and develop a national policy and an 
environmental assessment of the country.  Some suggest that the motive behind the 
creation of the ministry was political. Garcia needed the existence of an “Environmental 
Ministry” before a controversial Inter-American Development Bank loan was approved 




guaranteeing a stable, legal framework for private investment (Távara and Vásquez 2007, 
p. 15). From this moment forward oil development came to depend principally on private 
sector initiatives and attracting foreign capital, which, as part of a neoliberal policy 
agenda, required policies that removed institutional barriers, ended government 
monopolies, and privatized state-owned enterprises (Campos et. Al. 2006).   
In November of 1991, Fujimori began to implement the legal framework (LD 
757), still in place today, to open up the hydrocarbon industry to foreign and private 
investment. Initiating the deregulation process, the state-run oil company, Petroperú lost 
its monopoly on both upstream and downstream activities (LD 655), which included 
negotiating and entering into contracts with third parties in the upstream sector and all 
aspects of production (refining, manufacturing, etc.) in the downstream sector.65 The 
market was opened up to foreign and nation capital and, in 1992, the government 
privatized most of Petroperú (Gastelumendi 2003; Campodónico-Sánchez 1999, p. 16).  
The most important change in hydrocarbon policy came with the 1993  
“Hydrocarbons Law (Law 26221)”, which set the existing legal framework for oil 
development in Peru. Reflective of the neoliberal shift, the law declared that “the 
Government promotes the development of Hydrocarbon activities on the basis of free 
competition and free access to economic activity” (Title I, Article 2). This law led to 
several significant changes:  
                                                
65 The upstream sector includes exploration and development in the search for and 
production of crude oil, natural gas, and oil from tar sands. The downstream sector 
includes refineries, product distribution, truck, rail and pipeline transportation, and retail 
gasoline markets.  
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• It created Perúpetro to promote investments in the exploration and exploitation 
activities, to negotiate, sign, and oversee hydrocarbon contracts and, as 
mentioned, to represent the state in its dealings with private entities.  
• Based on the idea of contract law, under these new provisions, the extracted 
petroleum no longer belonged to the state, but to the contractor, who, in exchange, 
now would pay royalties to the state.  
• Price controls were eliminated, leaving prices to market supply and demand, and 
former requirements to sell to the national market were also eliminated.  
• Contract requirements in the exploration phase were relaxed, the time frame for 
exploration and exploitation contracts was extended, and the process for 
approving contracts was simplified (Gastelumendi 2003; Campodónico-Sánchez 
1999, p. 16-17).  
These changes provided the basic foundation for hydrocarbon policy under Toledo and 
Garcia and were part of the explicit goal to turn Peru into a net exporter of oil and gas, 
something that had not occurred in Peru since the mid 1980s.66 The idea of turning Peru 
into a net exporter of Petroleum has, in some respects, existed throughout the years, even 
under Velasco, however, under Garcia, these efforts have intensified dramatically.  
This led to an intense effort to bring in private capital. Between 1993 and 1999, 
under Fujimori, the government signed 37 exploration contracts, which amounted to 1.3 
billion dollars in investments (Campodónico-Sanchez 1999, p. 8). Toledo continued 
Fujimori’s policies. In 2002, for example, the Toledo government mounted an aggressive 
campaign to promote private investment, passing legislation to lower royalty payments 
                                                




by 30 percent and making the contract process more flexible so that companies could 
invest in more lucrative projects (Gastelumendi 2003, also see Gurmendi 2004). As of 
2006, Toledo managed to signed more oil and gas contracts that at any time in the history 
of Peru (Cueto 2006).  
The move to bring in private capital for hydrocarbon development, as mentioned, 
intensified under Garcia. As of September of 2009, there were 92 oil and gas contracts in 
force. Since 2006, under Garcia’s watch, the Peruvian government has signed 31 
exploration contracts with oil companies, breaking records in 2007 and 2009. In 2007 the 
global increase in investments in the hydrocarbon sector was 110 percent over 2006.67 
Private investments between January and November of 2009 amounted to U.S. $797 
million (see Living in Peru.com). In January of 2011, the government plans to offer 10 
more blocks for concession (20 for the entire year) (upstreamonline.com; perupetro.com).  
Increase in contracts between 2005 and 2009 (as of September 2009) 
 
Year  Exploitation  Exploration Total  
2005 17 28 45 
2006 19 42 61 
2007 19 65 84 
2008 19 61 80 
2009 19 73 92 
Source: Perúpetro  
 
As a result of these policies, the majority of the Amazon region is now slated for 
oil and gas development. According to the Institute of Wellbeing (Instituto de Bien 
Común), from 1975 until 2004 the number of concessions in the region was relatively 
                                                
67 In 2007, the Fraser Institute of Global Petroleum study found the, along with the US 
states of Wyoming and Colorado, Peru had a regulatory climate more conducive to oil 





small, amounting to about 13 percent of the region68 (see Smith 2005). From 2005 to the 
present, however, the number of concessions skyrocketed to approximately 73 percent of 
the Amazon region. The majority of these blocks overlap indigenous territories, 
indigenous reserves for isolated indigenous peoples, territorial reserves, and other 
national protected areas.69 According to Finer, in the Amazon region 20 blocks overlap 
semi-restricted areas (Communal Reserves and Reserved Zones), 58 blocks overlap lands 
that are titled to indigenous peoples, and 17 blocks overlap indigenous groups in 
voluntary isolation (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010a).  
Natural gas and the Camisea discovery 
 
Peru’s hydrocarbon policy is also closely related to the Camisea Natural Gas 
project located in the Urabamba River Valley of Peru. In short, massive discoveries of 
natural gas reserves in the mid 1980s led to a rethinking of hydrocarbon policy that 
would eventually define Peru’s energy policies under both Toledo and Garcia. Given the 
potential of these untapped reserves, the government has set forth a bold policy approach 
that seeks to reduce the country’s dependence on the importation and use of petroleum. 
Internally, government policy is focused on creating a viable natural gas industry and 
establishing a national market to promote the consumption of natural gas throughout Peru 
(especially in Lima and Callao). Externally, the government, as discussed, is hoping to 
increase hydrocarbon exports, thus, correcting the hydrocarbon deficit that Peru has 
suffered for nearly twenty years (Barandiarán-Gomez 2008).  
                                                
68 According to the Institute of Wellbeing (IBC), the Amazon region has an area of 
approximately 8 million km squared.  
69 For a detailed look at hydrocarbon development in the entire Amazon River Basin see 
Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010a, 2010b.  
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Camisea began with the participation of three international petroleum 
giants⎯Shell, Mobile, and Chevron⎯but has since morphed into a multi-stage project 
with many small to medium size oil and gas companies. Royal Dutch did exploratory 
work in the region from 1981 to 1987, which led to the discovery of two gas fields (San 
Martin and Cashiruiaru) in 1986.  Shell signed an original agreement with the 
government to exploit Camisea in 1988, but the negotiations failed and the company 
ended up leaving. In 1994, however, Shell returned to the region to negotiate with the 
government and in 1995 the company entered into a consortium with Mobile to exploit 
the Camisea gas fields. However, despite considerable investment ($250 million) and 
intense negotiations with the government, the Shell-Mobile consortium decided the 
project was not financially feasible and in 1998, again, left the region (Campondónico- 
Sanchez 1999, p. 34).  
In April of 1999, the Fujimori government issued an emergency decree (022-99) 
that mandated the implementation of the Camisea project as a matter of national interest 
(Hanish 2005, p. 3). As a result, in May of 1999, the Commission for Private Investment 
Promotion (COFOPRI) called two international biddings for the project. The project was 
divided into two separate modules: one for exploration and the other for the 
transportation of gas and gas liquids from the Camisea fields to the coast and to supply 
gas for Lima and Callao. The project, which would start production in 2004, was named 
by Project Finance Magazine as the “deal of the year” in 2004 (Vences 2006).  
The main objective was to produce and transport natural gas and natural gas 
liquids from the San Martin and Cashiriari fields (Block 88) to the Peruvian markets and 
to the coast to export. The project was divided into three parts:  
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• An upstream consortium (development of fields and a processing plant) made up 
of and led by the Argentine company Pluspetro, the US company Hunt Oil, the 
South Korean company SK, and the Peruvian firm Tecgas to carry out upstream 
operations.  
• A downstream consortium, called Transportadora de Gas de Peru (TPG), would 
build two massive pipelines and the transportation to Lima and the coast. It was 
made up of Tecgas (Argentina), Pluspetrol (Argentina), Hunt Oil (US), SK 
Corportation (Korea), Sonatrach (Algeria) and Graña and Montero (Peru).  
• The distribution of gas was awarded to a Belgium Company, Tractelbel (Riveros 
and Brehaut 2005, p. 1-2). This approach focused on attracting more midsize oil 
companies rather than major corporations, which  to a large degree has continued 
throughout the Garcia administration.  
The financing to the project is also important. With an estimated cost at $1.54 billion, the 
consortium approached a multitude of financial entities: private banks, export-credit 
agencies, and multilateral development banks. Early in the process the a few private 
banks such as Citibank, JP-Morgan-Chase, the US Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, and the Brazilian export-credit agency (BNDES) were involved. However, 
in 2002, TPG and Pluspetrol entered into negotiations with the US Import-Export Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Andean Development Bank (Johnson 
2005).70   
                                                
70 Given the scope of the project and the potential environmental and social 
repercussions, many environmentalists, indigenous groups and other social advocate used 
the banks strategically to halt the project all together or to ensure better environmental 
monitoring. See Johnson 2005 for details. Also visit the Amazon Watch and Bank 
Information Center websites.   
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It is estimated that the Camisea fields contain 11 trillion cubic feet of gas and 600 
million barrels of liquids, which amounts to ten times the amount of fossil fuels 
compared to all of Peru’s other reserves combined (Johnson 2005, p. 7). The first major 
hydrocarbon discovery since the Trompeteros find in 1975, the project is touted by the 
government and international financial agencies (i.e. the Inter-American Development 
Bank) as “the model” for hydrocarbon development in the Peruvian Amazon both for its 
productive potential and for the project’s environmental and social record.  
For environmentalists and pro-indigenous advocates, however, the project is 
controversial. Environmentalists point out that in the fall of 2004, the first eighteen 
months of operations, the Camisea pipeline had five major spills (Finer et. Al. 2008). The 
area, the Southwestern Amazon Moist Forest Region, is home to one of the globe’s 200 
eco-regions and part of the Urubamba region is recognized as one of the world’s twenty-
five hotspots given “a combination of high species richness, endemism, number and 
diversity of habitats, and bio-geographic and evolutionary processes” (Riveros and 
Brehaut 2005, p. 3).  Further, multiple groups of indigenous peoples reside in the region, 
some of whom live in voluntary isolation, a special category recognized by international 
law and the Peruvian Constitution.71  
It is important to recognize that Peru’s hydrocarbon policy is somewhat 
constrained by Peru’s existing environmental and social framework. The issue of 
indigenous rights, both nationally and internationally, will be addressed briefly in the 
                                                
71 The Machiguenga (10,000) and the Yine (2,500) live in the Northern part of the Lower 
Urubamba and along the Ucayali region. An Ashaninka group (1,500) migrated to the 
region in 1980s.  The project also affects the voluntary isolated peoples living in the 
Nahua Kugapakori Reserves, consisting of 450 Nahua, 950 Kugapakori and 200 Kirineri. 
See Hanish 2005.  
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following section. However, the Peruvian Constitution of 1993, several civil codes, 
national laws, and a host of international agreements and accords, to a degree, force the 
government to promote, design, and implement hydrocarbon policy in accordance within 
the context of environmental and social constraints. The Peruvian Constitution, for 
example, directly addresses the importance of sustainable development, protection of 
biodiversity, and respect for indigenous peoples territorial rights. Internationally, Peru is 
a signatory to several international agreements and accords that, again, protect the 
environmental and social integrity of indigenous territories.72 
Peru’s hydrocarbon policy agenda, therefore, includes an important, yet 
contradictory environmental component. The shift towards natural gas is framed not only 
as a way to reduce Peru’s dependence on foreign petroleum, but natural gas is marketed 
as a cleaner energy source, one that will reduce Peru’s carbon footprint. Hydrocarbon 
development, in general, is framed within the context of sustainable practices and respect 
                                                
72 The 1993 Peruvian constitution obliges the Peruvian state to promote sustainable 
development and protect biodiversity in the Amazon region. The Law to Promote 
Investment in the Amazon Region (Nº27037) specifically addresses all investment in the 
region should respect biological diversity, the sustainable use of resources, and the 
identity of “native” and “campesino” communities (Art. 4). Article 66 of the constitution 
mandates the sustainable use of natural resources. Existing legislation restricts the 
extraction of natural resources in certain Natural Protected Areas (i.e. National Parks, 
Natural Sanctuaries, and Historic Sanctuaries) (Law of Natural Protected Areas, Nº 
26834). The state is obliged to promote the creation of wealth only when it does not place 
at risk the “health, morals, and public security,” of citizens (Art. 44). The Constitution 
recognizes the legal existence of “native” and “campesino” communities and provides a 
degree of social, political, and economic autonomy over indigenous territory. Peru is 
signatory to national and international norms and codes: UN Declaration of Human 
Rights; International Pact of Civil and Political Rights, International Convention over the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention ILO 169, 1985 Civil 
Code on the “inalienability, the imprescriptibility, the un-seizability”  of native and 
campesino communities, the Law of Native Communities and Agriculture Development 
in the Jungle and Jungle-edge regions for the demarcation and titling of lands for native 
communities, the Law for the Protection of Indigenous and Original Peoples in Situations 
of Isolation and Initial Contact; and others (see Barandiarán-Gomez 2008a).  
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for native peoples. However, Peru’s larger energy goals, as mentioned, work to open up 
the region to foreign capital. The development of the biofuels (especially palm oil) and 
other alternative fuels (i.e. forestry products) in the Amazon region is also a priority of 
the Garcia government.73  
State Practices and indigenous rights to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)  
 
 This chapter, thus far, has addressed the history of hydrocarbon development and 
the current institutional framework designed for implementation.  It should be clear that, 
historically, Peruvian governments have always seen extractive development in the 
Amazon region as a key component to a larger development agenda. In this context, 
Garcia’s hydrocarbon policy, albeit aggressive, is a mere continuation of the Peruvian 
state’s extractive development agenda. Since 1976 and the first reform of the Native 
Communities Act, Peruvian governments have enacted policies to implement this larger 
development agenda (Stocks 1988), which historically has come at the expense of 
indigenous rights. In this section, I will examine some of the specific state practices 
associated with the implementation of hydrocarbon policy on indigenous territories, 
which have been created within the framework of indigenous territorial rights. In terms of 
broader issues of state-indigenous relations, as Migdal’s state-in-society approach 
suggests, this is precisely where “patterns of domination” are manifested, which exist, in 
many respects, a the periphery of state-society relations (Migdal et. Al., p. 9).   
While a host of state entities are involved in hydrocarbon development, in this 
section, I will focus on the two principal agencies that are responsible for the promotion 
                                                
73 See Article 3 of the Law of Promotion of the Biofuel Market (Nº28054). Also see “IDB 




and implementation of oil and gas development in Peru: the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines (MINEM) and Perúpetro, Peru’s hydrocarbon licensing agency. As discussed, 
MINEM is the state entity in charge of both promoting and regulating oil and gas 
development in Peru and, Perúpetro, as the hydrocarbon licensing agency, represents the 
state in its dealings with private companies interested in investing in oil and gas 
development. Both entities are responsible for not only informing indigenous peoples of 
hydrocarbon development, but for establishing relations between the state, indigenous 
communities, and private companies that are awarded concessions to explore and produce 
hydrocarbons on indigenous territories 
Most directly, indigenous peoples participate in the hydrocarbon process in two 
distinct, but related practices74: 1) informative workshops, and 2) public audiences to 
approve the Environmental Impact Studies.75 Both of these practices revolve around the 
elaboration and execution of a series of environmental and social studies76 to ensure that 
hydrocarbon activity takes place without harming the environment, natural resources, or 
                                                
74 According to a MINEM and Peruvian Law, citizens participate in the entire process of 
hydrocarbon development. The most recent manifestation of this is in the Supreme 
Decree Nº 012-2008-EM. For details see MIMEM (2008). “Las actividades de 
hidrocarburos, la participación ciudadana y los instrumentos de gestión ambiental.” 
Presentation of the General Office of Social Management. Iquitos January 1 2008. 
75 Both of these are required by law. There are other mechanisms which are framed as 
‘complementary,’ but not obligatory. These include: 1) observation box (buzon de 
observaciones y opinions), 2) office of information and citizen participation (oficina de 
información y participación ciudadana), 3) guided visits (visitas guidadas), 4)  
Promotional team and diffusion through television, radio, and written media (equipo de 
promotores y difusión a través de medios de comunicación escrita, televisiva o radial). 
See Decreto Supremo Nº012-2008-EM.  
76 Environmental Impact Study, Environmental Impact Study semi-detailed, 
Environmental Management Plan, Community Relations Plan, the Declaration of 
Environmental Impact, and the Abandonment Plan.  
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the people that inhabit the area.77 Perúpetro is responsible for holding the events and 
MINEM is in charge of evaluating and approving the environmental studies (MINEM 
2008).   
Crucially, hydrocarbon policy is promoted around the notion of creating a 
harmonious relationship between state, company, and civil society.78 According to 
Perúpetro, informative workshops are designed to bring together representatives from 
native communities, companies, and regional and local authorities to inform the public of 
the details of the proposed oil and gas project (both a representative from Perúpetro and 
MINEM must be there. See Pinto Lopez).79 The objectives, for Perúpetro, are (1) to 
identify and incorporate strategic allies for the execution of local and regional 
development projects, (2) to develop an integral policy of social responsibility with the 
cooperation and compromise of those contracted, and (3) to promote an exercise of co-
responsibility between companies, communities, and the state in development projects.80 
Before any hydrocarbon activity takes place the contracted company must present 
to the competent authority an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) that contains a baseline 
study of socio-economic conditions of the area, all potential impacts (social, economic, 
and health) to indigenous and peasant communities, and the specific measures that 
                                                
77 The most complete document that articulates citizen participation in hydrocarbon 
activities is the “Law of Citizen Participation in Hydrocarbon Activities.” Supreme 
Decree Nº 012-2008-EM. 
78 In regional informative workshops Perúpetro describes a new three-party relation 
between native communities (and representatives), regional and local governmental 
authorities, and business. This is taken from “Diálogo Tripartito en la Región Ucayali: 
promoción de lotes de hidrocarburos- una propuesta para el desarrollo,” a powerpoint 
presentation conducted by Perúpetro in July 2008.  
79 According to SD 015-2006, the idea of public participation is to bring together the 
state, the entity the will carry out the project, and the population.  
80 Perúpetro (2008). “Diálogo Tripartito en la Región Ucayali: promoción de lotes de 
hidrocarburos- una propuesta para el desarrollo.” (powerpoint presentation July 2008).  
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should be adopted to prevent, minimize, or eliminate these effects (DS 003-2000-EM, 
Art. 2; DS 046-93-EM Art. 10; DS 041-2001-EM Art. 2).  After these studies are 
evaluated by MINEM, then they are subject to a public audience, in which all actors are, 
according to Peruvian Law, allowed to express their opinion. The standards of MINEM 
state that the EIS should inform the population about the details of the hydrocarbon 
project, collect observations and suggestions from the population and local authorities, 
and include these observations in a required evaluation.81 
Much of the controversy surrounding oil and gas development on indigenous 
territorial spaces is related to Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC), a concept that is 
expressed in the United Nation’s Declaration on Indigenous Rights (2007) and 
International Labour Organization (LO) Convention 169 (1989), to which Peru is a 
signatory.82 Thus, the Peruvian state is subject to an international human rights regime 
that, on paper, that supports indigenous claims to protect the environmental and cultural 
integrity of indigenous territories and to decide their own development path. For 
example, Article 3 of the UN Declaration stipulates that indigenous peoples have the 
“right to self-determination” and, “[by] virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development” (UN 
2007). In a similar vein, ILO 169 recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain 
their own way of life (language, identities, and religion), to exercise control over their 
                                                
81 The is taken from a MIMEM presentation in 2008 titled “Las actividades de 
hidrocarburos, la participación ciudadana y los instrumentos de gestión ambiental.” It 
was presented by the General Office of Social Management in Iquitos on January 1. 
82 ILO 169 was signed by Peru into law in December of 1993 (Legislative Resolution 
26253) and the UN Declaration in December of 2007. Because ILO is an international 
treaty it is legally, constitutionally binding on the Peruvian state. This is not the same as 
the UN Declaration, which is an agreement and is not legally binding.  
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own institutions, and calls attention to the distinct contributions of indigenous peoples to 
humankind, including cultural diversity and social and ecological harmony (ILO 169).  
Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) relates directly to the government’s 
responsibility to fully inform indigenous peoples and achieve consensus (or agreement) 
before development projects take place on indigenous territories. In theory, FPIC 
provides indigenous peoples with the legal tools to prevent or significantly modify 
private or state development projects that violate indigenous territorial rights (see 
Colchester and Ferrari 2007, Chirif and Garcia Hierro 2007). Article 32 of the UN 
Declaration stipulates:  
States shall consult and cooperate with indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their land or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization, or 
exploitation of mineral, water, or other resources (UN 2007).  
 
With similar language, ILO 169 (Article 6) declares that “Governments shall consult the 
people concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their 
respective institutions,” and these consultations, “shall be undertaken in good faith and in 
a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the object of achieving agreement or 
consent” (ILO 169).  
Given that ILO 169 is a treaty, rather than an agreement, in Peru it is legally 
binding and is, therefore, part of Peruvian law (Articles 55, 56, and 57 of the Peruvian 
Constitution). In relation to oil and gas development, much of the responsibility for 
ensuring that ILO 169 is upheld lies directly with Perúpetro and MINEM. Both 
organizations, not surprisingly, accept that they are constitutionally obliged to follow 
these accords, especially ILO 169. For example, the most recent Supreme Decree, 
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approving new rules for the citizen participation in hydrocarbon activities, acknowledges 
that  
[the] Peruvian State ratified the Convention 169 of the ILO on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, which obliges governments to assume the responsibility to 
develop, with the participation of the involved peoples, a coordinated and 
systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples, and guarantee the respect 
for their integrity” (DS 012-2008-EM).  
 
Perúpetro and MINEM argue that by providing informative workshops and public 
audiences to discuss environmental impact studies they are fulfilling their obligations 
under these accords. In its official strategic plan for 2008-2011, MINEM makes it clear 
that they are “complying with international agreements ratified by our country that are 
related to the social-environmental sector” (OIT 169, Biodiversidad,  RAMSAR, Marpol, 
Basilea, Kyoto, etc.) (MINEM 2008, p. 14). In a guide to community relations that 
MINEM provides to oil and gas companies, the organization refers to relations with 
indigenous peoples within the context of ILO 169, even providing a summary of articles 
15 and 16, which they consider most relevant to hydrocarbon development on indigenous 
lands (MINEM 2001, p. 74).  
On their website Perúpetro claims that “conscious of the need to establish good 
relations with civil society”, Perúpetro has “initiated a special relation with indigenous 
communities” in which the state, oil and gas companies, and indigenous communities 
work together harmoniously, companies providing social benefits to indigenous 
communities and indigenous communities participating in hydrocarbon project. 
Perúpetro, in addition claims that they are “complying with what is established in 
Convention 169 of the ILO.”83 It is important to reiterate that both MINEN and 
                                                
83 http://mirror.perupetro.com.pe/protamb-s.asp .  
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Perúpetro argue that through the entire process of the elaboration and diffusion of the 
environmental impact studies they are upholding ILO 169 and other legal provisions that 
provide indigenous peoples with rights over their land.  
The question of whether the Peruvian state by virtue of the informative workshops 
and the EIAs upholds indigenous rights stipulated in these accords is subject to much 
interpretation. For the Peruvian state, it is clear that indigenous peoples do not have the 
legal right to prevent oil development.  Government officials continuously point out that 
the state is rightful owner of all natural resources: Article 66 of the Constitution 
stipulates:  
All natural resources, renewable and nonrenewable, are the nation's patrimony. 
The government enjoys the sovereign right to their development. Organic laws 
define the terms for their use and concession to private parties. Such concessions 
grant real rights to the holders subject to such laws (Peruvian Constitution 1993).  
 
In other words, it is the government’s constitutional right to develop Peru’s natural 
resources, including hydrocarbons found on indigenous territories.84  
 However, according to indigenous advocates, the Peruvian government clearly 
violates the spirit of ILO 169 and the latest UN Declaration. One of their main arguments 
is that the state must negotiate with indigenous communities in “good faith,” meaning 
that consultations must take place with the objective of reaching a consensus. As such, 
ILO Article 6 of the ILO treaty mandates,  
[Consultations] carried out in application of this convention (agreement) must 
take place in good faith and in a manner that is appropriate to the circumstances, 
with the objective of coming to an agreement or achieving consent over the 
proposed measures” (ILO 169. Article 6). 
  
                                                
84 The Organic Hydorcarbon Law also states that “in situ” hydrocarbons are the property 
of the government (Title II, Article 8).  
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Indigenous peoples and environmental advocates point out that in Peru consultations are 
simply informative and, in reality, there are virtually no mechanisms for dialogue or 
discussion. In fact, the newly passed legislation that guides citizen participation in 
hydrocarbon activities (DS 012-2008-EM), considered by the government as monumental 
achievement, was condemned by indigenous advocates because it did not improve 
indigenous participation given the state’s excessively restrictive interpretation of FPIC85 
(Barandaiarán-Gómez 2008a, p. 22).  
From the perspective of the Garcia government, ILO 169 does not require the 
state to reach consensus and, consequently, indigenous peoples do not have the legal 
faculty to reject oil and gas projects on their land. As stipulated in this Supreme Decree,  
[the] objective of the information and public diffusion process is to consider and 
incorporate the criteria of the community as deemed appropriate; this process 
does not imply the right to veto nor is it binding” (DS-015-2006-EM).  
 
Government officials continuously point out that indigenous communities do not have the 
right to veto development projects on their territories. For example, a Ministerial 
Resolution referring directly to consultations communities states that “this does not imply 
that citizens have a right to veto the project” (RM 596-2002/DM). In other words, the 
Peruvian state has the obligation to consider indigenous peoples opinions, but indigenous 
groups (communities, individuals, federations, etc.) cannot reject development projects 
on indigenous territories.  
However, as indigenous groups argue, independent of whether indigenous groups 
have veto power, the state still must carry out consultations in “good faith” with 
                                                
85 The Working Group on Indigenous peoples that made the pronouncement against the 
new law was made up of the following organizations: Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos 
Naturales (DAR), APRODEH, SERVINDI, Racimos de Ungurahui, Instituto de Bien 
Común y CAAAP.  
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indigenous peoples before the initiation of any development project on their territories. 
Article 15:  
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface 
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall 
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, 
…  before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or 
exploitation of such resources (ILO 169. Article 15).  
 
This has been a fundamental point of contention from indigenous peoples and their 
advocates who claim that the entire process of indigenous participation (informative 
workshops and environmental impact studies) takes place after the government has 
already negotiated and signed concessions with private companies. The Sub-regional 
director of ILO (in Peru) in a 2006 interview agreed that the Peruvian government should 
be consulting with indigenous communities before signing contracts with petroleum 
companies (Greenspan 2006, p. 8).  
 The government’s position on this issue is telling. According to Ronald 
Egúsquiza, general manager of Perúpetro, ILO 169 does not require the government to 
consult with indigenous communities before the demarcation of hydrocarbon blocks. He 
points to Article 6, stating that the government must consult with indigenous 
communities when “approving legislative or administrative measures.” Egúsquiza 
remarks: “a contract,” referring to contractual negotiations between the government and 
private companies, is neither a legislative nor an administrative measure, but the result of 
a negotiation between two parts that simply establishes a framework.86 Here the 
                                                
86 This interview is taken from a video put together by Tsiroti, a website portal, run by 





government argues that oil and gas projects are not initiated with the signing of a 
contract, but only after informative meetings and EIAs are complete.  
 This issue largely boils down to the government’s interpretation of consultation. 
In a 2006 study, Greenspan states that the government’s definition of consultations “does 
not offer a single space for communities to influence government land and resource use 
decisions” and the government perceives its role simply as an information provider. 
Marco Carrasco of the Environmental Protection and Communities Division of Perúpetro 
maintains that indigenous people wrongly understand that consultation implies the right 
to veto, when consultation, according to Peruvian Law (RM 596-2002-EM/DM), means 
that the state, citizens and energy companies come together to provide information only 
so that project managers can take preventative measures to manage possible social and 
environmental impacts. Again, for the government, consultation  implies only that the 
government must provide information and consider indigenous (or community) 
perspectives (Greenspan 2006, p. 11).  
 The government’s insistence on the “informative” content of the workshops is 
palpable. In 2004, the government replaced the legislation that was titled “Regulation for 
Consultation and Citizen Participation in Proceedings to Approve Environmental Studies 
in the Energy and Mining Sector” with “Regulation of Citizen Participation in the 
Realization of Energy Activity Administrative Proceedings for Environmental Study 
Evaluations (RM 535-2004-MEM/DM). As Greenspan points out, the word 
“consultation” was removed from both the title and the text, to be replaced with 
“informational workshops” and public hearings. The government’s interpretation of 
consultation is clearly limited to merely providing information to communities and 
113 
 
avoiding any meaningful dialogue with indigenous peoples. In short, the Peruvian state 
employs a limited (or minimal) understanding of consultation and participation that, in 
reality, excludes indigenous actors from any meaningful participation in the process of 
hydrocarbon development policies.  
This is also reflected in the practices of informative workshops and public 
audiences to discuss the environmental impact studies. Human rights lawyer Lilly La 
Torre, director of a Peruvian human rights organization (Racimos de Ungurahui), argues 
that in these workshops the government, not indigenous groups, sets the terms of 
participation upon arrival to indigenous villages throughout the region.  She explains that 
petroleum companies, Perúpetro, and MINEM arrive in a village together—usually in a 
helicopter or airplane—to announce to indigenous communities that they are in the 
village to discuss a legally binding contract that the government has signed with a private 
company.  The government representative (from Perúpetro or MIMEM) explains to the 
community how they will benefit from and how they will participate in the project. They 
announce, for example, that there will be work for anyone interested, so “all interested in 
work, please sign the sheet.” For La Torre, the state manipulates the entire process so that 
any real decision-making power or genuine dialogue between the state entities and 
indigenous people is eliminated.87 
In the same context, Peruvian environmental specialist Cesar Ipenza claims that at 
these informative meetings some state officials purposely distort the information and 
manipulate the entire process. He mentioned one especially bizarre case. A lawyer 
representing Perúpetro said to a villager who brought up ILO169 in a meeting: “ILO 169 
                                                
87 Lily La Torre (Director of Racimos de Unguragui) personal interview, January 2008.   
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does not say what ILO 169 says.” The lawyer argued that because the state is the rightful 
owner of all of Peru’s natural resources, indigenous territories are in reality superimposed 
over the subsurface (not the concessionary blocks), which is property of the state. 
Therefore, according to this logic, ILO 169 does not protect indigenous territorial rights 
where the state’s resources are concerned. Part of the problem, according to Ipenza, is 
that state lawyers tout their position as “legal experts” as a way to intimidate villagers 
who are normally not well-equipped to deal with the technical-legal knowledge.88  
Sometimes, however, state practices are less subtle. Petroleum companies, in 
conjunction with state officials, have made concrete offers to indigenous peoples in the 
form of health centers, roads, electricity, telephone service, boat motors, and even things 
like soccer jerseys, toys for kids, and other random items. These types of offers have been 
well documented (Saywer 2004, Kimberling 1991, La Torre-Lopez 1999). In 1997, one 
Achuar indigenous leader explained how state officials and company representatives 
offered the community, “20 peque-peques (motorized canoes), 8 chainsaws, 30 sewing 
machines and 40 cases of beer” (La Torre 1999, p. 186). More recently, a Shipibo woman 
explained how in a government visit to Shipibo village community members told her they 
had been offered 50,000 soles (roughly $17,000) and if they did not accept the terms of 
the contract that army would come.89 According to Robert Guimaraes, former vice 
president of AIDESEP, the state’s strategy is designed to take advantage of the needs and 
vulnerability of indigenous peoples that live in remote jungle areas. Guimaraes remarks, 
“The state, together with the resources of oil companies, can arrive by helicopter and, if 
                                                
88 Cesar Ipenza, environmental lawyer, the Association for the Conservation and Defense 
of Nature) personal interview, January 2008.  
89 Personal interview with Shipibo woman, Yarina Coche, Peru. January 2008.  
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communities are not well informed, they are especially susceptible to these types of 
offers.”90 
The public audiences surrounding the environmental impact studies are, like the 
informative workshops, venues designed to inform the public (i.e. indigenous peoples) 
about the details of the final study. Equally, there are no provisions that provide 
indigenous peoples the opportunity to reject the claims made in these studies or, in 
reality, any possibility of debate or dialogue. While these forums typically include a 
question and answer session (see RM 596-2002-EM/DM), La Torre says that they are 
simply informative meetings that are dressed in overly technical language, conducted in 
such a way that there is little room for input, little time to understand the complexity of 
the studies, and virtually no opportunity to dispute the validity of the claims presented. 91  
Conclusion 
 
To summarize, Garcia’s hydrocarbon development policies are based on a 
(neo)liberal model that extols the extraction of natural resources as a vital component of 
Peru’s development policy agenda. This is portrayed as an integral part of the state’s 
ambitions to become a modern, advanced, and developed country. As Migdal 
recommends, a historically specific treatment of power is critical (Migdal et. Al, 1994, p. 
9). To this end, understanding the historical context of extractive development in the 
Amazon region is quite important. This chapter reveals that Garcia’s policies, while 
clearly neoliberal, are merely an extension of the state’s colonial logic toward the 
Amazon region and its indigenous peoples. In other words, what is significant here is not 
                                                
90 Robert Guimaraes (vice-president of the Association Interethnic of Development of the 
Peruvian Amazon, from 2004-2008 (check this). Personal interview. January 2008.  
91 Lily La Torre (Director of Racimos de Unguragui) personal interview, January 2008.   
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the shift to neoliberalism, but the continuity of hydrocarbon development in the Amazon 
region. For Garcia, the Amazon region, like in nearly every presidential period, is used as 
an “empty space” to exploit natural resources. Oil development in the region, while never 
living up to its promises, is just another attempt, albeit aggressive, to turn Peru into a net 
exporter of petroleum. Amazonia, purportedly devoid of civilization, is again and again 
used to serve the development objectives of the nation.  
To carry out hydrocarbon policy on indigenous lands, via the key institutions 
Perúpetro and MINEM, the government relies on state practices that, in theory, are 
designed to respect indigenous rights and protect the environment.  However, these 
practices fall short on both accounts. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter in relation to the IMPA’s challenge to the government’s development 
agenda and hydrocarbon policies. The Garcia government, according to most experts, 
utilizes an extremely weak interpretation of ILO 169, arguing that these rights only 
provide indigenous peoples with “information” concerning hydrocarbon development 
projects. Moreover, according to Perúpetro, the act of negotiating between the 
government and oil companies is just a “business deal,” and not something that should 
concern indigenous actors. Most would agree that this attitude is contrary to the spirit of 
FPIC, which is intended to provide indigenous peoples the rights to decide their own 
development path. However, again, understanding the historical context of extractive 
development in Peru, the policies and positions should not be surprising. The 
government, in spite of indigenous rights, has always proceeded to move “forward” to 
extract Amazonian natural resources. Fittingly, President Garcia’s governmental slogan is 
summed up in these three short words: “¡El Perú Avanza!”  
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State hydrocarbon practices, the informative workshops and EIAs, in the present 
day context are designed, in theory, to uphold indigenous cultural and territorial rights, 
resemble colonial practices, like the encomienda and the repartamiento, that were 
designed, in theory, to save and protect indigenous souls. In reality, however, both are a 
means to carry out extractive development on indigenous territorial spaces. The 
indigenous response to the government’s hydrocarbon policies is the subject of the 
following chapter. However, AIDESEP, the leading indigenous federation in the Amazon 
region, just after President Garcia’s inaugural address, articulated this continuity between 
colonial and modern-day state practices. AIDESEP not only complained that the Peruvian 
state still sees the region as “petty cash,” but that the practice of the colonial encomienda 
had not been abolished in Peru, but replaced with the more modern day “concession.” As  
Migdal might agree, the image that indigenous peoples have of the Peruvian state is the 
result of a certain genealogy of state practices that, in spite of their lofty rhetoric, work to 
marginalize indigenous peoples from Peru’s development policies.  
118 
 
CHAPTER IV. INDIGENOUS RESPONSE AND RESISTANCE TO THE 
GOVERNMENT’S HYDROCARBON POLICY AGENDA 
 
“When transnational oil companies contaminate our lands, they are psychologically 




In opposition to the government’s campaign to not only promote oil and gas 
development but to open up the Peruvian Amazon to other extractive industries (mining, 
timber, etc.), the Indigenous Movement from the Peruvian Amazon (IMPA) staged 
massive protests in August of 2008 and the spring and summer of 2009. The tragic events 
in Bagua described in the opening chapter were the erupting point of these protests in 
which indigenous peoples from the region took to the streets to directly confront the 
government’s development policies. As the Defensoria de Pueblo recognized, indigenous 
groups demanded the repeal of several legislative decrees and special legislative projects 
enacted by President Garcia, which would set the legal framework to put into place the 
government’s plans to develop the region’s natural resources (See Merino 2010).  
As discussed in the Chapter I, the protests led to the repeal of four of the eleven 
legislative decrees that indigenous peoples throughout the region have specifically 
targeted (Romero 2009) and Congress recently passed a consultation law, which Garcia 
has yet to sign, but is designed to implement ILO 169. Furthermore, in spite of 
government attempts to dismantle AIDESEP, the most formidable representative of the 
movement, the indigenous organizing remains strong in the Peruvian Amazon. Alan 
Garcia has not faired so well. In an October poll, the president’s approval rating 
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plummeted to 34 percent one of the worst approval ratings in all of Latin America 
(Lizoan 2009). On the contrary, the fact that the indigenous population in the Amazon 
represents less than one percent of the Peruvian population (about 300,000 people), in 
many respects, is a testament to the political impact of such a small population.  
In this chapter, theoretically, I shift from a neoinstitutional approach to the study 
of the IMPA within the context of social movement theory. The IMPA is led by 
AIDESEP (the Interethnic Association of Development of the Peruvian Jungle), but 
includes the many regional, sub-regional, and village-level organizations throughout the 
Amazon region. AIDESEP alone is made of up 57 federations, the majority of whom can 
be divided into multiple organizations (regional, sub-regional, and village-level). In spite 
of the debate surrounding the “newness” of new social movements (see Weir 1993), 
given that indigenous movement demands are closely related to identity and cultural 
politics and, to a large degree, go “beyond” simply material values, the IMPA, as 
discussed in the Chapter I, is probably best described as a new social movement. Perhaps 
even more accurate, the IMPA, as this chapter reveals, has much in common with what 
Bohm, Dinerstein, and Spicer (2010) describe as autonomous movements, which usually 
involve a struggle for self-determination, organizational self-management and 
independent social and economic practices vis-á-vis the state and capital (2010, p. 18).  
   Notwithstanding the categorization of IMPA, social movement theory suggests 
that movements arise given certain political and transnational opportunities. Based on the 
importance of structures, social movement scholars pay close attention to the 
configurations of political opportunities. Some of the early social movement scholars, for 
example, explained the emergence of a social movements based upon “changes in the 
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institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system” 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, p. 3). In the case of indigenous movements, while 
national political configurations are important, international forces are also important and 
in many cases help to explain the emergence, success, and longevity of indigenous 
movements. Lucero describes these as “transnational opportunities”, which implies that 
organizations like the World Bank, Oxfam, the United Nations, and the International 
Labor Organization, at times can be instrumental in explaining movement success or 
failure. More generally, the internal arena is important for understanding the emergence 
of indigenous movements (Lucero 2008, p. 20-21).  
While these movements certainly respond to political structures, providing 
opportunities and constraints, indigenous peoples are also active agents in deciding their 
future and, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, indigenous peoples have 
responded vehemently to the state’s constant attempts a colonization of the Amazon 
region. In part, a response from social movement scholars to the lack of agency-driven or 
cultural-prevailing explanations, Snow and Benford (1988) coined the concept of a 
“framing process.” Giving attention to the importance of ideas and sentiments (meaning 
and identity), Snow describes framing as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people 
to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, p. 6). In this same vein, 
Goodwin and Jasper describe frames as “simplifying devices that help us understand and 
organize the complexities of the world.” For these authors, social movement leaders must 
work hard to find the right frames, ones that are properly aligned with potential recruits 
and, perhaps most relevant in this case, leaders are often involved in framing contests or 
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“framing wars” with their opponents to capture the attention and win the “hearts and 
minds” of the larger public (Goodwin and Jasper 2009, p. 55).   
This chapter uses these “social movement theory” tools to understand the 
emergence of the IMPA, the movement’s principal values and, more specifically, its 
response to the Garcia government’s hydrocarbon development policies. First I will 
explain how the IMPA emerged in the Amazon region against the constant process of 
invasion of indigenous territories, to a large degree fomented and propagated by 
government policies. I will then examine how indigenous organizing benefited from 
political and transnational opportunity structures and how, given the crucial important of 
indigenous conceptualizations of territory, the IMPA has been able to frame indigenous 
concepts of territory against “Western” concepts. This framing helps to illuminate 
indigenous perspectives on development and explains how these perspectives offer an 
approach that is both environmentally sustainable and socially equitable. Finally, I 
engage in a detailed discussion of indigenous opposition to Garcia development policies 
and, specifically to hydrocarbon development in the Amazon region. Utilizing the 
protests of 2008 and 2009, I will analyze some of the strategies, tactics, and actions that 
the IMPA has used to confront the government’s policies.  
The emergence of the indigenous movement in the Amazon region  
 
 The first (recorded) “modern” indigenous organization in the Amazon region is 
the result of a meeting between 120 Campa (Asheninka) delegates from the Perené River 
basin in 1959 to discuss issues surrounding land rights and, specifically, the presence of 
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the British multinational company, the Peruvian Company, which was given a giant land 
concession (500,000 hectares) in the nineteenth-century to colonize the area.92  
Responding to what was perceived as a territorial invasion, indigenous delegates entered 
into a strategic alliance with Andean colonists, immigrants, and others and, as a result, 
formed the Association of Native Campas of Perené93 (Chirif and Garcia 2009). From 
this point, a plethora of indigenous organizations were formed starting in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s in the Peruvian Amazon.94  
In 1969, from the central jungle, in an effort to defend their territorial spaces, 
Yanesha groups formed the Amuesha Congress95 (Congreso Amuesha) and in the early 
1970s groups of Asháninkas organized the Center of Native Communities from the 
Central Jungle (CECONSEC). Between 1970 and 1973, largely based on these 
experiences, Yáneshas (now Amueshas) and Campa (now Asháninka) groups began to 
organize, forming the Congress Campa de Pichis in 1973. In the Napo River basin (in the 
northern-Amazon region), in the mid-seventies, the Organización Kichwaruna Wangurina 
(ORKIWAN), with 26 base-communities (today it has over 40), was established. In the 
northern jungle, in 1969, Aguaruna and Manseriche peoples formed the organization, 
                                                
92 According to Chirif and Garcia (2007), the government provided the British company, 
The Peruvian Corporation, with a 500,000 hectare-concession as part of the external debt 
acquired with Great Britain as a result of the Pacific War (p. 104).  
93 These processes led to the formation, in 1976, of la Federación de Comunidades 
Nativas de Perené (FECONAPE), which one year later changed its name to la Central de 
Comunidades Nativas de Producción y Comericialización Agropecuaria del Perené 
(CCNAPCAPE).  
94 One of the first indigenous organization to emerge in the entire Amazon river basin 
was the Shuar federation, organized in Ecuador in 1964, with the help of Salesian 
Catholic missionaries, who used a revolutionary method (at the time) of bilingual 
intercultural schooling (Hvalkov 1998, p. 91).  
95 In 1981, the Congreso Amuesha, became la Federación de Comunidades Nativas 
Yanesha (FECONAYA), which continues to function today (Chirif and Garcia 2009).  
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Chapi-Shiwag. In the same year the Achuar peoples formed a similar organization, 
Achuarti Ijumdramu (ATI). Also in the northern region, the Aguaruna peoples, in 1971, 
formed an organization amongst communities from the North-eastern Marañón river 
basin.  
In the Ucayali region, in 1976, responding to economic (production) needs, the 
Shipibo peoples established la Empresa Multicomunal de Artesanía Maroti Shipibo (The 
Multi-communal Business of Maroti Shipibo Artisanship) and, in 1977, Shipibo and 
Ashánikas carried out similar actions. This generally led to further organizing around 
issues of territorial rights. The Consejo Aguarana and Huambisa (CAH), one the first 
organizations to establish a regional mission, was established shortly thereafter. In a 
similar way, the first Shipibo organizations extended their scope to form the Shipibo 
Development Organization (ORDESH) in 1979 in the Upper Ucayali. In the middle 
Ucayali, FECONAU (the Federation of Native Communities of the Upper Uycali) was 
formed, and in the lower Ucayali, FECONBU (the Federation of Native Communities of 
the Low Ucayali) was formed, both around 1981. In the Central Jungle, CECONSEC, 
took on territorial integrity as one of their main focuses (Dandler 1998, p. 12-14. Also see 
Yashar 2005, p. 260).   
 As these experiences indicate, by in large, indigenous organizing in the Amazon 
region emerged against a constant process of the invasion and encroachment on 
indigenous territorial spaces. In other words, modern indigenous organizing takes place 
as the result of the state’s (colonial) development ambitions. Here the International 
Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) articulates the main reason that 
indigenous peoples in the Amazon began to organize:   
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Indigenous Amazonian peoples have suffered a process similar to indigenous 
groups from the Andes, although much later. The indigenous movement in the 
Peruvian Amazon emerges when, like in the Andean case, the invasion of 
territories and the dispossession of resources becomes intolerable (IWGIA 1995, 
p. 21).    
 
It is, therefore, the state’s push to extract and develop Amazonian resources, as detailed 
in Chapter III, that forced indigenous groups into creating viable organizations. 
Indigenous organizing, in this context, was basically a defense mechanism to protect 
territorial spaces.  
 As this will be detailed throughout the chapter, it is important to note that 
indigenous organization emerged very much as part of the state’s institutional framework. 
This is related to the political opportunities that resulted from the 1974 Native 
Communities Law and, more generally, from the fact that indigenous leaders were quite 
adept at utilizing the political system and structures available to form their own 
organizations.  Chirif and Garcia explain this process:  
With the passing of time, while dominant-subordinate relations are established, 
the dominated indigenous peoples are able to discover, within the systems and 
mechanisms imposed by the dominant legal system, a few institutions that they 
are able to appropriate, thus, forming their own institutions (2007, p. 102).   
 
In the analysis of the emergence of Amazonian organizations it is, therefore, important to 
recognize that these organizations were never intended to be organizations totally 
separate from the state and the institutional framework in Peru.  
That said, indigenous organizations emerged to a large extent from the grass 
roots, where indigenous peoples began to organize to protect the integrity of their 
territories and to advocate for indigenous rights, including bilingual education and health 
services. In 1979, out of the need to establish a nationally based (Amazonian) indigenous 
federation, leaders came to form the Coordination of Native Communities of the Peruvian 
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Amazon, which, in 1980 became AIDESEP, the Interethnic Association for the 
Development of the Peruvian Amazon (Chirif and Garcia 2009). In 1987 CONAP, (in 
some respects a rival to AIDESEP) the other nationally-based Amazonian indigenous 
federation, was born. As mentioned, the contemporary indigenous movement in the 
Amazon region is made up of organizations at the community, regional and federal levels 
of organization (see Dandler 1998 p. 13-14).  
Political and transnational opportunity structures 
 
 As mentioned, the Amazon movement emerges in the midst a long history of 
conquest and colonization. However, as Yashar explains, while incipient organizations 
started to emerge before 1974, it wasn’t until indigenous settlements became organized, 
officially, as “native communities” that these communities would come together to form 
indigenous federations (2005, p. 235). As such, the Amazonian indigenous movement 
benefited from political opportunity structures that provided a space for indigenous 
peoples to organize formally, which enabled them to make demands against the state. In 
conjunction, indigenous peoples further profited from transnational opportunity 
structures in which international NGOs, religious organizations, pro-indigenous activists, 
and academics also worked to advance indigenous claims.   
 In terms of national political opportunity structures, the Velasco regime, relatively 
progressive in advancing indigenous rights, provided an opportunity for a group of 
young, well-educated, and informed professionals to design and implement policies to 
benefit Amazonian peoples.  One of the most influential figures was Stéfano Varese,96 an 
                                                
96 In a 2001 interview, Varese explains that even though he knew that the Velasco regime 
was not the true “Socialist Revolution” he and his counterparts had dreamed of, he felt 
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anthropologist from the University of San Marcos in Lima, who wrote one of the premier 
books, la Sal de los Cerros (1972), that studied indigenous peoples from the Peruvian 
Amazon. Varese was given the task of creating a national policy for indigenous peoples 
from the Amazon region,97 which eventually led to the 1974 Law of Native Communities 
(Stocks 1984, p. 49). This law, due to the influence of Varese and others, was the most 
advanced document (or law) dealing with “native” communities at the time in all of Latin 
America. Moreover, given the specific provisions within the law, it provided the impetus 
for indigenous organizing throughout the region, and, thus helped to initiate a process of 
recuperation and re-integration of indigenous territories, which is still the key tenant of 
the movement’s platform today.  
 As explained in Chapter II, the law created a new social unit called a “native 
community,” which officially recognized the legal existence and integrity of indigenous 
communities and, in turn, required that the state issue a land title to each community. 
Native communities were thus required to register with the state to acquire legal status, 
which, in many respect, provided the first official link between “native” peoples and the 
state. Under the National System of Support and Mobilization (SINAMOS), the Office of 
Support for Native Communities was created to implement the new measures.98 The task 
                                                                                                                                            
that by working with the government they could “occupy spaces, fissures, and introduce 
changes that indigenous peoples could appropriate in the future” (Montoya et. Al. 2001).  
97 In interview with Varese, he explains how he began working with the Velasco 
government. In short, he was asked by two anthropologists from Cornell University to 
leave San Marcos University, in Lima, to apply for director of an administrative unit 
working on issues related to indigenous peoples from the Amazon. From there the 
government opened the Division of Native Communities. (See Montoya et. Al, 2001).  
98 Stocks observes that, under Varese’s successors, Alberto Chirif and Carlos Mora, two 
academics that are still actively involved in advocating for indigenous peoples, were part 
of a national network of support, that helped “organize and politicize” native 
communities, permitting them to obtain land titles (p. 49).  
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was formidable: 1) to locate native settlements, 2) to inform them of their rights, 3) to 
register them as “native communities,” and 4) to demarcate and title their lands (Smith 
1982, p, 5). This created a wave of indigenous organizing, supported by the state, that 
was based on the titling of indigenous communities.99 Furthermore, the law required that 
native communities organize in a uniform way, which, while imposing the exact model 
that was used in the Andes, provided native peoples with legal instruments to make 
demands before the state (Dandler 1998, p. 13; also see Yashar 2005, p. 253). To 
reiterate, it was through the legal figure of the native community that indigenous peoples 
from the Amazon region were officially represented (and recognized) through the state.  
 Indigenous peoples also took advantage of what Lucero refers to as “transnational 
opportunities” (2008, p. 16). By 1968, the international context was changing as many in 
Europe and the United States were becoming aware of issues concerning the rights of  
indigenous peoples. Organizations such as the IWGIA, from Copenhagen, Survival 
International, from London, and Cultural Survival, from Boston, were all founded in this 
time period. The World Council of Churches, working with Anthropology Department at 
the University of Bern in Switzerland sponsored the first international conference on 
indigenous rights in South America, to be held in Barbados in 1971. This led to the 
“Barbados Declaration,” which not only declared indigenous peoples rights to self-
determination, but included the state, religious missions, anthropology as an academic 
discipline, and indigenous peoples themselves as the principal actors securing these rights 
(Hvalkov 1998, p. 91). In this environment, NGOs, religious groups, academics, and 
                                                
99 According to Stocks (1984), attention was first given to indigenous peoples closest to 
the Andean “border,” including the Campa, Aguaruna, Machiguenga, Amuesha, and 
others. As of 1981, 341 native communities were established, which included 
approximately 11,000 families and 1.3 million hectares of land (See table 2, p. 50).  
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international activists began to actively support indigenous organizing in the Peruvian 
Amazon.   
Anthropologists were especially helpful in raising awareness about some of the 
extreme situations of marginalization and violence against indigenous peoples in the 
Peruvian Amazon. Varese’s influential book, La Sal de los Cerros, published for the first 
time in 1968, detailed the precarious situation of the Campa (now called the Ashéninka) 
in the Gran Pajonal Region in the Central Jungle of the Peruvian Amazon. For Chirif and 
Garcia (2009), his work not only paved the way for further anthropological studies in the 
region, but helped to establish solidarity ties with academics and activists who would 
later become committed to indigenous rights issues. After writing La Sal de los Cerros, 
Varese became involved as a writer and public figure, speaking out on issues related to 
indigenous politics. In 1972, IWGIA published “The Forest Indians in the Present 
Situation in Peru,” which examined the socio-economic situation of native peoples in 
Peru (Varese 1972). About the same time U.S. anthropologist John Bodley wrote about 
the relations between patrons and indigenous peoples, which drew attention to the 
expansion of slave raiding in the Ucayali region up until the 1940s. However, while 
drawing attention to the issue of slavery, at the time Bodley was not aware of how 
“serious and contemporary” the situation was in this region (Hvalkov 1998, p. 92).  
In this case, the influence (and support) of certain academics (particularly 
anthropologists) and international NGOs presented indigenous peoples with political and 
transnational opportunities that propelled indigenous organizing in the region. Peruvian 
anthropologists such as Varese, Chirif, and Mora (ex-government employees during the 
Velasco regime) played a critical role in both policymaking and providing general 
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support for indigenous peoples in their private and professional lives.100 Furthermore, a 
North American anthropologist and Peace Corps Volunteer, Richard Chase Smith, today 
the director of The Institute of Wellbeing (IBC), an organization that advocates on behalf 
of indigenous causes, helped to organize the Amuesha Congress in 1969 (Van Cott 2005, 
p. 156; Brysk p. 64). NGOs have frequently assisted in bringing indigenous peoples 
together (in forums and other venues) to discuss important issues, plan strategies, and 
work toward common goals. The Center for Research and Amazonian Promotion (CIPA), 
for example, played an important support role in the creation of AIDESEP (Yashar 2005, 
p. 261).  
Religious missionary groups, supported and financed by European and US parent-
organizations, also helped to organize indigenous leaders, most notably around bilingual 
education programs. The (North American) Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), for 
example, helped to train young indigenous people, who became fluent in Spanish and 
would later emerge as important indigenous leaders (Yashar 2005, p. 259). Hvalkov 
observes, in the Ucayali region, how Ashéninka peoples, strategically, formed  alliances 
with the SIL to fight off the encroachment of colonist society and to obtain land titles. 
While the SIL missionaries expected that the schools would become part of a broader 
evangelical ecclesiastical Christian society, indigenous teachers insisted that the SIL 
assist in the demarcation of indigenous territories to prevent further colonist expansion 
(Hvalkov 1998, p. 104-105). The work of missionaries is, of course, controversial. 
However, the important point here is that indigenous leaders were skilled enough to use 
                                                
100 Both Mora and Chirif are principal figures in the Centro de Investigación y Promoción 
Amazónica (CIPA), a Peruvian organization financed by Swiss, Dutch, and English 
sources (Stocks 1985, p. 55) 
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the support that missionary organizations provided to develop leadership skills, which 
would eventually translate into important resources for the IMPA. More generally, albeit 
controversial and often counterproductive, missionaries did played an important role in 
the organization and mobilization of several indigenous groups throughout the region.101  
Indigenous values and framings of territory    
 
 The territorial dispossession that indigenous peoples suffered from an unending 
process of colonization cannot be underestimated.  IWGIA describes colonization as a 
“process in which the conquerors would deny indigenous peoples all of the spaces in 
which they were able to express themselves as different” (1995, p. 22). For indigenous 
peoples the dispossession of territory represents the deprivation of religion, philosophy, 
language and literally the entirety of culture. Furthermore, this loss of territory not only 
altered indigenous relations to their immediate environment, which includes intra and 
extra community relations, but, most importantly, it dramatically reduced indigenous 
capacity to shape their own future. Put differently, the loss of indigenous territory 
radically impacted indigenous political and cultural sovereignty. Given the history of 
colonization, resulting in the dispossession of indigenous territorial spaces, the main 
objective of the IMPA is therefore to reverse this process of territorial dispossession. As 
IWGIA states, the mission of the indigenous peoples movement in the Amazon is “to 
                                                
101 The formation of la Organización Kichwaruna Wangurina ORIKIWAN in the Napo 
region was assisted by a group of Canadian Franciscans in 1970. A cooperative, 
organized and managed by Jesuit missionaries, criticized by the indigenous population, 
later turned into la Central del CENEPA, which became the seed for el Consejo 
Agurauna Huambisa (CAH) in 1977 (Chirif and Garcia 2009). The SIL provided the 
impetus for indigenous organizing in the Northern Amazon region, specifically in 
organizing the Aguarunas in the Upper Amazon region (Dandle p. 12).   
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recover each space and each expression that has been usurped by the Conquest” (1995, p. 
21-22).   
In this context, territory represents the principal value that informs and guides the 
IMPA. To better understand indigenous conceptualizations of territory, drawing from 
IWGIA (1995), Chirif and Garcia (2007), and indigenous intellectuals and activists, here 
I establish a rough theoretical framework to articulate the meaning of territory. While it is 
important avoid the tendency to essentialize (or romanticize) indigenous notions of 
territory (especially nature-human relationship), it is useful to recognize the significant 
and important differences from mainstream (or Western) concepts. As Chirif and Garcia 
explain, it is precisely because of these differences that indigenous peoples have 
appropriated the concept of “indigenous territory” as a new juridical concept that is 
capable of explaining these differences (2007, p. 36). It is precisely in this context that 
the IMPA has sought out to frame indigenous notions of territory and explain how they 
are different from “Western” notions.  
It is also worth noting that there is an ever-present danger in generalizing about 
“indigenous” conceptualizations of territory. Indigenous peoples from the Amazon region 
include a multiplicity of groupings that, in many ways, express particular meanings of 
territory that relate to the territorial spaces on which the reside.102 Secondly, it is 
important to reiterate that indigenous conceptualizations of land and territory stem from 
the history of colonization and, as Chirif and Garcia note, they have been strategically 
employed (and framed) as a means to recover indigenous territories. Thus, these 
                                                
102 Chirif and Garcia explain that in order to properly reclaim indigenous territories, each 
indigenous group must play a deciding role in defining territorial limits, which includes 
the vast gamut of cultural factors that are particular to each group and are intimately 
related to a particular territorial space (2007, p. 37).  
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conceptualizations should not be understood as abstract, pure notions of territory, but 
they are the result of the historic experience of colonization and subsequent dispossession 
of indigenous territories. Again, in order to obtain recognition of their territorial rights the 
IMPA has been forced to operate within the institutional framework of the Peruvian state 
and the culture of national society (2007, p. 23). Finally, territory, as the predominant 
indigenous value, provides a window to understanding a host of other related values that 
the indigenous movement in the Peruvian Amazon strategically employs on a regular 
basis.  
Indigenous conceptualizations of territory can be explained through the following 
four principles. First, indigenous conceptualizations of territory (and land) are historically 
produced. This is relevant not only because of the experience of colonization, but 
because as “conquered” peoples who inhabited the “Americas” before the Europeans, 
indigenous peoples possess particular rights which are stipulated in the Peruvian 
Constitution and in international documents such as ILO 169 (IWGIA 1995, p. 26).  
Second, indigenous claims are based on territorial integrity, which means that 
indigenous territorial spaces should be continuous, contiguous, and undivided. Territorial 
integrity responds to indigenous beliefs surrounding the wholeness of territory and 
nature, but also to the historic process of fractionation of indigenous lands, where 
indigenous peoples have only been able to acquire small disparate (unconnected) plots of 
land. Furthermore, in response to state attempts to administer and categorize resources for 
development purposes, territorial integrity implies that the surface, subsurface, air, and all 
resources within a given space are inseparable and cannot be specially categorized for 
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development purposes (i.e. the state is the owner of subsoil resources) (IWGIA 1995, p. 
25).  
Third, indigenous peoples seek the political and administrative autonomy to 
control all land and resources within given space. This not only includes the free use and 
administrative control over all resources, but also control over indigenous culture, 
spirituality, and the social makeup of such a space. Importantly, this includes critical 
aspects such as control over indigenous knowledge of biodiversity and related issues 
(Chirif and Garcia 2007, p. 39).   
Finally, in the legal sphere, indigenous peoples as a larger collective group 
represent the rights-bearing-subject, not the individual or any smaller group (family, 
village, community, etc.). This is critical for notions of sustainability and suggests the 
following: a) territory is transgenerational (including past and future generations), b) it is 
indivisible (can’t be sold to individuals), and c) it extends beyond the borders of the 
nation-state (some indigenous groups, like the Achuar, who share Ecuador and Peruvian 
borders can’t be divided by national borders) (IWGIA 1995, p. 24-29).  
While there are multiple ways to conceptualize indigenous notions of territory, 
these four principles can be found in much of the framing of indigenous rights from 
indigenous organizations. For example, a recent constitutional proposal from the four 
major indigenous organizations in Peru addresses the idea of territorial integrity: “for us, 
territory is the totality of a peoples’ habitat.” It includes, “the ground-surface, the waters, 
and the subsurface (with all the natural resources that are found in the territory).” It is 
also a space where indigenous culture is established and reproduced. Expressing this 
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sense of integrity, “spirituality, cosmovision, music, dance, poetry, and literature” are all 
part of indigenous conceptualizations of territory103 (AIDESEP et Al., 2004, p. 15).  
Given the legal implications surrounding the definition of land, indigenous 
organizations have gone to some lengths to frame a distinction between Western concepts 
of “land” and indigenous concepts of “territory.” On AIDESP’s website, in a section 
denominated “Our Territories” they point out that Western viewpoints are based on 
“land” as a commodity with a specific market value that can be negotiated, whereas 
indigenous viewpoints are based on “territory” as spiritual space that is sacred and never 
negotiable. In the words of AIDESEP: 
For indigenous peoples “territory” is the embryo that gave birth to the existence 
of our peoples with culture and our own identity. If we don’t have territory, we 
are an indigenous people without live and, as a result, sentenced to extermination.  
 
This definition contrasts with the western concept and is totally different. For 
western society, land is when someone has a property title that is inscribed in the 
public registries. For indigenous peoples, the owner is the “mother of the earth.” 
The Andean [indigenous peoples] recognize the “Pachamama,” the Shuar 
recognize “Nugkui” and it is this way for each indigenous group.  
 
For the market, land has a monetary importance and it is negotiable. For us, 
indigenous peoples, land has a spiritual importance and is sacred.  
in our cosmovision the term land doesn’t make sense, but rather territory, broader 
concept that includes the integrity [of territory] as a collective good that is inter-
dependent with nature.  
 
Territory is not something that can necessary be governed by Western understandings of 
property ownership. Indigenous peoples, rather than owners of the land per se, are the 
rights bearing subjects, that retain certain rights and responsibilities over the land. In the 
                                                
103 The following organizations wrote the proposal: AIDESEP (The Inter-ethnic 
Association of Development of the Peruvian Jungle), CONAP (Native Communities of 
the Peruvian Amazon), CCP (the Peasant Confederation of Peru), and CAN (the National 
Agrarian Confederation).  
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constitutional proposal cited above, indigenous groups frame property ownership in the 
following way:  
We are owners [of territory], but from in a communal sense and in a responsibility 
way, one that is different from the world of common law that is governed too 
frequently only by the profit motive” (AIDESEP et Al., 2004, p. 15.)  
 
Accordingly, indigenous “special” relationship to territorial spaces gives them specific 
knowledge and understanding of nature that not only works to protect these spaces, but 
also provides indigenous peoples with particular insights that can benefit the nation. This 
comes from the same constitutional proposal:  
because our proximity to nature is understood as us being part of nature we 
possess knowledge that spans from the technical use of soils, waters, and forests, 
to the chemical and pharmaceutical properties of plants (AIDESEP et Al., 2004, 
p. 15) . 
 
Indigenous framing of territorial rights, thus, is not simply as the role of protector of the 
forest, but more as “trustees” of the land largely within the context of the sustainable use 
of natural resources.  
 It is thus from the perspective of sustainable development that indigenous groups 
argue for the need to maintain the administrative and political control of the territorial 
spaces in which they reside. This is from the constitutional proposal mentioned:  
Autonomy, self-governance and the administration of justice will permit us to our 
capacity to control and regulate internal issues. Indigenous peoples have the right 
to decide over issues related to our culture, education, territory and management 
of natural resources . . . These rights include sustainable development and 
political participation. [indigenous] communities have better structural elements 
of local governance that other [non-indigenous] forms AIDESEP et Al. 2004, p. 
14-15) 
 
Similar types of statements are made throughout the Amazon region from indigenous 
groups. Responding specific issues of laws that will place in jeopardy the integrity of the 
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forests, The Regional Association of Indigenous Peoples from the Central Jungle (APRI-
S.C.)104 made the following statement:  
The administration of our land and territories responds to our internal decisions as 
communities and people in accordance with our own visions of consolidation and 
territorial development” (Servindi 2008a). 
 
Here it is important to note that, contrary to what some argue, the IMPA is not advocating 
the political separation of indigenous territories from the Peruvian state. As indigenous 
groups claim, “autonomy, self-governance and the administration of justice” require the 
correct juridical and political conditions to make this a reality. For this reason, the state 
should guarantee the democratic and direct representation of indigenous peoples within 
existing governmental instances (AIDESEP, et Al., p. 15). In other words, as indigenous 
leaders constantly remark, indigenous territorial rights are framed within the legal 
jurisdiction of the nation-state.  
  Some of the common misperceptions that indigenous peoples are a “separatist” 
movement stem from indigenous claims to being the “original” inheritors of the land. 
While notion of “origins” is inherently problematic, indigenous groups are careful to 
frame indigenous rights to territorial spaces in historical terms, rather than racial or 
essential terms. This particular statement came from APRI: “Our territorial rights are 
provided by its original character (condition), because this was established before the 
foundation of the state, it was not sold, nor was it donated to us, it is transgenerational 
                                                
104 In Spanish the acronym APRIC S.C. is Asociación Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas 
de la Selva Central. This organization represents the Ashaninka, Yanesha, No otiguenga, 
Kakinte, Asheninka, Matsiguenga and other groups from the Central Jungle, including 
CARE (Río Ene), KANUJAN (Valle de Pangoa), OCAR (Río Negro), CONVAN SAT 
(Valle del Maranquiari), FECONABAP (Bajo Perené), CECONSEC (Sapito y 
Chanchamayo), ANAP (Puerto Burmúdez, Oxampampa, Pasco), OARA (Río Apurimac, 
La Convención, Cusco) , UNAY (Ciudad Constitución), etc.  
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and irreversible.” (Servindi 2008a) In the abovementioned constitutional proposal, 
indigenous rights are stipulated as a particular historical condition and not because of any 
“racial, economic, or social privileges” (AIDESEP et Al. 2004, p. 15). It is worth noting 
that this historical description is also used to define indigenous peoples in the ILO 
Convention 169:  
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their decent from the populations which inhabited the country, or geographic 
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal 
status, retain some or all of their own social, cultural and political institutions 
(Article 1.b).  
 
Again, this framing, used throughout the Amazon region, emphasizes indigenous 
peoples’ territorial rights based on a historic condition as subjected and colonized 
peoples, not on a privileged or essential condition as original peoples. Importantly, 
indigenous peoples framings are most often strategically designed to work within 
international legal frameworks such as ILO 169.  
Territory is the single most important factor that defines the indigenous 
movement today. Indigenous framings of territorial rights, however, are based on a rather 
complex distinctions between “Western” and indigenous conceptualization of territory. 
Indigenous territorial rights are not based on essential or romantic views of nature, but 
are based rights and responsibilities as trustees or stewards of territorial spaces. To 
explain indigenous responses to Garcia hydrocarbon policies and to his broader 
development agenda it is absolutely necessary to understand the complexity of these 
conceptualizations of territory and the seriousness around which indigenous peoples treat 
territorial rights.  
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This is why AIDESEP frames defending indigenous territories as an act of moral 
obligation. Not to defend indigenous territories is not simply an evasion of responsibility, 
but it is an act of cowardice: 
To avoid the responsibility of defending our territory is an act of spiritual suicide 
and anyone who shuns this responsibility is guilty of the worst attitude of a 
coward that negates his or her own existence.105  
 
Expressing a similar sincerity, Shipibo leader Juan Agustin explained that when 
transnational oil companies contaminate indigenous territories “they are psychologically 
killing us.”106  
Opposition to legislative decrees (and projects)  
 
 The protests in 2008 and 2009 provide an excellent opportunity not only to study 
indigenous opposition to hydrocarbon development, but to place this resistance within the 
broader context of indigenous opposition to Peru’s natural resource policies. Moreover, 
indigenous opposition to Garcia’s legislative decrees also highlights the critical 
importance of territory for indigenous peoples and, thus, helps to explain why the IMPA 
has so vigorously opposed Garcia’s development policies.  
Specifically, the 2008 and 2009 protests were a response to the legislative decrees 
and a series of “special legislative projects” issued by President Garcia in 2007 and 2008. 
On August 6, 2008 AIDESEP, via “the Platform of Struggle for the Recognition of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples from the Peruvian Amazon,” announced their official 
protest of Garcia’s policies and demanded the repeal of seven of the ninety-nine decrees 
and five “legislative projects” (Merino 2010, p. 11). After studying the decrees, 
AIDESEP demanded the “immediate repeal of the Legislative Decrees Nº 1015 and 
                                                
105 See AIDESEP’s website at http://www.aidesep.org.pe/index.php?id=5,0,0,1,0,0.  
106 Personal Interview, January 2008.  
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Nº1073 (unconstitutional), Nº994, Nº1020, Nº1064, Nº1081, and Nº1090 for threatening 
indigenous territories and the definitive shelving of the Five Legislative Projects Nº 840, 
1770, 1900, 1992, 2133.107   
Before moving forward, it is important to recall that four of the most controversial 
decrees have since been repealed. The 2008 protest led to the repeal of LD 1015 and 
1073 and the 2009 protest led to the repeal of LD 1090 and 1064. This is important 
because, perhaps to the surprise of Garcia, indigenous opposition (and protest) has been 
relatively successful. In the next section, I will discuss the strategies, tactics, and actions 
of the IMPA, especially in relation to oil development. However, it is impossible to 
neatly separate oil development from the legislative decrees, which were designed not 
only to facilitate extractive development, but to open up the Amazon region to external 
capital and development. In this section, therefore, I will examine some of the main 
reasons why the IMPA has opposed Garcia’s these legislative decrees.  
 To a large decree, indigenous opposition to the (content of the) decrees revolves 
around three related issues. The decrees 1) violate Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), 
which, as mentioned, relates to the rights of indigenous peoples to be consulted before 
any development takes place on indigenous territories; 2) work against the political-
                                                
107 This document can be found at the Amazon Watch website at 
http://www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=1623. Also the Pensionista 
blog at http://utgpensionista.blogspot.com/2009/05/plataforma-de-lucha-por-la.html. The 
first point reads, in Spanish: “Derogatoria inmediata de los Decretos Legislativos Nº 1015 
y Nº 1073 (inconstitucionales), Nº 994, Nº 1020, Nº 1064, Nº 1081 y Nº 1090 por atentar 
contra los territorios indígenas y el archivamiento definitivo los Cinco Proyectos de 
Leyes N° 840, 1770, 1900, 1992 y 2133. The IMPA, usually via AIDESEP, has been 
relatively consistent, but given the dynamics of the events, opposition to the decrees has 
varied slightly. In April of 2009, AIDESEP, along with other organizations, demanded 




territorial integrity of indigenous lands, specifically collective property rights and the 
administrative and political control of resources, and 3) place at serious risk the 
environmental sustainability of the entire region.108 According to many experts, the 
legislative decrees and special laws were a systematic attempt by president Garcia to 
implement a development agenda that was seen by the larger indigenous community as a 
categorical attack on indigenous conceptualization of territory and, if passed, would 
radically accelerate the corrosion, since Fujimori, of indigenous territorial and cultural 
rights in the Peruvian Amazon.109  
Rights to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) gets to the heart of indigenous 
claims as distinct, particular peoples, whose societies were drastically altered by the 
historic process of colonization. Because of indigenous peoples status as colonized and 
“original” peoples, they have obtained certain rights that are stipulated in international 
accords such as the ILO 169 (1989) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007), both of which Peru is a signatory.110 With respect to the legislative 
decrees, Article 6 of ILO 169 is critical. It declares that the government shall:   
                                                
108 These legislative decrees and corresponding legal acts and measure were analyzed by 
a plethora of organizations (governmental, non-governmental, indigenous, environmental 
and human rights). Manacés-Valverde and Gomez-Calleja (2010) , in the “dissenting 
opinion” report list some of the principal organizations: Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL), 
Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR) 2009. Centro Amazónico de 
Antropología y Aplicación Práctica (CAAAP), AIDESEP, Congreso de la Republica. (p. 
36).  
109 This point is highlighted in Manacés-Valverde and Gómez-Calleja (p. 20). 
Interestingly, as the same document points out, the content of the decrees is similar to the 
Law 26505 and its annexes, elaborated as a result of the “Carta de Compromiso” with the 
FMI in 1995. (p. 13).  
110 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples was adopted 
September 13, 2007. Article 7 provides the rights to decide their own development 
priorities to control social, economic, and cultural development, and to participate 
directly in the implementation and evaluation of plans and programs that affect them 
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“[c]onsult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular 
through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly” (ILO 169, 
Article 6, Section A).   
 
As indigenous groups point out, the legislative decrees were adopted without 
consulting indigenous peoples. In fact, anticipating the government’s propensity to ignore 
rights to consultation, indigenous groups examined the ninety-nine legislative decrees 
and determined that thirty-four of them related specifically to indigenous territorial rights 
and concerns. Thus, because the entire legislative package is a violation of FPIC, 
indigenous groups (especially AIDESEP) have been reluctant to debate the decrees on a 
case-by-case basis (Manacés-Valverde and Gómez-Calleja 2010, p. 17- 18).   
In addition to its broader implications, the concept of FPIC is also closely related 
to development projects, in particular extractive projects on indigenous territories. In this 
context, two of the most controversial decrees, LD1015 and 1073, the focal points of the 
massive 2008 demonstrations in August, were considered a violation of FPIC.111 The 
decrees, as mentioned in the previous chapter, were directly related to the facilitation of 
development project by third parties (extractive companies) on indigenous territories. 
Attempting to repeal law 26505, the decrees would have changed the requirements from 
                                                                                                                                            
directly. For specific recommendations on the implementation of ILO 169 in Peru go to 
www.aidesep.org/pe/index.php?codnota=586. The National Coordinator of Human 
Rights makes as similar declaration. See www.aidesep.org.pe/index.php?codnota=528. In 
another statement, Magdiel González Ojeda, ex-Magistrate of the Constitutional Tribunal 
maintained that as a treaty ILO 169 is legally binding. See 
www.aidesep.org.pe/index.php?codnota=472.  
111 LD 1073 was only a slight modification of LD1015. It modified the letter (b) of the 
10th Article of Law 26505. See 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/DecretosLegislativos/01073.pdf 
 It is also important to point out the LD 1015 and 1073 were essentially a replication of 
“legal project 1770”, which was never passed by Congress and, from its announcement, 
was heavily criticized by indigenous organizations.  
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two-thirds of all communities members to only 50% of members present at an assembly 
to allocate community land for development purposes. Indigenous organizations worried 
that, given the past history of private company manipulation (divide and conquer 
strategies), the law would have opened the door to develop projects on community land 
without legitimate community approval (Barandiarán 2008a; CAAAP 2008; Ruiz-
Molleda 2009).  
In a similar vein, LD 1064 sought to create a new juridical regime for the use of 
agriculture lands that would have excluded previous mechanisms for negotiation between 
landowners and extractive companies, establishing a “forced legal servitude” for the 
benefit of mining, petroleum and other extractive activities. Other decrees, such as LD 
1081weakens the role of local community organizations in the making and 
implementation of environmental policies. For the IMPA, these decrees would, therefore, 
fundamentally undermine indigenous territorial rights to exercise political and 
administrative autonomy over land and resources (Barandiarán 2008b; DAR 2009).  
Secondly, many of the decrees work against the political-territorial integrity of 
indigenous lands, undermining the potential consolidation and extension of indigenous 
territories. For indigenous peoples this is not only a direct affront to indigenous 
conceptualizations of territory, but it signals Garcia’s attempts to appropriate indigenous 
lands for development purposes. Several of the decrees that the IMPA oppose, for 
example, are designed to re-categorize land, turning formally protected lands into 
“productive” agriculture lands. LD 1015, 1073, 994, 1020, 1089, 1090 and 1064, to one 
degree or another, all would affect the consolidation of indigenous territorial spaces and, 
correspondingly, the power (or ability) of indigenous peoples to control resources on 
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their own territories. Here are some of the ways in which work against indigenous 
conceptualizations of territory.   
 LD 994, 1064, 1089, together, promote the adjudication of indigenous and 
peasant land to third parties, seeking private investment in irrigation projects (994, 1064) 
and, using the new category “fallow lands apt for agriculture use,” places these lands into 
state hands so that they can then be sold to private entities for development purposes. 
Fallow land could potentially include indigenous lands that have yet to be titled and land 
that indigenous communities seek to incorporate into existing indigenous spaces. 
Moreover, the capacity to define “fallow land,” under 994 and 1064, would fall under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, whose institutional mission, not surprisingly, is based around 
agriculture interests. Under the notion of “expanding the agriculture frontier,” these 
decrees would reduce the definition of forestry land (excluding deforested land) to only 
land with vegetation coverage, excluding deforested land, which would be considered 
“fallow”112 (Barandiarán 2008b). The idea that fallow or idle land is unproductive, as 
explained in the previous section, contradicts the very concept of territory for indigenous 
peoples, which extends beyond economic or productive categories.  
 LD 1089 weakens the prospects for consolidating indigenous lands, but does so 
even more directly. In short, it grants to COFOPRI, an organization historically 
responsible for formalizing informal property in urban areas, the task to formalize and 
title agriculture property for a period of four years. According to experts, this would have 
the effect of slowing down the already ongoing process of titling and registering lands to 
indigenous communities. One of the main problems is related to the institutional capacity 
                                                
112 Also see  “Citizen Monitoring with a rights-based approach for the implementation of 
the US – Perú FTA.” http://www.redge.org.pe/tlc-peru-eua/implementacion.  
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of COFOPRI, an organization that does not have the resources nor the expertise to deal 
with this issue. For example, according to COFOPRI’s “Strategic Institutional Plan,” by 
2011 it would title some 55 communities, leaving more than 127 communities yet to be 
titled. Several organizations have criticized the government’s plans, citing them has 
shortsighted, ambiguous, and, in reality, designed to thwart the entire titling process.113 
  More generally, LD 1089 is designed to formalize rural property for agriculture 
purposes (to expand the agriculture frontier) within a span of only four years. This works 
along side LD 1064 (and 1090), which categorizes “fallow” land that can, under LD 994, 
be promoted as agriculture land. It is worth noting that LD 1089 is a virtual replica of the 
Legislative Project 1770 that was already rejected by Congress (CAAAP 2008).   
Third, indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and others are concerned that 
opening up the region to an intensive influx of extractive industries would potentially 
damage the region environmentally. One of the decrees that best exemplifies these 
concerns is the controversial LD 1090, since repealed, which would have approved the 
“New Forestry and Fauna Law (Nº 20317)” and replaced the existing Law Nº23708. In 
general, this would have established a new framework for the development and 
regulation of forestry and fauna activities in Peru. According to specialists, the new law 
would have considerably weakened the institutional framework in Peru that governs the 
regulations of forests and forest use, which, even goes against the stipulations in the FTA 
with the US. More specifically, the law would have changed the definition of forest 
                                                
113 Laureano del Castillo argues that 1089 allows COFOPRI the exclusive responsibility 
to formalize rights over agriculture property for four years, which allows COFOPRI to 
rectify property inscriptions in public registrars, which would reduce the areas that are 




resources and plantations to make them part of the agriculture regime and thus, enabling 
their allocation to private entities. It would have weaken forestry governance institutions, 
eliminated the National Forestry Policy Consultative Council (CONAFOR), and 
facilitated the sale of forest projects of a controversial origin (Barandiarán 2008b).  
 To a certain extent, LD 1090 is reflective of the entire body of legislative decrees 
and the FTA with the US, in general. According to the study, “the environmental 
governance in legislative decrees,” Barandiarán concludes that environmental standards 
are significantly weakened not only by the content of certain legislative decrees but, more 
generally, by the entire framework of the FTA with the US. This, according to 
Barandiarán, is the case despite the efforts of representatives in the United States 
Congress to improve the environmental content of the FTA. Barandiarán points out that a 
number of the legislative decrees (LD 1064, 1081, 1015, 1073, 1090, among others), 
which seek to facilitate the access and use of natural resources (land, water, forest, etc.), 
do not even consider environmental and social standards and others violate them. 
Moreover, perhaps even more troubling, specific decrees (i.e. LD 1090) in fact violate 
agreements within the FTA that, in theory, should protect given environmental standards 
(2008, p. 43). Barandiarán’s conclusions are consistent with reports from the Public 
Ombudsman’s Office, special legislative committees, and a host of environmental 
groups114 (see Defensoria del Pueblo 2008).  
According to the IMPA, the legislative decrees and the special projects mentioned 
reflect the government’s clear desire to open up the region to foreign investment and 
capital. Indigenous groups throughout the Amazon region, as explained, have struggled 
                                                
114 This report can be downloaded at http://www.servindi.org/actualidad/4872.  
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for years to obtain territorial rights, which is the core of all their claims. As such, it is 
impossible to underestimate the degree to which indigenous groups feel threatened by 
Garcia’s development policies. Oil development, to be sure, is one of the most visible 
extractive practices in the region and for indigenous peoples symbolizes the 
government’s disregard for indigenous values. The legislative decrees, as a whole, were 
designed to make it easier for extractive industries, including the hydrocarbon industry, to 
exploit hydrocarbon resources on indigenous territories. In this next section, I will 
illustrate indigenous opposition oil development in the Peruvian Amazon.115   
Indigenous opposition to oil development in the Peruvian Amazon: strategies, tactics, 
and actions of the IMPA  
  
Indigenous opposition to hydrocarbon development is closely related to Garcia’s 
larger (extractive) development policies as manifested in the legislative decrees. To a 
large extent, it is difficult to separate the two. However, in this section, I will look more 
specifically at indigenous opposition to oil development and indigenous responses. It is 
important to note that indigenous responses to hydrocarbon development are both 
symbolic and substantive. Given the potentially exploitative and high profile nature of oil 
development, the IMPA has utilized resistance to oil and gas policies as symbol of 
Western (or mainstream) development given its stark contradictions to indigenous 
conceptualizations of development and territory. The IMPA’s resistance to hydrocarbon 
development is also substantive, based on Peru’s rather infamous history of oil and gas 
development in Northern Peru, weak environmental regulations surrounding the industry, 
                                                
115 This analysis of the legislative decrees was taken from the following sources: Instituto 
de Defensa Legal (2009), the Defensoría del Pueblo (2008), the Comisión Consultiva de 
la Comisión de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos, Afroperuanos, Ambiente, Ecología del 
Congreso de la Republica (2009), CAAAP (2008), and DAR (2009).  
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and the lack of indigenous participation in the making and implementation of 
hydrocarbon development policies. Furthermore, hydrocarbon development (especially as 
conceived by President Garcia) highlights the quintessential problem of short-term 
economic benefits versus long-term potential environmental risks, which in many cases 
contradict indigenous notions of development.   
To respond the Garcia’s hydrocarbon development policies, the IMPA has turned 
to a repertoire of action and protest (Hughes 2010, p. 88), engaging in a combination of 
direct protest action (demonstrations, strikes, road and river blockades, occupations, etc.) 
and less-direct action, including pressure on and negotiation with congressional members 
and government officials, legal and constitutional challenges to government policies, 
international and domestic alliance building, direct confrontation with oil executives and 
board members, and, via organizational pronouncements, widespread diffusion of 
indigenous demands and concerns. While drawing from a multiplicity of tactics, in this 
case, the indigenous response has followed a somewhat consistent pattern: 1) an 
articulation (or manifestation) of indigenous demands to policymakers and the public at 
large, 2) efforts to seek dialogue and negotiation with public officials and, as these efforts 
fall short, 3) a call for direct protest action. It is worth noting that the IMPA, led 
principally by AIDESEP, does not generally control the agenda, but is often forced to 
react to the relatively organic nature of the movement.128 In other words, at times, rather 
than leading, AIDESEP and other regional organizations follow the initiatives of more 
localized or grassroots-based indigenous organizations.  
                                                
128 This is clearly related to existence of some 60 different ethnic groupings, a 
multiplicity of independent-minded indigenous communities, and the existence of 
multiple-level organizations throughout the Amazon region. 
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The protest in 2008 and 2009, as discussed, were not just about oil development, 
but, specifically, were an attempt to repeal the package of legislative decrees and special 
projects introduced by Garcia at the onset of his presidency. Of course, more generally, 
the protests stem from the invasion and dispossession of indigenous territories, which, as 
the previous sections demonstrate, has intensified since the Fujimori years. In fact, as 
mentioned earlier, the IMPA’s most consistent claim is to re-instate the notion that 
communal land is “inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptable”129 (Chirif and 
Garcia-Hierro 2007, p. 13). Indigenous responses to oil development, therefore, are part 
of the IMPA’s struggle to protect (and gain) indigenous territorial spaces. 
The IMPA, led by AIDESEP, reacted immediately to Garcia’s development 
policies, especially as the government’s extractive intentions became evident. On August 
6, 2006, on the “International Day of Indigenous Peoples,” only one month after the 
inauguration of Garcia, AIDESEP spelled out indigenous concerns in a pronouncement 
addressed to Garcia and international and national public opinion:  
1. We demand that the Peruvian State and International extractive companies 
respect our rights to territory and natural resources such as our forests, which 
[make up] our habitat. Petroleum and mining activities have drastically affected 
our resources and our collective way of life, [and] all of this is just another 
manifestation of how indigenous peoples are discriminated against and how our 
natural resources are illicitly appropriated, [these are] resources that [our 
ancestors] have taken care of for thousands of years. 
 
                                                
129 According to Manacés-Valverde and Gómez-Calleja (2010), indigenous peoples have 
experienced a progressive deterioration of the juridical security of their territories 
principally since 1993, via the auto-coup (of Fujimori) that eliminated constitutional 
guarantees established since 1920, especially the notion that communal territory is 
“inalienable, unmortgageable, and imprescriptable. Interestingly, these authors write that 
this deterioration of indigenous land rights was sustained in 1995 by a “Letter of Intent” 
with the FMI that, almost verbatim, contains the majority of the objectives proposed in 




2. We denounce the constant violations of human rights, collective rights and the 
right to free determination of our brothers living in voluntary isolation or initial 
contact, [we denounce threats] from illegal loggers who hire assassins just to 
illegally extract wood in areas where indigenous peoples have lived for many 
years such the Ucayali and Madre de Dios, as well as from others with particular 
interests.  
 
3. For all this we oppose the unscrupulous attitude of the Peruvian State that sees  
the Amazon and its natural resources as “petty cash” from which it can cover its 
excesses and poor economic management, thus permitting the entrance of 
companies that only see maximum profit, with little investment, without caring 
about the lives of indigenous peoples and the environment in which we live; the 
colonial “encomienda” has not been abolished in Peru, but has only changed its 
name, now it is called “CONCESSION.”  
 
4. We ask the President of the Republic, Alan Garcia Perez, and the Congress of 
the Republic to re-evaluate their policies and plans with respect to the Amazonia 
and to Indigenous Peoples; we have observed the president’s message to the 
Nation in which we were not even named, again we return to invisibility and [the 
realization that] our dreams of vindication have been postponed. (AIDESEP 
2006)  
 
In many respects, this statement is strikingly prescient: it announces to the government in 
especially clear terms their serious concerns with oil development, broader issues of 
development in the region, and the state’s propensity to invisibilize indigenous peoples in 
a national discourse. More concretely, it reveals the very clear relationship of oil 
development to indigenous notions of territory. The first point, for example, illustrates 
the historical experience Amazonian peoples have with oil development, which, as they 
see it, is “another” manifestation of a long history of discrimination. They remind that 
indigenous ancestors, before the existence of the Peruvian nation-state, were able to take 
care of natural resources. In point two, in support of indigenous peoples living in 
voluntary isolation, they again draw inferences to the history of discrimination and 
environmental contamination. In the third point, already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, AIDESEP illustrates the differences between state and indigenous viewpoint of 
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land. For the state land is only “petty cash” and works against the health and wellbeing of 
indigenous peoples and the environment. And, in a direct link to colonialism, they equate 
the present day “concession” with the colonial encomienda. Finally, they ask the 
president to “visibilize” indigenous peoples and, in a sense, to recognize their historic 
struggle for the recuperation of indigenous territories and rights.   
Interestingly, much of the opposition to Garcia’s policies in the first few months 
of his presidency were related to oil development, especially the Rio Corrientes case, 
which will be discussed in detail in the next section. Indigenous opposition to Garcia’s 
broader development policies and, specifically, to the legislative decrees and special 
projects emerged as these policies and the president’s philosophy of development became 
evident. This first clear signal was in 2007 when Garcia described his “perro del 
hortelano” philosophy in a series of editorials in el Comerico. This will be detailed in 
Chapter V.  AIDESEP, indigenous regional federations, organizations, human rights 
activists, and environmentalists all responded forcefully to Garcia’s plans to develop the 
Amazon region. One indigenous group, in fact, so offended, declared Garcia to as “an 
enemy of the indigenous movement.” This tone (and tension) set the stage for the 
subsequent official announcement of the legislative decrees in June of 2008, which led to 
the massive protests in 2008 and 2009. Beginning in 2008, as a plethora of studies around 
the legislative decrees came forward, the IMPA began to clearly articulate their position 
against the legislative decrees, special projects, and all policies that affected indigenous 
territorial rights. Oil development, subsequent to 2008, became attached as one of the key 





Rio Corrientes and grassroots responses 
 
 The responses and positions of the IMPA often stem from grassroots or localized 
conflicts. In the case of oil development, such responses have come in direct opposition 
to petroleum companies operating on indigenous lands, especially when indigenous 
(local) villages are impacted.  As explained in Chapter II, the most important example of 
the exploitative nature of oil development is in the Corrientes River Basin, specifically 
Blocks 1AB and 8, where Oxy Petroleum and Petroperú (the state-run oil company) 
operated since the early 1970s.131 In 2000, Oxy sold its concession to Pluspetrol, an 
Argentine company that continues to operate in the area today. From the perspective of 
the state, this region is critically important as it supplies more than 50 percent of all the 
petroleum produced in Peru. For indigenous peoples, it is an example of long-term oil 
development in the Peruvian Amazon and thus serves as a reference point for other 
communities, who point to the Corrientes region and the experience of the Achuar as an 
example of the devastating consequences of oil development for indigenous peoples.  
 It is important to note that, perhaps as a harbinger of future conflicts, Garcia 
entered the presidency at a time when the Achuar struggle against oil development was 
gaining momentum. Providing legitimacy to years of Achuar complaints about river 
contamination from oil development, in May of 2006, the Peruvian Ministry of Health 
released a report that officially documented high levels of contamination in the Corrientes 
River Basin. Particularly troubling, the study found that an extremely high number of 
children (66 percent) and relatively high number of adults (24 percent) living in the area 
had levels of cadmium and lead in their blood that was above maximum limits for 
                                                
131 For a compelling story of oil operations in this region see La Torre Lopez (1999)  
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humans. Even more frightening, 13 percent of children had levels considered 
dangerous.132 The response from the Achuar, importantly, mirrors the pattern of 
resistance mentioned earlier: 1) pronouncements and communiqués, 2) attempts at 
dialogue, negotiation with government officials and, as these efforts fall short, 3) direct 
protest action.  
 The Achuar responded to the study immediately. In June of 2006,  The Federation 
of Native Communities of the Corrientes River Basin (FECONACO) made an official 
pronouncement stating the “dangerous” situation that 5,000 people from distinct 
communities suffered because of oil contamination.133 In an attempt to communicate their 
worries to government and company officials, the coordinator of FECONACO, with a 
delegation of eleven leaders, arrived in Lima to discuss the situation with officials from 
the Ministry of Health and leaders of Pluspetrol (Servindi 2006a).134 Subsequent to this 
initial visit, indigenous organizations (FECONACO, AIDESEP, etc.) issued further 
statements, conducted a series of meeting with local apus (traditional leaders), and made 
another trip to Lima.  By mid June, amidst a sense of frustration at the lack of 
                                                
132 The study was conducted by DIGESA, the General Directorate of Environmental 
Health. Informe Nº 995/DEPA/ APRAH//DIGESA. The study found that 66.21% of 
children had levels of lead in their blood that was above the maximum limits for humans, 
13% had levels that were considered “dangerous,” and 24% of the adults in the region 
had levels above maximum limits. The study was published in May of  2006.  
133 It is worth noting that, according to indigenous sources, indigenous organizations, 
groups, and locals had always complained of river contamination and the side effects that 
individuals had been suffering for many years (headaches, stomach aches, diarrhea, etc.). 
The study, therefore, only confirmed their suspicions.   
134 As this article states, between 2005 and 2005 Pluspetrol presented remediation plans 
for blocks 1AB and 8, which included the construction of aqueducts to remove produced 
waters from the affected streams and, also, of wells that would eliminate contamination 
of nearby waters.  
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government action, indigenous organizations began to clearly articulate their position and 
demands, which included a broader critique of oil development.  
 On June 12, 2006, ORIA, AIDESEP’s regional organization from the Iquitos area, 
issued an official statement that supported FECONACO’s claims and included a 
statement against oil development in the entire Iquitos region. Importantly, the statement 
referred to a previous agreement with Pluspetrol in which the oil company would take the 
necessary steps to remediate previous environmental damage and prevent further 
contamination. This included a plan to re-inject what is referred to as “produced waters,” 
which contain dangerous chemicals known to produce cancer and other serious 
conditions.  The document also included a rejection of any hydrocarbon related activities 
in eight recently auctioned off oil blocks (117, 67, 39, 121, 104, 106, 8, 1AB) in the 
surrounding area (Servindi 2006b).135 The declaration was followed by events to bring 
public attention to the issue. For example, the U.S. actress and activist Q’orianka Kilcher, 
of Peruvian decent, who played the role of Pocahontas in a 2005 film, visited the area in 
September, and, in November, a special appeared on a popular news program that 
illustrated the environmental and health consequences of oil development for the Achuar. 
Finally, in September FECONOCO and ORACH (the Organization Achuar Chayat) 
traveled to Lima (the third time than an Achuar group made the trip) this time in the hope 
of speaking directly to President Garcia, to Congressional representatives, and to the 
                                                
135 In the document, ORAI specifies the company that owns the concession and the 
particular groups that are affected: 117- Petrobras (affects the Secoya and Kichwa), 67- 
Barret (affects the Aravela peoples and indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation), 
39- Repsol YPF (affects the Avarela, Kichwa, and peoples living in voluntary isolation), 
121- Barret (affects the Kichwa), 104- Burlington (affects the Achuar), 8 and 1AB-
Pluspetrol (affects the Achuar, Murato and Kichwa of the Corrientes and Tigre Rivers). 
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Ministries of Health, of Energy and Mines, the Public Ombudsman’s Office, and to 
CONAM (the National Council of the Environment) (Servindi 2006c).136 
 The lack of response from the government finally led to the IMPA (AIDESEP, 
regional and local organizations) to call for direct protest action. In September the Achuar 
community (in Iquitos) began to engage in public manifestations against the government 
and Pluspetrol. Early on the public demonstrations were supported by indigenous 
organizations (ORAI, FECONACO, AIDESEP, etc), environmental groups (i.e. La Red 
Ambiental de Loreto), and human rights organizations (Racimos de Ungurahui). Some of 
the banners included messages such as “Corrientes, Urgent Re-injection”, “Petroleum 
finances state corruption,” “Government, respect our decisions,” “No to the divide and 
conquer strategy by Petroleum companies,” “No more contamination of blood,” and 
others. The public protests were followed by further actions throughout the region. 
Focusing on blocks 1AB and 8, Achuar, Quichua and Urarinas communities from the 
Corrientes River region were able to completely shut down Pluspetrol operations (Pérez-
Rubio 2006).137 By October the protest had intensified, including more communities, and 
blocking highway access and river transport. At this point, via AIDESEP, the Achuar had 
issued a statement that they would not accept further petroleum development in their 
territories (Achuar from the Corrientes River Basin, Loreto region) (Servindi 2006d). On 
                                                
136 This article points out that Pluspetrol daily dumps 1,300,000 barrels of “produced 
water” (1 barrel = 159 liters), which is characterized for high levels of salinity, high 
temperatures (90ºC), composed of hydrocarbons, chlorides, and heavy metals that 
produce genetic alterations and cancer, including lead, cadmium, chrome, nickel, 
mercury, arsenic, etc.   
137 A September 7 agreement with the vice Minister of Energy and Mines included the 
following stipulations: 1) Re-injection of 100% of produced waters, 2) Financing of an 
integral health plan, 3) environmental remediation with indigenous monitoring, 4) 
Financing of an education plan, titling project, and productive activities, and 5) 
temporary, emergency support for food and water.  
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October 10, after several attempts at dialogue and negotiation, FECONOCO decided to 
halt Pluspetrol’s operations in blocks 1AB and 8, which included some 180 production 
wells. By October 15, they had put together a proposal that included the following 
demands: 1) the re-injection of production waters, 2) the procedural requirements for a 
health and integral development plan, 3) temporary (emergency) food provisions and 
potable water, 4) environmental remediation, and 5) health security for indigenous 
peoples living in the area. On October 22, after a series of negotiations (and a weak and 
highly criticized government proposal) the government finally accepted the Achuar 
demands. At the time, this was seen as an important victory for the IMPA against the 
government and the hydrocarbon industry (Servindi 2006e). 
 The Achuar case in the Corrientes region is a critical piece to understanding 
indigenous resistance to future oil development in the region. It provides an important 
reference point to any community that might consider oil development on their territories. 
Not surprisingly, the Achuar story is well-known throughout the region. This case is also 
reflective of the government’s general attitude towards indigenous resistance to oil 
development. In short, the government was forced to act because of the actions of 
indigenous groups who investigated the issues, staged protests, traveled to Lima and, in 
general, applied pressure on the government. I will return to this case in the following 
chapter.  
Indigenous responses to future oil development  
 
While the Achuar case serves as a reference point for indigenous opposition, 
given Garcia’s aggressive hydrocarbon agenda (denominated by Amazon Watch as a 
“fire sale”), indigenous peoples throughout the region have been forced to respond to 
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future (or potential) oil development on their lands. The IMPA response to oil 
development, thus, is very much revolves around a debate about future development of 
the region, especially as it relates to issues surrounding sustainable development and 
indigenous rights (i.e. the legislative decrees). This is one reason, again, that it is 
impossible to disconnect indigenous opposition to hydrocarbon development to the 
government’s larger development agenda.  
The Achuar experience is important, as mentioned, because is serves as a 
reference point for other indigenous communities that face the prospects of oil 
development on their land. However, it is also a vivid example of how the IMPA works. 
The movement does not, as some claim, work as a highly structured organization where 
subordinate groups and individuals simply follow directives from its leaders. AIDESEP, 
for example, the leading indigenous voice in the region, again is made up of 57 distinct 
federations, which are, in many respects, independent organizations that often act on their 
own accord. Further, the IMPA is larger than just AIDESEP, which clearly does not 
enjoy unfettered support from all indigenous communities throughout the Amazon. That 
said, opposition to oil development is widespread throughout the region, occurs at 
multiple levels (village, regional, national), and (again) reflects indigenous peoples deep 
rejection of the government’s broader development policies.  
 As mentioned, AIDESP made a public statement within the first month of 
Garcia’s inauguration that spelled out the organization’s opposition to extractive policies, 
even asking the government to reevaluate its development policies in the Amazon region. 
However, the Garcia government did not reevaluated its policies, but carried out the most 
aggressive hydrocarbon development agenda in the history of the Amazon region. This 
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has forced the IMPA to respond at distinct levels: 1) large indigenous federations (i.e. 
AIDESEP, regional federations, etc.) have challenged the government’s larger 
hydrocarbon development agenda (polices) on the grounds that it violates indigenous 
rights to FPIC (i.e. territorial autonomy and sovereignty), that it places at risk the lives of 
indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation, and that it works against the 
environmental and social sustainability of the region. More generally, the government’s 
extractive policies challenge the IMPA historical struggle to gain territorial rights. 2) 
Indigenous communities (at the village-level) have been forced to respond to specific 
instances of oil development or future oil development on their territories. This occurs 
generally after the government announces that it has signed a concessionary agreement 
with a private company to explore for oil resources. 3) The IMPA, usually in the figure of 
AIDESEP, works with local groups and villages at different levels to connect local 
opposition with broader opposition. Therefore, the IMPA’s challenge to the government’s 
hydrocarbon development policies works around a rather complex relationship between 
indigenous organizations at distinct levels.   
 While it is difficult to isolate indigenous responses to oil develop from the 
IMPA’s broader struggles against the government development policies, early in the 
Garcia presidency, AIDESEP and other regional federations reacted to the government’s 
hydrocarbon development plans, especially as Perúpetro (the government hydrocarbon 
licensing agency) began to announce its plans to auction off oil and gas concessions to 
foreign companies. In 2007, for example, as the government hydrocarbon intentions 
became apparent, AIDESEP issued multiple statements, many of which were related to 
the question of oil development on reserves for indigenous peoples living in voluntary 
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isolation. However, as the government’s even more ambitious development policies 
emerged, and in the midst of President Garcia’s rhetorical campaign against the 
indigenous movement, AIDESEP and other regional federations began to respond to 
government broader development policies. As such, much of indigenous opposition to oil 
and gas development became intertwined with a broader critique against government 
development policies in the Amazon region. This is especially true as the IMPA began to 
mount a campaign against the legislative decrees and special projects, a point at which 
opposition to oil development emerged as part of a broader platform against the 
government.  
 Nevertheless, throughout Garcia’s presidency, AIDESEP and its regional 
federations have issued multiple statements expressing their opposition to oil 
development on indigenous territories. In May of 2008, at the Third Summit of 
Indigenous Peoples, AIDESEP issued a statement that articulates a position of clear 
opposition. This is point three of a broader statement that encompasses issues of territory, 
the state and transnational companies, IRRSA (the Initiative to Integrate Infrastructure of 
South America), health and education, and the environment:  
Currently 70% of the Peruvian Amazon is covered with petroleum concessions 
that superimpose native communities, territorial reserves for indigenous peoples 
in isolation, communal reserves and other conservation zones; a similar situation 
exists with forest and mining activities. All of this [is done] without establishing 
free, prior, informed consent with representative [indigenous] organizations of the 
Amazonia. For this, we demand that this shameful liquidation or natural resources 
is stopped and that all concessions awarded against the will of indigenous 
communities are annulled (AIDESEP 2008a).  
 
While the content of the statements varies, the general position of AIDESEP and its 
regional federations has been consistent with this statement. In short, AIDESEP opposes 
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oil development that superimposes indigenous territories and other specially protected 
spaces, but, crucially, they argue for the right for indigenous peoples to be consulted.  
This position, to a large degree, has been maintained by indigenous federations, 
organizations, and communities throughout the Amazon region. Statements have ranged 
from broad-level denunciations of hydrocarbon development throughout the entire 
region, to statements regarding the presence of oil companies on specific community 
lands. One indigenous federation, for example, denounced the “anti-indigenous attitude 
and methodology” of the Garcia’s government’s hydrocarbon development agenda and 
vowed to physically defend with their lives indigenous territory and prevent the entrance 
of any oil company on indigenous territories.138 Other statements have been in direct 
relation to the presence of oil companies on indigenous territories. In one instance, three 
indigenous organizations from the Northern Marañon region demanded that if the 
Canadian company Tailsman did not abandon block 64 that they would take measures to 
stop oil production. In this case, similar to others, the organizations denounced the 
manipulative actions of the company to appear as if they have indigenous support.139  
The IMPA has also successfully drawn from the support of NGOs, 
environmentalist, human rights organizations, and others to confront Garcia’s aggressive 
hydrocarbon development agenda. Peruvian organizations such as Racimos de 
                                                
138 APRI S.C. (the Regional Association of Indigenous peoples from the Central Jungle) 
on June J, 2007 made the particular harsh statement against the government’s 
hydrocarbon policies. For details go to “Perú: Pueblos Indígenas de selva central 
rechazan agresiva política de concesiones sobre territorios indígenas” SERVINDI. June 
8, 2007. At http://www.servindi.org/actualidad/2197#more-2197.  
139 The organizations are OSHDEM (The Shuar Organization of Morona), FEFSHAM 
(The Sharpa Federation of Morona) and AIM (the Indigenous Association of Morona). 
See “Organizaciones indígenas anuncian medidas si petrolera no abandona lote 64” 
AIDESEP. October 21, 2008. http://www.aidesep.org.pe/index.php?codnota=291.  
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Ungurahui, the Institute of Welbeing (el Instituto de Bien Común), the Amazonic Center 
of Anthropology and Practical Application (el Centro Amazónico de Antropología y 
Aplicación Práctica--CAAAP), the group Rights, Environment and Natural Resources 
(Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales—DAR), the Peruvian Association for the 
Conserevation of Nature (la Asociación Peruana para la Conservación de la 
Naturaleza—APECO), the Institute of Legal Defense (el Instituto de Defensa Legal), and 
others have  supported the IMPA in a number of ways: legal analysis, public statements, 
logistical support, workshops, and exerting pressure on government officials are just 
some of the ways. International organizations such as Amazon Watch, World Wildlife 
Fund, the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs have been actively 
involved in supporting the IMPA.  
Indigenous organizations, when necessary, have also used tactics of direct action 
to demonstrate their opposition to oil development. As mentioned in the opening section 
of this chapter, much of the protests in 2008 and 2009 were pointed directly at the oil 
industry, to a certain extent, as a symbol of indigenous opposition to Garcia’s 
development policies. Direct action, in this case, was used to call the attention of the 
government and the larger public to indigenous demands surrounding the legislative 
decrees. In the larger scheme of the protest, these direct acts and others follow the general 
pattern of indigenous responses, given that the IMPA had announced to the government 
on multiple occasions its intentions if the government did not repeal the legislative 
decrees.  
In this context, direct protest, especially in 2009, had a major impact on the oil 
industry and successfully captured the attention of the government and brought 
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international attention to the issue. At one point in May it was reported to Rueters that at 
least 41 energy vessels were stuck along the rivers in the Amazon region. The protests, in 
fact, forced Petroperú (the state oil company) to stop operations on one of its main crude 
pipelines, which normally pumps some 40,000 barrels a day (Ford 2009).141 The 
government was also forced to declare a “state of emergency” in four departments 
because the protests were putting at risk the production, transportation, and distribution of 
natural gas and hydrocarbons (El Comercio 2009). In one key incident, Kichua and 
Arabela communities successful blocked the progress of a three Perenco (a French oil 
company) vessels that were trying to reach the company’s base operations. This case is 
especially important given that Perenco operations in the area are considered a 
fundamental part of the government’s plans to turn Peru into a net exporter of petroleum. 
In April, Garcia had declared the development of Block 67 of national interest given the 
quantity of heavy oil that is expected to be extracted from this area (Radio Voz de la 
Selva 2009a)142 The government responded, in this case, with sending Navy ships to 
secure river access for the Perenco vessels (Radio Voz de la Selva 2009b). 
The indigenous responses in the form of direct action also occur when the 
interests of particular indigenous communities and petroleum companies collide. In these 
cases, rather than a broad statement about the government’s development policies, local 
communities, often with the support of indigenous federations, confront oil companies 
                                                
141 According Luis Suarez, the head of maintenance of Petroperu’s pipeline, the protests 
forced the company to totally stop operations.  
142 The government considered the Perenco investment to be of national interest. The 
project involves a 2 billion dollar investment, which, in 2009, amounted to 200 million 
dollars in the eleven exploratory wells. At the time of this article they expected that this 
could produce up to 350 million barrels. According to government officials, the 
conclusion of this project will lead to Peru becoming a net exporter of oil.  
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and the government because of the specific policies and practices related to hydrocarbon 
development on community spaces. Since 2007, these confrontations have occurred 
frequently. Here are examples of a few.  
In May of 2007, leaders from nearly 200 communities, represented by the Main 
Office of Native Communities from the Central Jungle (CECONSEC), came together to 
denounce the 2005 oil concession awarded to Pluspetrol in Block 108. These 
communities were especially critical of the process of oil development, accusing 
Pluspetrol and Perúpetro of failing to provide an adequate environmental impact 
statement, of negotiating with individual communities (divide and conquer) as opposed to 
CECONSEC, the representative organization in the region, and that the state fulfill its 
responsibility in enforcing the constitution and laws for the development, peace, and 
general welfare of indigenous peoples (Servindi 2007a). In December of 2007, 
FENACOCA (the Federation of Native Communities of Cacataibo) asks for the 
intervention of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to intervene on behalf 
of a group of Cacaitabo living in voluntary isolation, threatened by the activities of the 
Canadian multinational, Petrolífera Petroleum, in Block 107 (Servindi 2007b). In 
October of 2008, three indigenous organizations, representing approximately 34 
communities warned the Canadian company Tailsman that if they did not leave Block 64 
(in the Northwestern Amazon region) that they would take measures to stop oil 
operations (AIDESEP 2008b). In November of 2008, several communities located on the 
River Curaray threatened to close all river transport if the managers of Respol and 
regional government officials from Loreto failed to enter into dialogue with communities 
affected by oil development (AIDESEP 2008c).  
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From 2006 until 2009, indigenous organizations (federations and other smaller 
organizations) confronted oil companies and government officials on multiple occasions. 
These confrontations involved pronouncements, letter writing to government officials, 
direct warnings to company officials, river blockages, and even the shutting down of oil 
operations. Incidences of opposition to oil development have increased as Garcia’s 
policies have become more evident to indigenous groups throughout the Amazon.  
Just between March and April of 2009, a the height of the 2009 manifestations, 
there were several acts of protest that were directly pointed at the oil industry. In March, 
more than one hundred Secoya and Kichwa communities from Northern Peru denounced 
the entrance of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras on their territories (AIDESEP 2009a) 
In April, in a similar act more than more than 3,000 indigenous people from 80 Kichua 
and Arabela communites came together to protest the UK-based Perenco for 
contaminating activities on their land (AIDESEP 2009b). In the Northeastern Amazon 
region, also in April, thousands of Mateses people move to the rivers (the Yaquerana and 
the Gálvez) to block the entrance of Colombian oil company Pacific Stratus, or any 
company, to enter their lands (AIDESEP 2009c). 
It is important to mention that some indigenous communities support petroleum 
development on indigenous territories. In truth, it is difficult to quantify the level of 
support/opposition to the government hydrocarbon development plans. CONAP, the 
other national indigenous federation, on many occasions have voiced their support for oil 
development, even signing a contract with Perúpetro to help carry out oil development on 
indigenous territories. CONAP’s position is, not surprisingly, controversial amongst 
indigenous communities, some of which consider CONAP as co-opted by government 
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influence.  However, independent of CONAP’s position, it is impossible to deny that 
widespread opposition (albeit difficult to quantify) to hydrocarbon development exists. 
The massive protest in 2008 and 2009, if anything, demonstrate the degree to which 
indigenous groups are willing to oppose government policies, including hydrocarbon 
development, that work against indigenous territorial claims.  
Conclusion 
 
The IMPA, perhaps to the surprise of the Garcia government, has proved quite a 
sophisticated adversary to the government. As mentioned, four legislative decrees (of the 
eleven) have been repealed and just recently (May 2010) Congress passed a consultation 
law that was meant to implement ILO 169 and, in spirit, the notion of FPIC. Garcia has 
yet to sign the law and, given recent statements, it appears that he will not. The objective 
of this chapter has been, in general, to describe indigenous opposition to the Peruvian 
government’s hydrocarbon policy. Again, while an exact number is difficult to determine 
it is impossible to deny (as President Garcia does) that significant opposition exists not 
only to hydrocarbon development, but to the government’s larger development policies. 
Perhaps the key point, evident throughout this entire dissertation, is that 
indigenous opposition to oil development is closely related to indigenous territorial 
claims. The emergence of the IMPA can be explained as a combination of the state’s 
consistent policy of development and colonization of the Amazon region, leading to the 
dispossession of indigenous territorial spaces, and political and transnational opportunity 
structures that not only facilitated indigenous organizing, but quite definitely shaped it. In 
other words, the 1974 Native Communities Law, the work of relatively progressive 
advocates within the government, largely determined the process of indigenous 
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organizing and the recuperation of territorial spaces. Paradoxically, this occurred against 
the state’s larger development objectives, which were still unmistakably based on 
colonization and development of so called empty, idle, Amazonian spaces. The IMPA, 
however, as it has done throughout history, reacted both to the process of colonization 
and to the opportunity not only to protect but eventually to expand (or retake) these 
territorial spaces. The IMPA, as all colonized peoples, were forced to adapt to colonial, 
republican and Eurocentric modern institutions, which has also, strategically, helped to 
shape the IMPA’s current political objectives and to frame indigenous conceptualizations 
of territory.   
 Indigenous opposition to Garcia’s legislative decrees, to the government’s 
hydrocarbon policies, and the protests of 2008 and 2009 all relate closely to this historic, 
yet current, government practice of the dispossession of indigenous territories against the 
indigenous practice of defense and recovery of these very same territories. Put 
differently, the existence of the IMPA can be largely explained as an impasse between 
the government’s historic colonization policy of Amazonian territorial spaces and 
indigenous peoples resistance to colonization and push to recover territorial spaces.  In 
the next chapter, turning to the lens of modernity/coloniality, I will try to explain this 
apparent policy gridlock between the Garcia government and the IMPA over 
hydrocarbon development, in particular, and natural resource development in general.  
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CHAPTER V. USING DECOLONIALITY TO UNDERSTAND STATE AND 
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES  
 
“The Eurocentric perspective of knowledge operates as a mirror that distorts what it 
reflects, as we can see in the Latin American historical experience.” Anibal Quijano 2000 
 
Houston Road Show 
   
The Houston road show, a promotional event carried out by Perúpetro to attract 
foreign investment in Peru took place, took place in February of 2008.143 As part of its 
program, Perúpetro included a space for “Environmental and Social Responsibility,” but 
instead of AIDESEP, the leading representative of IMPA, they invited the Confederation 
of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP) to speak as the representative of 
indigenous peoples throughout the Amazon region. Importantly, CONAP is one of the 
few indigenous organizations that has taken a favorable position towards oil development 
in the region, even signing a three-year agreement with Perúpetro to develop community 
projects in conjunction with oil development.144  
At the event, CONAP publicly declared that indigenous people support oil 
development, emphasizing a “harmonious” relationship between indigenous 
communities, the state, and oil companies. Following CONAP’s presentation, Robert 
                                                
143 I personally attended this event with the vice-president of AIDESEP.  
144 Go to http://www.perpetro.com.pe/noticias-s-asp?ID=118. On the 21 April, 2008, 
representatives from nine indigenous groups from the Amazon (Shawi, Shiwilo, Cocama-
Cocamilla, Shapra, Candozi, Quechua, Wampis, Achuar y Awajún), from four provinces 
(Loreto, Amazonas, Cajamarca, y San Martin) in the Northern part of the Amazon, 
formally denounced CONAP for signing an agreement with Perupetro, stating that this 
organization does not represent their interests (See Servindi 2008b).   
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Guimaraes, AIDESEP’s vice president, interrupted the meeting to announced to oil 
investors, “just as some things are not negotiable for you, some things, like our territories, 
are not negotiable for us.” Referring to oil contamination at the Corrientes River Basin, 
he explained that hydrocarbon development has already had serious consequences for 
indigenous peoples in Northern Peru, destroying biodiversity and making people sick, 
especially children who have high levels of cadmium and lead in their blood and bones. 
Finally, Guimaraes specified that he was carrying a letter from indigenous peoples 
throughout the region demanding that those oil blocks that overlay indigenous territories 
be taken off the negotiating table.  
In his closing remarks, Daniel Saba, president of Perúpetro, felt pressed to 
respond to Guimaraes, who he referred to as “our spontaneous visitor.” He complained 
that the CONAP presentation was  poorly translated and assured oil investors that 
CONAP, not AIDESEP, represented the “true” indigenous position on oil development. 
Saba, who seemed shaken by the Guimaraes intervention, ended the meeting with these 
words:  
If you are interested in investing in Peru, go the Amazon, and if you go you will 
notice that 66% of the people live in poverty. So when someone says that they 
want to live like they were living in the past [referring to Guimaraes], oh my God, 
they are saying that they want to live with 66% poverty. 
 
He never mentioned Guimaraes by name, leaving out the fact that this was the vice 
president of the most formidable indigenous organization in the Amazon region, one that 
officially represents approximately 350,000 indigenous persons and some 1,350 native 
communities. Guimaraes, in the end, approached Saba to hand him the letter that he had 
brought from the Amazon region. Saba, however, shook his head, indicating that he 
would not accept the AIDESEP letter.  
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Is Perúpetro’s dismissal of AIDESEP as a legitimate representative of indigenous 
peoples throughout the region a simple case of well calculated political strategy? Perhaps. 
The government is interested in selling oil concessions and any visible opposition clearly 
represents an obstacle that could complicate the government’s objectives to sell oil 
concessions in the Peruvian Amazon. However, Saba’s reaction seems to go beyond just 
political posturing. Not only did he seem unsettled by Guimaraes’s intervention, but Saba 
appeared puzzled by the fact that indigenous peoples could oppose oil development: “oh 
my God,” Saba decried, “they want to live like they were living in the past.”  
It is important to highlight Saba’s misrepresentation of Guimaraes’s statement. 
Guimaraes, who only spoke for one minute, never mentioned that indigenous peoples in 
the Amazon want to live like they were living in the past. Speaking in especially 
straightforward language, he addressed many of the critical issues for indigenous peoples, 
drew attention to the tragic history of oil contamination in Northern Peru and, as a 
representative of AIDESEP, demanded that those blocks that overlap indigenous 
territories be taken off the negotiating table. Consistent with AIDESEP’s broader 
message, he carefully stated that indigenous peoples throughout the region oppose oil 
development not merely to protect indigenous territorial and cultural rights, but also to 
conserve the region’s biodiversity and regulate the earth’s climate for the benefit of Peru 
and the world.    
In this chapter, I argue that the Houston road show mirrors the larger political 
conflict between the state and indigenous peoples over natural resource development in 
the Amazon region. To better understand this conflict and explain why the government 
misrepresents indigenous perspectives on development I turn to modernity/coloniality, an 
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alternative theoretical lens. In the first section, I provide an overview the 
modernity/coloniality theoretical approach, focusing on those elements that are especially 
useful in explaining this conflict.  In the second section, I examine Peru’s natural 
resource development policies through the lens of modernity/coloniality. This, I argue, 
helps to explain the government’s development approach and, specifically, why the 
Garcia government misrepresents indigenous positions on development. In the third 
section, I suggests ways in which the alternative development policy notion of 
decoloniality is expressed in indigenous society and in the IMPA. This position, I argue, 
not only challenges Peru’s predilections for Eurocentric development, but reveals a more 
sustainable approach to development that, in fact, does not reject modern economic 
development.  
Modernity/coloniality and Eurocentric development   
 
Modernity/coloniality is a theoretical approach inspired by the work of scholars, 
mostly from Latin America, including Walter Mignolo (Argentina), Enrique Dussel 
(Mexico), Anibal Quijano (Peru), Arturo Escobar (Colombia), and others that claim that 
the idea of modernity, along with its corollaries development and modernization, are 
heavily influenced by Eurocentric order and thinking.145 Eurocentric modernity, as they 
describe it, is guided by a logic that informs political, economic, social and economic 
thought and is predominant in mainstream institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and 
the WTO, but also permeates political institutions like the “modern” nation-state. The 
                                                
145 For an interesting look at the theoretical foundations (or genealogy of the groups 
thinking) see Escobar (2007). He includes liberation theology from the 1960s and 1970s 
(Enrique Dussel, Rodolfo Kusch, Orlando Fals Borda, Pablo Gonzales Casanova, Darcy 
Ribero), dependency theory, the debates on modernity and postmodernity in Latin 
America, the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, and others. See p. 180.  
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modernity/coloniality lens, as I will demonstrate in this section, offers not only a useful 
way to deconstruct contemporary notions of modernity and development, but suggests 
ways in which alternative or subaltern notions of modernity and development are 
emerging.   
For most, modernity is generally associated with an intellectual effort on the part 
of Enlightenment thinkers to develop objective science, to accumulate knowledge, and to 
dominate and control nature. For instance, according to Harvey, modernity is related to 
the pursuit of human emancipation by free and autonomous individuals, leading to the 
development of rational forms of social organizations and thought that would liberate 
humans from irrational notions of myth, religion, and superstition (Harvey 1989, p. 12). 
Modernity, as such, reorients the idea of history and progress around the logic of 
development, where perpetual betterment and understanding are always possible 
(Escobar 2007, p. 181-182).  According to most classical (Kant, Hegel, Weber, Marx, 
etc.) and critical thinkers (Habermas, Giddens, Taylor, Touraine, Lyotard, Rorty, and 
Foucault), modernity is located historically and spatially in France, Germany, and 
England around the time of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French 
Revolution and became consolidated with the Industrial Revolution. Most importantly, 
these views suggests that modernity can be explained by factors that are internal to 
Europe (Escobar 2007, p. 181).  
This viewpoint is fundamentally different than modernity/coloniality scholars, 
who locate the origins of modernity with Conquest of the Americas and the economic 
control of the Atlantic. The modernity/coloniality group draws from Wallerstein’s world 
systems analysis, agreeing that the “modern” world (capitalist) system was born in the 
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sixteenth century, precisely when European, via colonial domination, began to expand its 
reaches.  From Quijano and Wallerstein:  
The Americas as a geo-social construct were born in the long sixteenth century. 
The creation of the geo-social entity, the Americas, was the constitutive act of the 
modern world system. The Americas were not incorporated into an already 
capitalist world-economy. There could not have been a capitalist world-economy 
without the Americas (taken from Mignolo 2001, p. 24).  
 
The link between the origins of modern capitalism and colonialism emphasizes the role 
that the extraction of precious minerals and (later) agriculture commodities played in 
financing the Industrial Revolution and thus fomenting the modern world capitalist 
system (See Wolf 1982; Dussel 2002, p. 223).146  
The modernity/coloniality approach emphasizes that modernity, not just 
capitalism, can be traced to the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit in the 
sixteenth century. In other words, colonialism, postcolonialism, and imperialism are 
constitutive of modernity, which suggests that modernity should not be understood as a 
mere intra-European phenomena in which European Enlightenment thinkers (i.e. Locke, 
Smith, Descartes, Comte, etc.) introduced a new (superior) logic and rationality that all 
other peoples and cultures should follow. Rather, modernity (as a logical structure) is 
based on the domination of others (especially non-Europeans) and the imposition of 
Eurocentrism as a hegemonic representation of knowledge and power (Escobar 2004, p. 
217).  
                                                
146 According to Dussel, the rise of the “West” began with the comparative advantage 
that Europe had through scientific discoveries, precious metals (gold and silver), the new 
labor force (Indians and African slaves), the new agriculture products (the Inca potato, 
corn, the Mexican tomatl and chocalatl, etc.), and the millions of kilometers by the 
conquest into European colonial agriculture (p. 223).  
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Concretely, modernity is linked to what these authors describe as coloniality, 
which Mignolo defines as “the reverse and unavoidable side of ‘modernity’⎯its darker 
side, like the part of the moon that we do not see when we observe it from the earth” 
(Mignolo 2000, p. 22).  Not the same as colonialism, which refers to specific historical 
periods, rather, coloniality refers to the “logical structure of colonial domination,” which 
maintained Spanish, Dutch, British, and US dominance in Latin America throughout 
history (Mignolo 2005, p. 7) and permitted the genocidal acts against indigenous peoples 
and Africans and the marginalization of knowledges, religions, and of “non-modern” 
cultures.  
Mignolo argues that the “logic of coloniality” works through four domains of 
human experience: (1) the economic: control of land, labor and finance; (2) the political: 
control of authority; (3) the civic: control of gender and sexuality; and (4) the epistemic 
and subjective: control of knowledge and subjectivity. These domains are interconnected, 
reinforcing each other and creating a colonial matrix that, according to Mignolo, is 
“invisible to the distracted eye.” As Mignolo explains, when the logic of coloniality 
surfaces it is explained through rhetoric of modernity, where all problems can be 
corrected with modern development. The rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality 
have been alive since the sixteenth century, when the Spanish crown appropriated 
massive amounts of land and brutally exploited indigenous peoples and slaves, all 
justified and rationalized in the name of the Christian logic of salvation (Mignolo 2005, 
p. 10-11).  
The link between Christianity, as the original global design, and Eurocentric 
development is important because it helps to explain the origins of  modern development 
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as teleological (undeveloped to developed). In an article in 1993, titled “Eurocentrism 
and Modernity,” Dussel suggest that modern thought is based on the “myth of modernity” 
and the “fallacy of developmentalism,” which establishes modernity as an ontological 
category related to process of the self realization of God, Reason, and Freedom and 
reasons that the rest of the world (especially the “undeveloped” world) should follow 
Europe’s path to development (Dussel 1993, p. 68).  
 In the article, Dussel uses Hegel to point out an example of intra-European 
modernity and, specifically, how this leads to a teleological vision of modern 
development. From this perspective, World History and national development moves in 
time and space from East to West. For Hegel, Asia is the beginning of World History and 
Europe is the absolute end of history (Hegel 1988, p. 92). Hegel saw European 
Christianity (specifically German Protestant Christianity) as the absolute endpoint of 
development. Speaking to the superiority of Christian freedom, Hegel writes,  
The principle of the free Spirit [Embodied in European Christianity] makes itself 
here the banner of the whole world, and from it develops the universal principle 
of reason…. [given this superiority]  custom and tradition no longer have validity; 
the different forms of right need to legitimize themselves as founded on rational 
principles. 
 
In other words, all peoples and cultures must leave behind “customs and traditions” and 
follow the European, “rational” path to development and modernity (Dussel 1993, p. 70-
71).   
In this context, the global South is effective removed from World History. Here 
Hegel emphasizes the newness of America and Australia:  
The world is divided into the Old and the New–and the latter is called “new” 
because America and Australia became known to us comparatively recently. But 
these are not new only in a relative sense but new altogether, in respect to their 




Hegel sees the global South as immature, both physically and spiritually and, given the 
recent arrival of the Europeans, history is just beginning in America. Hegel, in fact, 
considered the Americas to be the future, not yet part of History, and not worthy of the 
“philosopher’s attention” (Hegel 1988, p. 90).   
 Hegel’s vision of World History implies that America’s original inhabitants, like 
the geographic space where they live, were not only immature, but inferior. This is from 
Hegel’s Geographical Basis for History:  
The main character of the native Americans is a placidity, a lassitude, a humble 
and cringing submissiveness toward a Creole, and even more toward a European–
and it will take a long time for the Europeans to produce any feeling of self-
confidence in them. The inferiority of these individuals in every respect, even in 
regard to size is very apparent. Only the extreme southern tribes, in Patagonia, are 
stronger by nature, but they are still in the natural condition of barbarism and 
savagery (Hegel 1988, p. 85). 
 
For Hegel, European superiority is juxtaposed against placidity, lassitude, and 
submissiveness. It will take time for “superior” Europeans to produce feeling of self-
confidence or to develop native Americans, which presupposes that “mature” Europeans 
must civilize and develop inferior natives, who in their natural condition are “barbarians 
and savages.”  
 For Dussel, Hegel’s ideas are tied to the “myth of modernity” the “fallacy of 
developmentalism,” in which all countries assume they must follow Europe’s path to 
development. Without entering in details, the myth of modernity is based on how Europe 
understands itself as the most superior, developed civilization. Stemming from the idea 
that World History ends in Europe, the myth is that all history leads up to Europe, which  
obliges Europe to civilize and develop “the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped 
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citizens” (Dussel 1993, p. 75). For Dussel, when the “barbarian and primitive” oppose the 
development process there is violent reaction:  
This violence, which produces, in many different ways, victims, takes on an 
almost ritualistic character: the civilizing hero invests his victims (the colonized, 
the slave, the woman, the ecological destruction of the earth, etc.) with the 
character of being participants in a process of redemptive sacrifice (Dussel 1993, 
p. 75).  
 
Here Dussel introduces the notion that implicit in Eurocentric modernity is the 
justification of the violence of coloniality, in a sense, a necessary evil of the 
modernization process. Modernity is therefore framed, in spite of the “necessary 
violence,” as ultimately beneficial to the victims. To understand how this works, I will 
turn to Quijano’s concept of the coloniality of power.  
The coloniality of power  
 
 The coloniality of power represents the common thread that links 
modernity/coloniality in the sixteenth century with its current version in the twenty-first 
century. In short, this term describes the strategy of control and domination of the 
European hegemonic form of modernity, born in the colonial epoch, but still present 
today. For Quijano, the defining element the coloniality of power is the idea of race, a 
mental construct that is based on purity of blood as a natural, universal principle for 
classifying people. This, combined with the a new structure to control labor, resources, 
and products, made up the colonial (and modern) system of domination in the Americas, 
which, according to Quijano, amounted to “an articulation of all historically known 
previous structures of control of labor, slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity 
production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis of capital and the world 
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market” (Quijano 2000, p. 533). Here race and labor worked in tandem as foundational 
elements to the modern capitalist system.  
 For Quijano, the idea of race, as a “biological category,” does not have a known 
origin before the colonization of the Americas.147 Quijano argues that posterior to 
colonization new racial categories appeared that referred specifically to the “biological 
differences” between Europeans and “other” classes of people considered inferior:  
From the sixteenth century on, this racial principle has proven to be the most 
effective and long-lasting instrument of universal social domination, since the 
much older principle⎯of gender or intersexual domination⎯was encroached by 
inferior-superior racial classifications. So the conquered and dominated peoples 
were situated in a natural position of inferiority, and as a result, their phenotypic 
traits as well as their cultural features were likewise considered inferior (Quijano 
2008, p. 183).  
 
At this time, as a result, new racial identities were produced that defined social relations 
not only in colonial society, but throughout the world. “Indians, blacks, and mestizos” 
were used as part of a complex racial matrix which worked, systematically, to place white 
Europeans and “whiteness” as a superior category. In Colonial Peru, for example, in the 
eighteenth century there were a total of twenty-one social-racial categories that were used 
to describe human beings (Cahill 1994, p. 339). Furthermore, as Quijano points out, 
terms such as Spanish and Portuguese (and later European), which before were only 
geographic references, began to take on a racial meaning. In short, in Spanish America, 
                                                
147 Quijano, as others have, makes the point that the idea of race is literally an invention, 
which has nothing to due with the biological structure of human beings. The phenotypic 
traits that are found in the genetic codes of individuals have no relation to the subsystems 
and biological processes of the human organisms, including those involved in the 
neurological and mental subsystems and their functions (taken from footnote #6) 
(Quijano 2000, p. 575).  
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race became a means of social classification and political, economic, and social 
dominance.148 
Significantly, as mentioned, the Eurocentric notion of racial superiority was 
established in conjunction with an entirely new structure to control labor forms in the 
Americas. While these labor forms, most of them highly exploitative, existed previously, 
for Quijano, they were organized around the production of commodities for the world 
market and directly tied to capital and thus became structurally dependent on the world 
economy. Slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, certain practices of reciprocity, 
and even wages, Quijano states, thus cannot be seen as “mere extensions of its historical 
antecedents” (like Marx’s notion of primitive capitalism), but as the key part of a new 
model of power. Quijano concludes, “Insofar as the structure of control of labor, 
resources, and products consisted of the joint articulation of all the respective historically 
known forms, a global model of control of work was established for the first time in 
known history” (2008, p. 184). Quijano argues that this racist distribution of labor, 
maintained throughout the colonial period, consisted of a new technology of 
domination/exploitation in which race and labor appeared naturally associated (2008 p. 
185).  
Natural resource development and Eurocentric modernity  
 
Mignolo writes that in the New World racism became an “epistemic operation 
that institutionalized the inferiority of the Indians and, subsequently, justified genocidal 
                                                
148 Quijano argues that the codification of the phenotypic trait of color was probably first 
established in the area of Anglo-America, where “blacks” were the most important 
exploited group given the importance of their labor to the colonial economy. This, 
according to Quijano, explains why the dominant group calls itself “white” (Quijano 
2008 p. 183).  
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violence, as Dussel pointed out, and exploitation of labor, as Quijano underlined” 
(Mignolo 2007, p. 473). This relation between racism, genocidal violence, and 
exploitation of labor and land was particularly acute in the Amazon region. Though I 
touched upon this topic in Chapter II, it is worth expanding here. In the Amazon region, 
somewhat different than in the Andes, the history of colonization was to a large extent 
based on the extraction of natural resources that created a hierarchal, racialized labor and 
social system that, in many ways, is still in place today. Under the pretext of European 
colonization and Christian salvation, in order to extract natural resources, indigenous 
peoples were brutally exploited as laborers. Later, when indigenous labor became less 
important, in the name of national development, again to extract natural resources, 
indigenous peoples became obstacles to development.  
 The encomienda, for example, veiled in the rhetoric of Christian salvation, 
worked as a cover institution for the control of indigenous labor and, in some cases, 
served as a space to experiment other highly exploitative forms of labor in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century. As Taylor argues, the encomienda was often a justification to 
conduct slave raids, it served as the legal framework to control labor, and it provided an 
excuse to appropriate large territorial spaces (Taylor 1999, p. 215). In the same vein, 
according to Santos-Granero and Barclay, the Christian missionaries, while providing 
some relief against the violent tactics of the encomenderos, in reality, provided a more 
effective and efficient means of colonization (1999, p. 26). For instance, the 1573 Law, 
Ordenanzas sobre nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones, even by the Crown’s account, 
was implemented to provide a more “peaceful” and efficient means to convert indigenous 
peoples and to colonize the region.  In line with the Christian “civilizing” mission and the 
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need to supply ample labor, as Taylor explains, the object was to indoctrinate “Indians in 
the pedagogic virtues of work” and rid them of the “habits of laziness,” which many 
considered (even de Las Casas) their “root condition as savages” (Taylor 1999, p. 219). 
In short, in the colonial period, the Christian “civilizing mission” (the rhetoric of 
modernity) covered up the violence of a highly exploitative labor system designed to 
extract natural resources (the logic of coloniality).  
 Perhaps the most vivid example of how the rhetoric of modernity hides the 
violence of coloniality, however, is the notorious rubber boom in the Amazon region. The 
rubber boom, which took place after Peru became an independent republic in 1821, was 
the product of a certain spirit of euphoria surrounding modernity and accompanied by a 
renewed interest in colonization and “pacification” of indigenous peoples. Pacifying 
missions to the jungle, new state-led colonization policies, state-sponsored expeditions to 
“discover” and explored unchartered, empty, Amazonian territories all reflected to one 
degree or another the modernist or “frontierism” zeal of the nineteenth century. The 
rubber boom, largely fueled by international events (skyrocketing demand), was an 
example of the spirit of modernity. Referring to the state of Loreto, Santos-Granado and 
Barclay write how contemporary observers referred to rubber as the “magical product,” 
that would not only save Loreto’s economy, but was the “golden key to national 
happiness” (2000, p. 22).  
 The rubber boom, however, as many historical accounts describe, worked around 
extreme violence and exploitation of indigenous peoples. According to Hvalkov, 
“[indisputably], the rubber boom is the single period in the history of the Amazon that 
has had the most devastating and disastrous effects on the indigenous population” 
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(Hvalkov 2000, p. 92). Chapter II details some of the sheer violence of this episode, in 
which a rein of terror (including murders, tortures, beheading, flogging, etc.) was 
inflicted upon indigenous peoples. This excerpt, taken from Taussig’s account of the 
Putumayo case, appeared in an Iquitos newspaper and exemplifies the logic of 
coloniality:  
They forced the Pacific Indians of the Putumayo to work day and night at the 
extraction of rubber, without the slightest remuneration; that they give them 
nothing to eat; that they keep them in complete nakedness; that they rob them of 
their crops, their women, and their children to satisfy their own voracity, 
lasciviousness and avarice of themselves and their employees, for they live on the 
Indian’s food, keep harems and concubines, and sell these people at wholesale 
and retail in Iquitos; that they flog them inhumanely until their bones are visible; 
that they give them no medical treatment, but let them die, eaten up by maggots, 
or to serve as food for the chiefs’ [i.e., rubber station managers] dogs; that they 
castrate them, cut off their ears, fingers, arms, legs (Taussig 1987, p. 34) 
 
While Putumayo is an extreme case and the story is more complex than “evil caucheros 
versus good Indians,” similar incidents are well-documented throughout the Peruvian 
(and Colombian) Amazon at this time. Furthermore, given the extreme violence and 
repression that indigenous peoples experienced during this period, today, this experience 
(or lived history) is etched in the memory of today’s indigenous peoples throughout the 
region.149 
 More than violence, however, the rubber industry worked to further inscribe a 
racialized hierarchal system(s) system used to control and exploit labor that, in certain 
respects, still operates in the region today. From the perspective of Quijano, the rubber 
industry provides an example of how the coloniality of power worked to racialize and 
                                                
149 On one research trip to the Ucayali region in 2008, one Shipibo indigenous leader 
pointed out the rubber tree to me and explained that this tree not only symbolized 
suffering and subordination, but the capacity of people to resist the dominance and evil 
that was inflicted upon them.  
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institutionalize indigenous people as inferior subjects and part of an economic system 
based on the exploitation of indigenous labor. This was touched upon in Chapter II. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the harsh labor systems during the rubber 
boom, described as “systems of slavery,” were, in some cases, intricate systems 
(habilitación o aviamento) that relied upon funding from US and European companies 
through large commercial houses. These systems, as such, were not “traditional” 
economic systems disconnected from the world capitalist system, but were intimately 
connected to it.  
According to Hvalkov, it was precisely this system based on exploitation of 
indigenous labor that connected the extractive (rubber) economy to national and 
international markets. The habilitación system worked around a hierarchy of 
interconnected debt relations with the indigenous rubber tapper and his family at the 
bottom of the chain. It was set up so that only those near the top (usually the white 
caucheros) could make capital gains in the system and those at the bottom accumulated 
debt. Furthermore, as the Putumayo case indicates, given the short labor supply, some 
caucheros felt the need to inflict terror upon indigenous subjects to bring in the necessary 
quantities of rubber. During this time, described as “chattel slavery,” another system 
developed that was based on inheritable debt, such that indigenous families were treated 
as real capital that could be traded the same way as bonds on the market. According to 
Hvalkov, these practices (known as slave-raiding or correría, widespread in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) evolved into a slave trade business controlled by 
contractors involved in extractive industries (Hvalkov 2000, p. 89).  
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 While some scholars emphasize the complexity (i.e. the fact that some indigenous 
peoples participated in slave trading, etc.) of the rubber industry (Coomes and Barham 
1994), it is difficult to deny the contemporary relevance of these highly exploitative 
practices. It is well known that as recent as the late 1980s there were documented cases of 
indigenous peoples working for timber companies and individual families that were 
considered personal property because of debts incurred. In Liberation through Land 
Rights in the Amazon (1998), Garcia-Hierro, Hvalkov, and Gray provide powerful 
testimonies of indigenous peoples who had worked for years without pay and without the 
ability to leave their workplace. AIDESEP, in fact, led the investigation to expose the 
“hidden” practices of outright slavery that were occurring in the Ucayali region until the 
mid 1980s.   
 The rubber era and its residual effects are important here because they represent a 
segue from the colonial era to the republican era. Clearly, the rubber boom was part of 
Eurocentric modern mentality and logic. Called a “magical substance,” rubber was used 
to make tires for cars and bikes, in roofing, cabling, and in the making of instruments for 
the steam machine (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000, p. 22). The violence that 
indigenous peoples suffered, to be sure, occurred as part of the logic of coloniality: 
indigenous peoples were seen as barbarians, less-than human, uncivilized and thus an 
exploitable labor force. Interestingly, starting in the early 1900s, as the Industrial 
Revolution was well under way, the Christian rhetoric of salvation began to change to a 
rhetoric of progress and development. 
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For indigenous peoples living in the Amazon region this meant that the Christian 
civilizing mission shifted towards a development or “modern” civilizing mission. Brown 
and Fernandez, write about this transition:  
Western rhetoric about jungle Indians had undergone a subtle shift at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Prior to 1900, Western observers spoke of the need to 
civilize the heathens, to bring them to the fold of Christianity and respect the king 
and viceroy. But the Rubber Boom, the expansion of plantation agriculture, and 
the industrialization of Peru changed the agenda. Now native peoples had to 
assimilate, move, or die, because the progress of Peru could no longer be 
stemmed (Brown and Fernandez 1991, p. 66).  
 
As this quote indicates, the language of Christian salvation became less prevalent and 
was replaced by the notion that, because of progress and development, indigenous 
peoples should assimilate.  
 In the Amazon region, the early 1900s the rhetoric of modernity was manifested 
through an intense period of state-led colonization. Although several governments 
showed a renewed interest in colonization projects in the region, the most extreme 
example is the government (or the figure) of Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968; 1975-
1980). Belaúnde is important, here, because his ideas are emblematic of the logic of the 
Peruvian state towards the Amazon region. Originally presented in his book Conquest of 
Peru by Peruvians, Belaúnde saw the conquest of the Amazon region as a solution to 
Peru development ills. In many ways, Belaúnde’s ideas were similar to ideas that 
permeated during the rubber boom. Amazonia was a space to be conquered, discovered, 
mapped out, and exploited. Like the rubber baron Fitzcarrald, this spirit of conquest, 
discovery, and development made Belaúnde a hero to the Peruvian bourgeoisie and 
middle class and a close ally and friend of the US government.  
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 This aggressive attitude towards Amazonian colonization subsided with military 
government of Juan Velasco (1968-1975), who not only de-emphasized the Amazon 
region, but in 1974 created what at the time was considered the most progressive 
legislation dealing with indigenous peoples in all of Latin America. The Velasco regime, 
different than Belaúnde, embraced left-leaning policies, nationalized industries, and 
carried out a somewhat radical land reform program. Crucially, however, in spite of these 
relatively progressive policies (towards Amazonian peoples), the Velasco regime did not 
fundamentally alter policies regarding Amazonian colonization. In fact, as mentioned, it 
created the “Peru Model” for oil concessions in which sixteen new contracts were 
established between 1971 and 1973. Interestingly, the oil concessions awarded to large 
companies were based on the 1891 “Rubber Concessions Model,” which, according to 
Stocks, led to an unprecedented exploratory period that affected nearly every indigenous 
group in Eastern Peru. In reality, Velasco also saw the Amazon as an untapped space for 
national development. He even envisioned oil development in the Amazon region as a 
way to pay for his ambitious social agenda (see Dandler 1988, Smith 1982).  
 In terms of Eurocentric modernity, throughout history the government has treated 
the Amazon region as an empty space, ripe for colonization and development. As 
mentioned, Smith writes about this in a 1982 paper titled, “The Dialectics of Domination 
in Peru: Native Communities and the Myth of the Vast Amazonian Emptiness.” 
Discussing the government’s 1980 plans to implement a USAID-sponsored colonization 
project, “the Pichis-Palcuza Special Project,” Smith alludes to the mentality and strategy 
of Peruvian development initiatives in the Amazon region:  
Underlying this dream of tropical development, there is a classical political notion 
that social and economic problems at home can be conveniently dealt with 
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through the conquest of new territories. To justify this conquest, an official myth 
is created which demonstrates the existence of a vast, bountifully productive, 
empty territory⎯the Amazon Basin⎯which awaits the enterprising individuals to 
settle it and harvest its riches (Smith 1982, p. 1).  
 
This myth of emptiness, the “rhetoric of modernity,” that sustains the government 
philosophical approach to development in the Amazon region has not fundamentally 
changed throughout Peru’s history.  
 This rhetoric of modernity, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, however, 
works via the logic of coloniality, modernity’s dark side. In the colonial era and well into 
the republican era this logic justified the brutal exploitation of indigenous labor (i.e., the 
encomiendas, the missionaries, and the rubber trade), In the contemporary era, the logic 
of coloniality, perhaps more difficult to visualize, worked towards the progressive 
(sometimes violent) dispossession of indigenous territorial spaces, which, in turn, led to 
the marginalization of indigenous knowledge, culture, and political autonomy. In the 
following section, I examine more specifically how the Garcia’s government uses the 
rhetoric of modernity to hide policies that work around a logic of coloniality. However, 
here it is important to emphasize that the logic of coloniality that Garcia employs is, in 
fact, a continuation of the same logic that is present throughout Peru’s history.   
 The beginnings of the contemporary era (circa 1950) are especially important  
because, in many respects, this is when the Peruvian government promotes specific 
policies that, on the one hand, profess to support indigenous territorial rights, while, on 
the other hand, work to further dispossess Amazonian indigenous peoples of their 
territorial spaces. This is very much part of the logic of coloniality, which, while less 
visible, is consistent with the control of land, labor, and finance, which, in the end, 
marginalizes indigenous knowledges, viewpoints, and perspectives on development. 
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Much of this was discussed in Chapter II, but to explain how the logic of coloniality 
works a few important historical reference points are important to note.  
 The 1974 Native Communities Law passed under the Velasco government is 
considered the apex of indigenous peoples territorial rights in the Amazon region. This 
law, as we recall, marked for the first time in history that indigenous land was considered 
“inalienable, unmortagageable, and imprescriptable,” provided indigenous peoples with 
subsoil rights, granted a legal basis for the existence of communal (as opposed to 
individual) property, recognized a certain level of political autonomy for indigenous 
peoples, and used a broader basis for describing the use of indigenous territories (Yashar 
2005 p. 253; Smith 1982, p. 5; Chirif and Garcia 2007, p. 195; IWIGIA 1995, p. 38).  To 
a large degree, successive governments have enacted policies that have led to the 
progressive deterioration of these rights. For Chirif and Garcia, the so called “radical” 
agenda that indigenous peoples support is, in reality, just an attempt to re-establish rights 
that were established in 1974 (Chirif and Garcia 2007, p. 107).  
 In summary, the “logic of coloniality” has continued to dominate and define state 
development policies throughout the country’s history. This logic is expressed as the 
violent exploitation of indigenous peoples in the colonial and republican era and the 
progressive dispossession of indigenous territorial spaces in the contemporary era. In 
truth, indigenous territorial rights opened up a legal framework to exploit Amazonian 
spaces that were not yet legally titled. The archipelago syndrome, the rescue and 
consolidation of small islands in the midst of a sea of extractive development projects, is 






Eurocentric development and the “perro del hortelano” rhetoric  
 
In this section, I argue that modernity/coloniality helps to understand Peru’s 
contemporary natural resources policies, especially as they conflict with indigenous 
territorial rights. While Garcia’s development policies are consistent with a neoliberal 
approach, in many ways, they are continuation of past policies, both left and right (liberal 
and socialist-leaning), in which the dreams of Amazonian development have trumped 
policies that advance indigenous territorial rights. Further, following the logic of 
coloniality, these policies work toward the progressive dispossession of indigenous 
territorial spaces and exclude indigenous peoples from the policymaking and 
implementation of hydrocarbon policies.  
Here, the rhetoric of modernity is best exemplified in President Garcia’s perro del 
hortelano discourse, which became the center of a national debate on issues of 
indigenous territorial rights. Between October of 2007 and March of 2008, Garcia wrote 
a series of four editorials in El Comerico, Peru’s most prestigious national newspaper, in 
which he uses the perro del hortelano (gardener’s dog) fable to make an argument for the 
use of big capital and modern technology to develop Peru’s vast natural resources 
throughout the Amazon, Andes, and Pacific Ocean regions.150 Garcia writes:  
There are millions of hectares for forestry that remain idle, millions more that 
communities and associations have not cultivated, nor will they ever cultivate, 
furthermore, there are hundreds of mineral deposits that cannot be worked and 
millions of hectares of sea that will never enter into mariculture, never be 
cultivated (Garcia 2007a).  
                                                
150 These articles appeared in el Comercio between October of 2007 and July of 2008 
(see Garcia 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b). While Garcia touches on these themes in all 
four articles, his main argument is laid out in the first article, written in October of 2007, 
and this is also the article that received an immediate response from indigenous groups. 
Here I will articulate the argument in this first article.  
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For Garcia the problem is that some Peruvians, including indigenous peoples, leftists, and 
environmentalists, are infested with the perro del hortelano mentality, which prevents 
certain groups from seeing the benefits of modern development.  
 In the “perro del hortelano” fable, the gardener’s dog protects its master’s garden 
from all the other animals (cows, rabbits, sheep, etc.) who, hungry, would like very much 
to eat from the garden. The dog, however, is blind to the fact that the animals need 
nourishment from the garden. The irony is that, while the dog is trying to protect the 
garden for its master, it does not realize that the animals, who also belong to the master, 
need to eat as well. Translated to Peru’s development problems, those that are anti-
development, like the perro del hortelano, don’t realize that it is in Peru’s best interest to 
develop the country’s resources, especially those vast, untapped resources that the 
Amazon region offers. Moreover, like the child that jealously guards his toys, part of the 
reason that indigenous peoples oppose development is that they themselves don’t have 
the resources (capacity, capital, technology) to do it. Following this logic, Garcia argues 
that natural resources are undeveloped because of “the taboo of already surpassed 
ideologies, for laziness, for indolence, or for the law of the gardener’s dog that says ‘if I 
don’t do it, nobody will’” (Garcia 2007a).  
In this section, drawing from the modernity/coloniality approach, I will focus on 
three particular ways in which Garcia’s perro del hortelano discourse is reflective of the 
rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality: 1) it reveals Garcia’s vision of land as 
intensely Eurocentric, 2) it shows a remarkable faith in “modern” solutions to resolve all 
of Amazonia’s problems (especially environmental problems), 3) it advances a  
teleological understanding of development, where the Amazon region is framed as a 
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historical relic, an un-modern, chaotic, unproductive and undeveloped space. Here it is 
important to emphasize the link between land and capital. According to Mignolo, in the 
Americas, 
[capital] was necessary to organize labor, production and distribution; and, the 
appropriation of land enormously increased the size and power of capital. It was 
land, rather then money, that made possible the qualitative jump of mercantile 
economy into mercantile capitalist economy (Mignolo 2007, p. 481; the italics are 
Mignolo’s).   
 
For Mignolo, capital in the form of land provided the glue that held together the colonial 
matrix of power. Eurocentric modernity foresees land as a source of capital given that the 
appropriation of land increases the power and potential of capital to work towards 
modernity. Capital and land, thus, are essential to bring about modern development 
(Mignolo 2007, p. 480).  
 The connection between capital and land is evident in Garcia’s perro del 
hortelano discourse. For Garcia, the Amazon region in its current state is an idle space, 
not only under-developed, but under-capitalized. The solution is to create large 
extensions of land (via multinational oil, gas, mining, logging concessions), where 
significant capital investments are then possible. Speaking to the abundance of resources 
available in the Amazon region:  
The first resource is the Amazonia. There are sixty-three million hectares of land 
and abundant rainfall. In the region it is possible to reforest the eight million 
hectares, but, for this, there needs to be land ownership, that is to say, secured 
land of five, ten, or twenty-thousand hectares, because with less land there is 
neither formal investment or high technology (2007a).  
 
Garcia is quite adamant that the solution to Peru’s development ills, especially in the 
Amazon region, lies in the country’s ability to attract large capital investments. 
Appealing to leftist or traditional Marxist sentiment, Garcia claims that even for left of 
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center parties (like APRA) it is important to embrace large capital. In an interview with a 
Spanish newspaper, Garcia implores, “a government of the left never can be an enemy of 
large capital. It is an enemy of monopoly, abuse, and absolute selfishness, but it must be 
an ally of large capital” (Perez-Maura 2008).  
 Expressing this rhetoric of modernity, Garcia suggests that the use of large 
extensions of land to bring in capital investments will reduce poverty. In this quote, 
Garcia responds to indigenous opposition to the privatization of native lands in the 
Amazon (this was manifested in LD 1015 and 1073):  
Those that oppose say that we cannot award property in Amazonia (then why, 
yes, on the coast and in the Andes?). They say that giving property in large 
extensions of land will enrich the largest companies, of course, but it will also 
create thousands of formal jobs for Peruvians that live in the poorest areas. It is 
the perro del hortelano (Garcia 2007a).  
  
Garcia’s viewpoint is clear: it is necessary to make available significant extensions of 
land to the largest companies, who have the capital and resources necessary to invest, 
which will create jobs and reduce poverty in the Amazon region. This is precisely what 
Garcia proposed in legislative decrees 1015 and 1073, which were designed to ease the 
requirements so that indigenous communities could make available their land to large 
investors.  
 The second way that the perro del hortelano discourse reflects the rhetoric of 
modernity is in Garcia’s quite remarkable faith in “modern” solutions to current 
environmental problems. This is closely related to his predilection for large capital 
investments, which, very much in line with the rhetoric of modernity, will bring cutting 
edge technology to the region. Here Garcia claims that modern technology has overcome 
all environmental problems associated with mining and extractive development:  
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Here we still discuss whether mining (techniques) destroy the environment, which 
is a theme of the past century, of course before mining destroyed the environment 
[but] the environmental problems today are basically because of yesterday’s 
mines (Garcia 2007a, the italics are mine).  
 
Again, for Garcia, the key is to bring in large capital investments, which will not only 
reduced poverty, but can also be used to better protect the environment:  
Small capital is respectable, but the capital that advances, that leads to 
technological progress, the capital that breaks barriers and crosses borders, thanks 
to the cybernetic and telecommunication’s revolution, [is big capital], large 
capital is the only way, if it is well-oriented, to end the destruction of the 
environment” (Perez-Maura 2008).  
 
Thus, imbued with this spirit of modernity, Garcia believes that the environmental 
problems associated with extractive development should be dealt with through large 
capital investments that will bring technology, reduce poverty, and protect the 
environment.  
 The third way that the perro del hortelano discourse reflects a Eurocentric vision 
of modernity is that it advances a teleological notion of development, which frames the 
Amazon region and its (indigenous) inhabitants as un-modern and historically backwards. 
This is especially important in this case because it has led to a misrepresentation of 
indigenous viewpoints on development and, consequently, has created conflict between 
indigenous peoples and the state.   
 Garcia’s support for large extensions of land financed through big capital 
investments comes alongside a harsh critique of small individual and community-own 
land spaces.  Small landholdings, for Garcia, are ideological relics, products of the past, 
and the reason that Peru remains poor. He writes,  
[we] have fallen into the trap of giving small plots of land to poor families who do 
not have a cent to invest, then, besides land, they ask the state for fertilizers, 
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seeds, irrigation technology and also protected prices. The minifundista model 
without technology is a vicious circle of misery (Garcia 2007a).  
 
This is clearly a critique of land reform under the Velasco regime and a jab at indigenous 
communities who are typically small landholders. For Garcia, these “small 
landholdings,” described as a minifundista model, are sort of a feudal relic, signifying the 
past and are in desperate need of modern technology. Again, this backwards model 
creates environmental degradation and, accordingly, is responsible for illegal logging and 
mining: “the environment is destroyed by semi-capital [small landholdings] that cuts 
trees but does not replace them or that mines with mercury and sulphuric acid” (Perez-
Maura 2008).  
 Garcia’s critique of small landholdings carries with it an implicit and explicit 
critique of Amazonian indigenous peoples, who he frames, like the territorial spaces in 
which they reside, as backward, undeveloped, and un-modern. In this quote, Garcia again 
alludes to the Amazon region as an idle, unproductive, space: 
We respect virgin forests and native peoples, but let’s start with the eight million 
hectares that haven been converted into deserts . . . in the last few years because 
of unregulated concession, cocaine, and illegal logging. There we could create 
millions of jobs and, furthermore, jobs in the making of furniture. It is shameful 
that Chile exports two billion dollars in timber without having one Amazonian 
hectare (Garcia 2007a, the italics are mine).  
 
Here Garcia conveniently places “virgin forest” and “native peoples,” in the same 
category. Throughout the perro del hortelano discourse, as in this quote, indigenous 
peoples often go unnoticed, as they become objects in the background.  
In some cases, however, Garcia makes a more explicit critique of indigenous 
peoples. Here he questions the idea that indigenous peoples have special rights to the land 
and challenges the very construct of the “native” community:  
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Demagoguery and trickery say that these lands cannot be touched because they 
are “sacred objects” and that this communal organization is the [original, pre-
Colonial] communal organization of Peru, without knowing that it was a creation 
of the Viceroy Toledo to push indigenous peoples to unproductive lands (Garcia 
2007a). 
 
Garcia implies that indigenous peoples have been tricked into believing that the 
“original” or native form of organizing was based on collective ownership of land. The 
idea of collective landownership, for Garcia, was an invention of the Crown. 
Notwithstanding the validity of this argument, Garcia implies that indigenous peoples, 
like children, really do not know their own history and have been manipulated by 
outsiders. 
This is a reoccurring theme in Garcia’s perro del hortelano discourse: indigenous 
peoples are continuously manipulated by outsiders, especially environmentalists. In this 
example, Garcia insinuates that environmentalists have created the “uncontacted, jungle 
native” purposefully to oppose oil development in the Amazon region:  
[and] against petroleum, they have created the “uncontacted” jungle-native, that 
is, unknown but presumably the reason that millions of hectares of land should 
not be explored. The petroleum should stay below the surface meanwhile the 
price is 90$ per barrel. It is preferable for them that Peru continues to import oil 
continues impoverishing (2007a).   
 
This is a direct reference to indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation. AIDESEP 
and many NGOs (Amazon Watch, Survival International, Save America’s Forests, World 
Wildlife Fund, Racimos de Ungurahui, Derecho Ambiente y Recursos, and el Instituto de 
Bien Comúm) have come out in support of these groups. According to Peruvian law, 
there are certain restrictions for oil and gas companies when they operate in reserves set 
aside for “uncontacted” peoples or when they encounter these groups (Law Nº28736). 
The Garcia government on several occasions has questioned their existence, suggesting 
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that, in most cases, this is simply a pretext by those that want to prevent oil development 
at any costs and, thus, prevent Peru from advancing.151   
This rhetoric, not surprisingly, touched a nerve among many Peruvians, especially 
those that are included on the left such as progressives, anti-capitalists, environmentalists, 
and indigenous groups. To some, Garcia’s position was surprising considering that he 
comes from the once center-left political party APRA. In spite of his background, 
however, Garcia’s condemnation of his opponents conspicuously includes traditional 
leftists and environmentalists. Moreover, for Garcia, the present day environmentalists 
that oppose his development policies are in fact just a modern-day version of yesterday’s 
anti-capitalist communists. They have simply changed shirts:  
[the] old anti-capitalist communists of the nineteenth century disguised 
themselves as protectionists in the twentieth century and, again, changed jerseys 
(shirts) to become environmentalists of the twenty-first century. But [they were] 
always anti-capitalist, always against investment . . .152 (Garcia 2007a).  
 
Indeed, this is a sweeping and categorical condemnation of the political left in Peru. For 
indigenous peoples these references are especially offensive because Garcia seems to 
                                                
151 One of the best examples of the Garcia Administration’s position concerning the 
existence of “uncontacted” indigenous peoples (the legal term is indigenous peoples 
living in voluntary isolation. See Survival International) is an interview with Daniel Saba 
on Peruvian television (Chanel 7) on April 13 2007. In this interview, Saba questions the 
National Ombudsman’s (Defensoría del Pueblo) understanding of what Saba calls 
“uncontacted” peoples. He argues that the Defensoria bases its position on the study of 
one anthropologist and that the idea that there are “uncontacted people” that have not 
been seen or contacted is, on its face, illogical. In the same interview, he makes several 
statements that reinforce Garcia’s “perro del hortelano” discourse. He is suspect of the 
agenda of environmental organizations (especially foreign ones), declares confidently 
that there is absolutely zero environmental waste (or damage) from oil exploitation, states 
that modern technology has virtually eliminated all environmental risk, and emphatically 
questions whether anyone in Peru has ever been affected negatively by oil development. 
Go to http://www.observaperu.com (videos/audios) for the video.  
152 In Spanish, “el viejo comunista anticapitalista del siglo XIX se disfrazó de 
proteccionista en el siglo XX y cambio otra vez de camiseta de el siglo XXI para 
medioambientalista. Pero siempre anticapitalista, contra la inversión. . .” 
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believe that the “natives” have been manipulated by environmentalist and leftists. As his 
logic goes, indigenous peoples, manipulated by environmentalists, support a “hands off” 
approach to the Amazon region, and because of influence by Marxists, they reject all 
forms of development.  
In summary, the perro del hortelano rhetoric characterizes both indigenous 
peoples and the land they live on as undeveloped and primitive. They irrationally protect 
the Amazon from development because they have been tricked into believing that they 
have special rights to the land, when, in reality they are controlled by outsiders that are 
patently anti-development. Garcia frames both the land and indigenous peoples as 
historical relics. Amazonia is a primitive space (chaotic) that is lacking the capital and 
technology to modernize it. The real obstacle, for Garcia, is the perro del hortelano 
mentality.  
The logic of coloniality: legislative decrees and hydrocarbon practices 
 
 In this section, I examine some of the ways in which Garcia’s development 
policies work around a logic of coloniality. In the previous chapters, I provide a rather 
detailed description of how these policies have led to the progressive dispossession of 
indigenous territorial spaces. Here I will not repeat these claims, but will briefly try to 
explain how Garcia’s policies are an expression of this logic. As detailed earlier, 
according to Mignolo, the logic of coloniality works through four interconnected domains 
of human experience: (1) control of land, labor, and finance; (2) political control of 
authority; (3)  control of gender and sexuality; and (4) control of knowledge and culture 
(Mignolo 2005).  
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 In general, the legislative decrees (especially those that indigenous peoples 
opposed), for the government, represent the tools to bring modern development to the 
Amazon region and to Peru.  As explained in Chapter III, many of the decrees were 
designed to “expand the agriculture frontier,” which is a way to make land that the state 
deems unproductive, productive. This requires creating the political, economic, and social 
conditions necessary to make this happen. The legislative decrees were designed 
precisely to create these conditions. Several decrees (LD 994, 1064, and 1089) would 
create new legal mechanisms to facilitate extractive development or irrigation projects 
(LD 994) by private entities. It these cases, laws were created to facilitate infrastructure 
projects for mining and hydrocarbon development, forced easements (rights of passage), 
and a new legal regime for private investment in agriculture development. LD 1089, 
which mandated COFOPRI, an agency controlled by the Garcia government, the task of 
titling indigenous territories. This, most experts agree, would have the opposite effect of 
making even more land available for development purposes (this was the stated goal of 
the government). In short, several of the legislative decrees were directed toward private 
or state control of the indigenous territorial base.  
 The control of the indigenous territories also requires political control. The 
decrees 1015 and 1073, which changed the requirements from two-thirds of the entire 
community to only fifty percent of attendees at a community assembly, are examples of 
how political authority and control of land is taken away from indigenous communities 
for the benefit of modern development. Another example, as mentioned in Chapter III, 
was LD 1090, which, apart from the negative environmental consequences, would have 
taken power away from indigenous authorities who participated in the National Forestry 
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Policy Consultative Council (CONAFOR) to make decisions related to forestry 
development. In general, the legislative decrees (those that affected indigenous 
communities) were considered a violation of indigenous rights to consultation (ILO 169), 
which is also an example of how these policies undermine the political authority of 
indigenous peoples in development related matters. 
 From the perspective of the government, one of the main threads throughout the 
decrees is the re-categorization of land, which is an example of how the government 
controls knowledge and subjectivity. As explained in previous chapters (II and IV), 
indigenous advocates have always argued that land, as a category, for indigenous peoples 
has a much broader meaning than simply economics or production. Many of the gains 
achieved in the mid 1970s were related to expanding the definition of land, to include 
hunting, fishing, gathering, recreation, and religion. Several decrees (LD 994, 1064, and 
1090), however, seek to narrow the definition of land, so that “fallow” and “deforested” 
land are considered “apt for agriculture use.” The very idea of defining “fallow” land as 
unproductive works very much towards the control of knowledge and subjectivity. From 
a Eurocentric perspective, it is a way to create and control the epistemological terms that 
define modern development. Deforested and fallow land are defined economically, which 
directly challenges indigenous conceptualizations of territory.  
The logic of coloniality also helps to explain the government’s hydrocarbon 
development practices on indigenous territories. In chapter III, I explained how the 
government, on the one hand, claims to support indigenous rights (ILO 169), but in 
reality excludes indigenous peoples from the entire process of hydrocarbon development. 
There is no need to repeat the details here. However, as explained in Chapter III, the 
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government uses informative workshops and environmental impact studies to claim that 
they are upholding indigenous rights to consultation under the stipulations of ILO 169.  
The Garcia government, like previous governments, works from the logic of coloniality, 
where it is imperative to control the political authority related to the use of natural 
resources on indigenous land. The government advertizes a certain “respect for 
indigenous rights,” but only within the context of modern development and the state-led 
imperative to go forward with hydrocarbon development projects. As the logic of 
coloniality dictates, the fact that indigenous rights are minimized (or violated) is a 
necessary sacrifice in lieu of the requirements of modern development.  
Indigenous perspectives on development and decoloniality 
 
 Thus far I have argued that modernity/coloniality helps to identify the 
government’s  perspectives on development as Eurocentric, rather than liberal, socialist 
or neoliberal. This explains why both “left” (socialist-leaning) and “right” (neoliberal-
leaning) governments historically have treated the Amazon region as an empty space to 
be utilized (and civilized) for national development purposes. The payoff of the shift 
away from the meta-narratives of modernity (liberalism, socialism, and postmodernity) is 
that it opens up other possibilities or other ways of understanding development and 
modernity. Understanding development as Euro-centered, rather than simply European, 
suggests that it is possible to think about development not from the center, but from the 
fringes or borders of Eurocentric modernity. In this section, thinking from the borders 




 In the hope of advancing alternative development perspectives, the objective here 
is to move towards decoloniality theory and explain how it is expressed in the IMPA. 
Decoloniality theory is based on the modernity/coloniality approach, but it seeks to 
uncover alternatives perspectives of modernity (and development). Here Mignolo 
describes decoloniality theory:  
A critical theory beyond the history of Europe proper and within the colonial 
history of America (or Asia or Africa; or even from the perspective of immigrants 
within Europe and the US who have disrupted the homogeneity) becomes 
decolonial theory. That is, it is the theory arising from the projects for 
decolonization of knowledge and being that will lead the to the imagining of 
economy and politics otherwise (Mignolo 2005, p. xx. The italics are Mignolo’s).   
  
It is important to stress that decoloniality theory works to bring to the foreground those 
theories, ideas, and perspectives that have been largely relegated to the background of 
history. In this context, the objective is to provide a more complex understand indigenous 
perspectives on development, which, as argued in the previous sections, have been 
misrepresented by the Garcia government. First, however, let’s look at how decoloniality 
works to articulate an understanding of modernity (and development) from the borders of 
Eurocentric modernity.  
 One of the most important conceptual differences of the modernity/coloniality 
approach is that modernity is not conceived in teleological terms, but in historical and 
relational terms. In other words, modernity can be experienced from different 
(epistemological) loci, as the result of political, economical, and cultural structures. 
Eurocentric modernity, as explained, is a hegemonic mode or strategy of power that 
occupies the center of the modern imaginary153 and works to suppress, marginalize, and 
                                                
153 Mignolo draws from Glissant’s (1997) use of the concept of “imaginary,” defined as 
the symbolic world through which a community defines itself. Glissant’s term neither has 
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exclude Other imaginaries. The key point here is that these Other imaginaries were not 
necessarily eliminated (though some surely were), but were pushed to the fringes of the 
Euro-centered modern experience. Drawing from the work of Spivak, Gua, and others 
(see Rodríguez 2001), modernity/coloniality scholars emphasize how the Other has been 
subalternized by Eurocentric modernity. Crucially, here the subaltern becomes not simply 
a victim of oppression, but a place to discover new ways of thinking and acting that 
might provide viable alternatives to Eurocentric modernity. In fact, for Mignolo, the most 
effective critiques of globalization today are articulated not by postmodern theories, but 
by the “emergence of forms of knowledge that have been subalternized during the last 
five hundred years under global designs. . .” (Mignolo 2000, p. 22).  
 It is important (briefly) describe the conceptual space from which the subaltern 
operate. From the vantage point of modernity/coloniality, this space is a privileged 
epistemological space that is created out of the unequal relations between a dominant 
center and a subalternized Other. Mignolo conceptualizes this process (and space) as 
colonial difference, an Other-ing that is produced by the coloniality of power. The 
coloniality of power (Quijano), as described earlier in this chapter, works to repress 
indigenous peoples forms of knowledge, their symbolic universe, and their modes of 
objectification and expression. However, it is precisely this repression, the experience of 
                                                                                                                                            
the common meaning of a mental image nor the more technical meaning that is has in 
contemporary discourses in which the imaginary forms a structure of differentiation 
between the symbolic and real. The imaginary includes all the ways that a culture has of 
perceiving the world. Mignolo extends this concept to include a geol-political meaning 
used to describe the foundation and formation of the modern/colonial world-system 




living on the margins of Eurocentric modernity, that creates this privileged 
epistemological space.  
One of the most compelling examples of the idea of colonial difference is in 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of “double consciousness.” For Du Bois,  double 
consciousness is the strange feeling of anyone who does not have true self-consciousness, 
but must form consciousness from a relation to an Other world. As Mignolo might argue, 
Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness is essentially the “lived experience from the 
notion colonial difference.” Du Bois writing in 1903:  
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, 
the Negro is sort of a seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight 
in the American world,–a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but 
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar 
sensation, this double consciousness, the sense of always looking at oneself 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,–an American, 
a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals 
in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. 
(Du Bois 1994 [1903] p. 2).   
 
For Mignolo the concept of double consciousness captures the dilemma of those 
imaginaries that are forced to live modernity from coloniality, where colonial subalternity 
represents the imaginary of the modern/colonial world, but from the “margins of the 
empires” (Mignolo 2001, p. 9).  
According to Escobar, modernity/coloniality as a conceptual frame, thus, permits 
one to focus on the subaltern subject from the perspective of coloniality difference, which 
brings to the foreground epistemic alternatives (Escobar 2004, p. 217). Mignolo describes 
the space: 
This is an exteriority that is not necessarily outside of the West (which would 
mean a total lack of contact), but which is an interior exteriority and an exterior 
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exteriority (the forms of opposition trace the interior exteriority of the system) 
(Mignolo 2001, p. 27).  
 
Again, this is the space in which the subaltern were (are) forced to imagine themselves 
from the dominant power or hegemonic representation of knowledge. It is precisely from 
this intellectual space, defined as exteriority, where I argue that it is possible to rethink 
hydrocarbon development in the Peruvian Amazon.   
 It is also important to stress that this conceptual space is modern. As Mignolo 
argues, it is not possible to separate the subaltern from the modern imaginary. This is 
notably distinct from the metanarratives (especially liberalism and socialism), which tend 
to place indigenous peoples in traditional or non-modern categories. Modernization 
theory (Rostow), liberalism (and neoliberalism), socialism and other “modern” 
perspectives emphasize the idea of stages of development and the general idea that it is 
possible to become modern (see Escobar 1995). Importantly, notions such as 
undeveloped, underdeveloped, or the “Third World” apply not only to countries but to 
peoples and places within countries. For Alan Garcia, the Amazon region and its 
inhabitants are primitive, backwards, and undeveloped.  From the perspective of 
modernity/coloniality, indigenous peoples, along with other subaltern subjects (Afro-
Latinos, workers, etc.), are just as modern as Euro-centered Latin Americans in positions 
of power, yet they experience modernity from a different vantage point, a different 
epistemological loci.   
Amazonian viewpoints on development   
 
  To examine indigenous viewpoints on development I, first, return to the Houston 
Roadshow and specifically to the letter that Robert Guimaraes, the vice president of 
AIDESEP, unsuccessfully tried to give to Daniel Saba, the president of Perúpetro. The 
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letter, addressed to all three state institutions involved in oil development (the Presidency, 
Perúpetro, and MINEM), illuminates several points that indigenous peoples throughout 
the region are expressing: 1) it frames indigenous resistance to oil development around 
the protection of Peru’s valuable biodiversity and its role in regulating the temperature of 
the planet; 2) it brings up the issue of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation, citing a 
recently passed law (Nº 2873) that prohibits oil development that might engager these 
peoples; 3) it argues that the Amazon is a cultural and spiritual space for present and 
future generations, and 4) and it states that oil development is not the only type of 
development alternative for Peru. The letter ends with “Enough Mr. Alan Garcia, you 
cannot qualify the citizens that elected you ‘Perros del Hortelano.’ We are peoples with 
rights, peoples worthy enough to be respected and listened to” (Guimaraes 2008).  
 Guimaraes’s response, as mentioned earlier, echoes what many indigenous 
leaders throughout the region have been expressing for years. In short, indigenous 
peoples have continually pointed out that they are not, as the government claims, anti-
development, but rather they possess a different understanding of development. For 
example, Alberto Pizango, the president of AIDESEP, explains why indigenous peoples 
declared themselves in a state of insurgency against the Garcia government in May of 
2009:  
Indigenous peoples don’t understand development in the same way as the 
government. For us development is not synonymous with income and 
macroeconomic indicators. For us, development is solidarity, equality, and a 
balanced management of resources. Our vision of development is not savage 
development, but to safeguard life and the future of generations to come’ (Castillo 
2009). 
   
This same idea is expressed in a proclamation from the Secoya Indigenous Organizations 
of Peru and the Kiwcha of Alto Napo, they claim, “We want development without 
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loosing our identity, without altering nature, and without conflicts with other peoples” 
(Alverez Alonzo 2009).  
Indigenous positions on development resonate with relatively mainstream or 
“modern” positions on the environment. As Guimaraes makes evident in the 
abovementioned letter, the Amazon should be protected because of the importance of 
biodiversity, critical for Peru and the world, given the implications for global warming. 
For Pizango, indigenous peoples will continue to propose “development with harmony 
because what they [state officials] don’t understand is that we are the air conditioning of 
the world.” (Voz de la Selva 2009a). In an “Open letter from AIDESEP to President 
Garcia,” they remind the president that 10% of the world’s biodiversity and 30% of the 
world’s fresh water is located in the Peruvian Amazon:  
Mr. President, it is you and your assessors who are really not connected to the 
information about environmental degradation and climate change. . . if there were 
an ecological catastrophe, only from Peru would it be possible to repopulate the 
planet” (AIDESEP 2007).  
 
It is important to note that here it is AIDESEP that frames Garcia’s views as anti-modern, 
given that his government is “not connected” to the latest information about climate 
change. Again, these types of statements are quite common. In a public pronouncement 
from 22 distinct women’s indigenous groups, they state that “indigenous peoples are the 
guardians and protectors of the Amazon and the Andes. Thanks to our ancestral 
knowledge and our protection we have a territory that is called the lungs of the earth” 
(Radio Voz de la Selva 2009d).   
However, while many indigenous leaders do consider themselves protectors of the 
environment, indigenous opposition to development is directly intertwined with the 
historical experience of environmental and social exploitation. In other words, indigenous 
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perspectives on the environment, to a large degree, stem from the notion of colonial 
difference, from the experience of being marginalized subjects of modern development.  
From the perspective of modernity/coloniality this explains why indigenous leaders are 
fierce advocates for the Achuar from the Corrientes region of Northern Peru, who, at the 
hands of the state run company Petroperú and the multinational Occidental Petroleum, 
experienced over thirty years of gross environmental negligence (La Torre-Lopez 1998). 
This  comes up repeatedly as one of the reasons that indigenous groups throughout the 
region oppose oil development. Speaking for AIDESEP, Pizango expresses indigenous 
viewpoints on development in relation to the experience of the Achuar:  
And we will always take the example of our Achuar brothers of the River 
Corrientes; . . . today children and adults are dying because they have lead and 
cadmium in their blood, and we ask, is this the development that the government 
wants? (AIDESEP 2007)  
 
In this context, indigenous environmental perspectives, are also formed around the dark 
side of modernity: the experience of 30 years of oil development, for the benefit of all 
Peruvians.  
This 2008 response from a Matés leader to the entrance of Pacific Stratus Energy 
on indigenous land exemplifies how the experience of the Achuar weighs heavily on the 
minds of indigenous peoples when they consider the prospects of oil development on 
their land:  
We do not want to live what happened to other indigenous communities. The 
companies promise not to contaminate, but we have the experience of 1974, 
where various brothers died when the company came in” (Servindi 2008c).  
 
Etched in the collective memories of indigenous peoples, these remarks are frequent 
throughout the region. The government does acknowledge that oil companies 
contaminated in the past, but, as mentioned, argues that modern technology has surpassed 
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yesterday’s environmental problems. Indigenous peoples, however, are quick to point out 
that these companies are still contaminating the environment. In just one example the 
community monitor of the indigenous organization FECONACO, working in the 
Corrientes region, has evidence of 48 spills from November to March of 2009 (see Herra-
Galvez 2010).  
In summary, indigenous viewpoints on the environment often resonate with 
mainstream, modern positions on the environment. While some might interpret this as 
simply strategic, from the perspective of modernity/coloniality, indigenous use of 
contemporary environmental concepts (i.e. global warming, etc.) are just as “modern” as 
any actor that accepts the scientific arguments about global warming. From this vantage 
point, the IMPA, like any other political actor is willing to engage with the modern 
environmental movement given, in this case, shared ideas about the dangers of global 
warming. But, different than many mainstream environmental groups, indigenous 
perspectives on the environment (i.e. the dangers of environmental contamination) are 
also the result of the lived experience of modern development and global capitalism, as 
the case of the Achuar indicates. 
One of the best examples of how Garcia misrepresents indigenous viewpoints on 
development is his tendency to confuse indigenous responses with Marxist or traditional 
leftist opposition to all forms of capitalism. Whether Garcia explicitly calls out 
indigenous peoples as leftists or he refers to how they are manipulated by leftists, the 
result is the same: the Amazon remains closed off from development because of already 
surpassed ideologies.  
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In one article indigenous intellectual and the ex-president of AIDESEP, Gil 
Inoach-Shawit writes about the government’s misunderstanding of indigenous 
perspectives. Explaining the difference between scientific and utopian socialism, Inoach-
Shawit categorically denies that these philosophies have anything to do with indigenous 
thinking:  
[the] philosophy of the indigenous movement is founded on the very idea of 
human existence and the right to a life in a determined space with a broad sense of 
cultural and historic ownership (Inoach-Shawit 2009). 
  
He explains that indigenous claims against the state, different from ideals that stem from 
the proletariat, are based on territorial and cultural rights denied by a dominant system 
that negates indigenous existence. The proletariat’s claims, he continues, are based on 
salaries and improved conditions of life, not on restoring territorial rights. Moreover, 
Inoach-Shawit argues that indigenous peoples, who protected the Amazon region before 
the existence of the modern state, only agreed to respect the state’s sovereignty in 
exchange for the right to exist as indigenous peoples:  
[What] the “modern” state and the government must understand is that we have 
never given them a blank check so that our destiny depends on the good will of 
any one government and we never thought that being part of Peru would be a 
constant threat to our territories and our millennial existence.  
 
Inoach-Shawit argues that indigenous perspectives on development are not related to 
Marxist perspectives. He continues:   
our road [to development] is not the one marked by Western philosophers, for 
indigenous peoples scientific and utopian socialism don’t exist, we believe in the 
goodness that life can bring while we express solidarity and reciprocity” (Inoach-




From the lens of modernity/coloniality, the idea that indigenous resistance can be 
categorized as Marxist (or even guided by leftist ideologies) represent a basic 
misunderstanding of indigenous viewpoints on development.  
As Inoach-Shawit suggests, indigenous values (specifically the values of the 
IMPA), different that Marxist-inspired values, revolve around the critical importance of 
territory. Thus, indigenous perspectives on development also intimately tied to 
indigenous conceptualizations territory and the acquisition of territorial rights. Here I will 
not repeat the intricacies of indigenous conceptualizations of territory that were examined 
in detail in Chapter IV. However, because the concept of territory is so central to 
indigenous values, to understand indigenous perspectives on development, it is necessary 
to highlight some of the ways in which indigenous leaders have sought to articulate the 
difference between indigenous and state conceptualization of territory.  
As argued throughout this dissertation, for the government, the Amazon region is 
a place to extract resources for the benefit of the nation. This is, in fact, embodied in the 
legal framework of the Peruvian Constitution. Article 66 establishes the state has the 
absolute right to exploit renewable and non-renewable resource. Furthermore, resources 
are economic in nature and, even within the context of sustainable development, the use 
of resources is based on market criteria. For example, according to an Organic Law for 
the Sustainable Use of Resources, natural resources should be  “exploited by human 
beings for the satisfaction of their needs and having actual or potential market 
value…”154   
                                                




The Amazon region, from the perspective of the state, is a place to extract natural 
resources, the value of which is to be determined by economic or market forces. It is not 
surprising that Garcia frames the region, in its current state, as an unproductive and 
empty space. Indigenous leaders, however, fundamentally reject the idea that the region 
is unproductive. As the IMPA has always argued, for indigenous peoples “territory,” an 
indigenous category that is distinct from the Western notion of “land,” represents the 
totality of a peoples’ habitat: territory is a collective, spiritual, and sacred space that is 
interdependent with nature. Again, to protect this space is a moral obligation and, as the 
AIDESEP website declares, not to defend it is an act of cowardice. This quote from the 
Native Federation of Madre de Dios River and Tributaries (FENAMAD) symbolizes the 
importance of territory for Amazonian peoples:  
[The] resources that exist in the forest and rivers, where we have lived during 
thousands of years, before the formation of the state, constitute the main source of 
our existence, providing us with food, water, medicine….” (FENAMAD 2008) 
 
The Garcia government interprets this as a romantic relationship to land, which implies 
protection, nurturing, and a radically hands off approach to development in the Amazon 
region.  
To some extent, the government’s interpretation of indigenous relationship to 
territory is comprehensible. In the constitutional proposal of the four major Peruvian 
indigenous organizations discussed in chapter IV, the special relationship indigenous 
peoples have to the land is emphasized:  “in this space we express our spirituality and 
cosmovision, music, dance, poetry, literature…” (AIDESEP et Al. 2004) Further, as 
indigenous peoples continuously point out, international law recognizes (ILO 169, UN 
Declaration, etc.) that indigenous peoples are connected to their land spiritually and 
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culturally. In a 2008 declaration from nine indigenous groups from the Northern Amazon 
rejecting oil development, this relationship between nature and indigenous peoples is 
evident: “Reaffirming our rights as millinery indigenous peoples of the Amazonian lands 
and thanks to the wonders of nature, we have been able to develop our knowledge, 
securing at the same time the duty to defend our territory that is the base of our 
existence” (Servindi 2008b).   
 However, it is too simplistic to reduce indigenous conceptualizations of the 
Amazon to a cultural and natural space, which, as others have pointed out, romanticizes 
indigenous peoples as traditional, non-modern, for some, to be protected from all 
development. According to the same constitutional proposal just cited above, aside from 
cultural aspects, indigenous peoples possess not only technological capabilities regarding 
the use of soils, waters, and forests, but also understandings of the chemical-
pharmaceutical properties of plants (AIDESEP et Al. 2004). Crucially, part of indigenous 
claims are centred on the importance of economic development, including the creation of 
a state development fund for financial and administrative support to indigenous peoples, 
the promotion and organization of a host of indigenous businesses enterprises, and 
special tax arrangements for indigenous peoples, in effect, designed to provide 
indigenous peoples greater access to markets. In other words, indigenous peoples do not 
necessarily reject the tools of “modern” economic development, which include the 
marketing of indigenous products and the creation of state financing for development 
related ends.  
Responding to Garcia’s perro del hortelano discourse, Inoach-Shawit 
categorically rejects the idea that the Amazon can be considered an unproductive space. 
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He provides examples from the 1980s, where, with minimal assistance of a state led 
agriculture financing program, indigenous peoples in two provinces were able to produce 
rice and corn yields of 500 and 700 tons per year. This represented a 500 percent 
increase, leading to historical highs in indigenous children attending schools in the area 
(families could pay for school supplies). Explaining that the program ended up failing 
because of state corruption, Inoach Shawit remarks,  
the people of indigenous villages, now the object of the perro del hortelano 
metaphor, … demonstrate that, given the opportunity, they are productive and 
generators of wealth… (Inoach-Shawit 2007). 
 
He cites other examples of indigenous productivity throughout the Amazon. Indigenous 
communities in four provinces with the help of NGOs, are currently engaged in a process 
that provides market access to 50 communities, which reduces the impact of 
intermediaries, many of whom are responsible for illegal logging practices. In a similar 
vein, the Shawi peoples have organized productive cooperatives in fish-farms, reducing 
their dependence on extractive industries. In fact, indigenous peoples throughout the 
region are engaged in a wide variety of productive activities (tourism, agriculture, 
forestry, etc.), in most cases without the assistance of the state (Chirif 2009). As Inoach 
Shawit argues, the president mystifies the use of indigenous territories as an unproductive 
space: “the indigenous population is not some perro del hortelano. They defend their 
territories like a businessman defends his economic assets..” (Inoach-Shawit 2007)  
The fact that indigenous peoples do not reject modern development begs the 
question of how might indigenous perspectives on development translate into public 
policy, especially in terms of hydrocarbon development? This, to a large extent, is the 
objective of Chapter VI and, as a result, here I will not enter into details. However, 
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indigenous conceptualizations of land, from the perspective of decoloniality, might 
significantly change the content of public policy surrounding hydrocarbon development. 
Here is one example.  
For Robert Guimaraes, a former vice-president of AIDESEP, much of the current 
tension between indigenous peoples and the government is related to the state’s historic 
imposition of a system based on the economic interests of the powerful. Using 
hydrocarbon development as an example, he explains that because the state assumes 
ownership of the subsoil it effectively controls the economic and political power 
apparatus. Guimaraes argues that a re-equilibrium of power is necessary to create more 
effective public policy, improve relations with indigenous peoples, and protect the 
environment and biodiversity. In terms of hydrocarbon policy, Guimaraes asked what 
would happen if indigenous peoples conceptualizations of territory were incorporated 
into natural resource policy. This would mean, said Guimaraes, that “we would control 
not just the ‘land,’ but  the air, soil, and subsoil.”  This would then force the state to 
negotiate with indigenous communities as equals. It would, according to Guimaraes, level 
out the playing field. This would not necessarily prevent all oil development, says 
Guimaraes, but it would make it more difficult for companies to enter onto indigenous 
territories.155  
These words are consistent with indigenous perspectives on hydrocarbon 
development throughout the Amazon region. According to Awajún intellectual Fermín 
Tiwi, it is necessary to change the Greek-Roman legal definition of property where the 
                                                
155 Personal interview January 2008.  
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surface and the subsurface are divided. Indigenous cosmovision (more like the 
Anglosaxon perspective), places no difference between surface and subsurface:  
With this right, indigenous peoples would be the first the negotiate our natural 
resources with whatever company, giving only a percentage to the state, which 
currently occurs in reverse. In countries like Canada indigenous peoples enjoy 
these rights. They are the ones that negotiate with companies (Pilar Arroyo 2009). 
 
Again, these positions are consistent with indigenous claims for the control of resources 
on indigenous territories. 
The modernity/coloniality lens, in summary, offers a more complex 
understanding of indigenous perspectives on development: Indigenous peoples from the 
Peruvian Amazon do not reject development, rather they seek to forge an alternative 
development project that is based on indigenous conceptualizations of territory. Garcia 
misinterprets indigenous conceptualizations of territory as a natural and essential 
relationship to land, one that requires protection, nurturing, and a fundamentally hands 
off approach to development in the Amazon. As a result, he seems to think that 
indigenous peoples long for a primitive, idyllic space that is untouched and should remain 
untouched by all things modern. Garcia also sees indigenous peoples as children, who are 
manipulated by leftist, anticapitalist ideologies that will, under all circumstances reject 
capital and modern technology. In either case, indigenous peoples reject modern 
development.  
From the perspective decoloniality, indigenous viewpoints emerge from the 
borders of Eurocentric modernity. While appropriating certain aspects of Eurocentric 
modernity, they reject others. Indigenous conceptualization of territory are based on a 
historic (not natural) experience of marginalization and exploitation, one in which the 
colonial powers have always seen the Amazon as an exploitable, empty space. For 
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indigenous peoples, as Guimaraes and others have remarked, it is a space for life and 
development. It is not surprising that one might confuse this with a certain type of 
environmental protectionism that is categorically antidevelopment. However, as a space 
for life, which includes human life, indigenous peoples recognize the importance of 
development, albeit from a different perspective. Furthermore, as “modern” citizens, 
indigenous peoples embrace some mainstream environmental positions, especially those 
on biodiversity and global warming. However, as indigenous conceptualizations of 
territory might indicate, indigenous peoples think of territory and development in terms 
of a trustee relationship, with rights and responsibilities. This, I argue, is consistent with a  
more environmentally sustainable approach to development, one that might require a new 
epistemological loci.  
Conclusions 
 
 Modernity/coloniality as an alternative theoretical lens helps to illuminate the 
tension between a Eurocentric vision of development and indigenous perspectives. Too 
often indigenous peoples are categorized as left-leaning or romantic environmentalists 
that oppose all development. Most academics do recognize that indigenous peoples 
embrace modernity. A short visit to an indigenous village in the region will quickly 
dispel any notions about indigenous peoples wanting to live, as the Perúpetro president 
thinks, like “they were living in the past.”  The problem, nevertheless, is that this conflict 
still gets frames as anti-capitalist indigenous peoples, located on the left, against a 
neoliberal, pro-capitalist government on the right. While there might be some truth to this 
framing, the modernity/coloniality lens helps to fundamentally rethink this issue. From 
the vantage point of modernity/coloniality, the Garcia government is not neoliberal, but 
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Eurocentric. I argue that this is a more appropriate framing, especially considering that 
anti-neoliberal governments (Chavez, Correa, Lula) are still drilling for oil in the Amazon 
region and, quite possibly, still violating indigenous territorial rights.  
From a policymaking angle, the modernity/coloniality approach is also helpful. 
Rhetorically, the president frames indigenous peoples as enemies of development, while 
at the same time, the government claims to uphold indigenous rights to decide their own 
development path. Officially, the government is the rightful owner of all natural 
resources and, constitutionally, is obliged to develop resources for the benefit of all 
Peruvians. However, the government, while acknowledging that Peru is a signatory to 
ILO 169, demonstrates little interest in legitimate dialogue with indigenous peoples. For 
the government, the rights to FPIC are narrowly framed as an obligation to merely inform 
indigenous peoples about already decided development policies.  
Indigenous opposition to oil development is directly related to the content of 
Garcia’s development policies, including hydrocarbon development, which collide with 
indigenous peoples’ historic struggle to obtain territorial rights in the Peruvian Amazon. 
However, indigenous peoples are also opposed to the policymaking process in Peru, 
which excludes indigenous peoples from any meaningful participation in hydrocarbon 
development. In the following chapter, I address how decoloniality theory might be 
translated to the public policy realm and examine some of the current obstacles and 
political opportunities for advancing sustainable development goals in Peru. Specifically, 
I will suggests the existence of certain opportunities where indigenous peoples and the 
Peruvian government might engage in a public policy process that will address the urgent 
need to change the paradigm of natural resource extraction on indigenous territories.  
216 
 
In terms of modernity/coloniality, this implies a necessary de-colonization of the 
public policy instruments surrounding hydrocarbon development. This would, however, 
not only require a deeper understanding of indigenous perspectives on development, but 
would oblige the Peruvian government to recognize and relinquish some of its own 
Eurocentric predispositions toward development. Following the advice of the Awajún 
intellectual Fermín Tiwi, this might imply changing the Greek-Roman legal definition of 
property which divides the subsurface from the surface. Ironically, this vision is closer to 
Anglo-Saxon conceptualizations of property, which would give indigenous peoples sub-
soil rights. The point, of course, is not to adopt Anglo-Saxon concepts, rather it is to 
develop policy mechanisms that provide indigenous peoples with the political power to 
incorporate indigenous thinking in development policies. The letter that Robert 
Guimaraes tried to give Daniel Saba at the Houston Roadshow ended with “Enough Mr. 
Alan Garcia, you cannot qualify the citizens that elected you ‘perros del hortelano.’ We 
are peoples with rights, peoples worthy enough to be respected and listened to” 
(Guimaraes 2008). The fact that Saba refused to accept the letter I think is but one 




CHAPTER VI. DECOLONIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY: 
INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL TRUSTEESHIP  
 
“As good as the proposal for a consultation law might be, if there is no political will it is 




 The main objective of this chapter is to provide a framework for the 
decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policies on indigenous territories in the Amazon 
region and then to offer certain recommendations to the Indigenous Movement of the 
Peruvian Amazon (IMPA) on the basis of some of the major findings in this dissertation. 
The hope is that this dissertation provides some utility to indigenous peoples from the 
Amazon region and, specifically, these insights, while recognizing and respecting the 
autonomy and intellectual contributions of indigenous actors throughout the region, 
might offer alternative ways of thinking (and strategizing) about indigenous claims and 
objectives. Put differently, this chapter works towards the practical application of 
decoloniality and the hope that, in the end, the findings in this dissertation might have  
policy implications.  
The argument throughout this dissertation has been that natural resource policy in 
the Amazon region, especially hydrocarbon policy, is guided by a Eurocentric mentality, 
or colonial logic, that envisions the region as an empty space, abundant with natural 
resources, idly waiting to be developed (and colonized) for the benefit of all Peruvians. 
This logic, I argue, is based on the “Euro-centric” colonization of Amazonian spaces, is 
incompatible with indigenous viewpoints on development, and places at risk the 
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existence of indigenous cultures and the environmental sustainability of the region. The 
intensity of the protests in 2008 and 2009, which ended in the death of (at least) thirty-
three Peruvians, is a testament to the degree to which indigenous peoples from the 
Amazon region are willing to fight for (indigenous) territorial spaces. The protests are 
emblematic of the larger conflict between indigenous peoples and the state and signal the 
urgent need the rethink or, as I argue, decolonize Peru’s natural resource policy agenda.  
 The first task for this chapter is to articulate a necessary framework so that the 
decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policy agenda in the Amazon region is feasible. 
Here I argue that a genuine decolonization of natural resource policies on indigenous 
territories requires not merely the incorporation of indigenous viewpoints, but an active 
role for indigenous peoples in the management and control of natural resource 
development on their territories. As I have suggested throughout this dissertation, this 
goal has been at the forefront of the indigenous struggle against the Peruvian state. The 
question is how to achieve such a goal.   
In this chapter, I recommend that indigenous groups, to counter President 
Garcia’s perro del hortelano rhetoric, engage in a reframing of the role of indigenous 
peoples in the implementation of sustainable development initiatives on indigenous 
territorial spaces. I argue that such a reframing could actually provide greater political 
leverage to enable a broader coalition of political and economic actors that might work 
against a recalcitrant state to support indigenous objectives in the Amazon region. Before 
considering the details of such a move, I will address the current political landscape, 
which presents not only political opportunities, but certain obstacles that make the 
challenge of decolonizing quite formidable.  
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The IMPA: political opportunities, obstacles, leverage points, and strategies  
 
 The IMPA, to the chagrin of Garcia, has achieved remarkable success influencing 
public policy, especially considering that the indigenous population from the Amazon 
region represents only about one percent of the entire Peruvian population.156 Many of 
these accomplishments have already been discussed. As mentioned, the protest of 2008 
and 2009 led to the repeal of four of the eleven legislative decrees in question and, 
AIDSEP, the lead organization, in spite of Garcia’s attempts to dismantle it, remains 
strong. It is also important to note that the protests were supported by a wide variety of 
social actors, including indigenous groups from the Andes region, and much of the 
general population throughout Peru. In this context, the National Coordinating 
Committee for Communities Affected by Mining (CONCAMI), the National Agrarian 
Foundation (CNA), and the Peasant Farmers Confederation of Peru (CCP) campaigned 
aggressively in favor of the IMPA’s demands. Important for the future of indigenous 
politics in Peru, these organizations, who represent indigenous peoples from the Andean 
region, provide the potential to bring about an Andean/Amazonian alliance that has thus 
been absent from the broader indigenous movement in Peru.157 However, while there 
have been gestures of such an Andean/Amazonian alliance, however, a clear 
manifestation of this (potential) alliance is pending.  
More than just indigenous groups, however, labor organizations, student groups, 
environmentalists, anti-globalization protestors, human rights advocates, and even 
                                                
156 The indigenous population of the Peruvian Amazon, according to the latest census, is 
332,975, which represents only 1.18 percent of a total of 28,220,764 Peruvians (from 
Finer 2010b. p. 8).  
157 In a recent article in Socialism and Democracy, Gerardo Rénique makes this very 
point, “the Amazonian uprising has also made possible a hitherto elusive alliance 
between Amazonian and Andean indigenous peoples” (2010, p. 118). 
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Catholic bishops have advocated strongly in favor of the IMPA. Furthermore, the IMPA 
also enjoyed support from important elements within Congress and even from 
governmental organizations such as the Defensoría del Público. According to Peruvian 
sociologist Pilar Arroyo: 
It is striking the significant national and international solidarity that the 
Amazonian struggles have invoked. We can affirm that since we have been 
following this situation (December 2000) there has never been a social conflict 
that generated so much internal and external solidarity (Arroyo 2009).  
 
This wave of support became even more evident after the Bagua tragedy, where 
thousands of protesters marched to the steps of Congress, demanding that the most 
controversial legislative decrees (1090, 1064) be repealed (and they were repealed!). 
Finally, throughout his process, Garcia popularity sank to historic lows, many citing his 
handling of Bagua as the principal reason for massive public disapproval of his 
government.158  
 This quote from indigenous rights lawyer Vladimir Pinto puts this particular 
moment for the IMPA in historic perspective:  
This year of 2009 will be remembered as a seminal mark in the history of the 
indigenous movement in Peru. Never, as in this past year, has so much public 
consciousness been generated around the existence of an indigenous Peru, 
diverse, in which original peoples maintain strong identities capable of mass 
mobilization unlike any other social actor today in Peru. The criollo society, each 
day more Westernized, woke up to a reality that they did not understand, even the 
most critical intellectuals spoke of a “new actor,” when the only new is that 
finally Lima is paying attention (Pinto-López 2009).  
 
The current political scenario suggest that before the IMPA is a classic, if not, historic 
political opportunity.  
                                                
158 In late June of 2009 Garcia’s approval rates dropped to only 21 percent, a historic low. 
In the Amazon region, some estimated that his approval rated dropped to as low as 5 
percent (taken from Rénique 2010).  
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 The most prominent issue in relation to this conflict is the proposed Law of the 
Rights to Prior Consultation for Indigenous and Original Peoples recognized in the 
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization,159 hereafter the Consultation 
Law. The Consultation Law was initially approved by Congress on May 19, 2010. To be 
sure, the Law is intended to create the legal framework in Peru to implement, in good 
faith, the ILO Convention 169. Without entering into details, the Law proposed the 
creation of certain conditions to advance “intercultural” dialogue between the state and 
indigenous communities (Coronado, Ortega, and Vega 2010, p. 2). More specifically, the 
law sought to articulate ways in which the state might create more effective mechanisms, 
according to some of basic principles in ILO 169, to enter into conversations with 
indigenous groups, to gather opinions, and to share information concerning development 
projects on indigenous territorial spaces. However, as Pinto reminds us, notwithstanding 
the attempt to create an intercultural dialogue, “at the end of the entire process⎯the 
decision to adopt a specific measure or norm that has been consulted, is maintained 
within the notion of state sovereignty” (Pinto-López 2009). In other words, even with this 
new consultation law the state retains absolute sovereignty over natural resource 
development on indigenous territorial spaces.    
The Consultation Law, in spite of this quite obvious fact, was strongly rebutted by 
President Garcia and the President of the Council of Ministers, Javier Velásquez, in a 
series of “observations” that displayed an almost obsessive preoccupation that the law 
might undermine the state’s right to implement development projects on indigenous 
territories. Garcia, for example, questioned whether the Consultation Law might give the 
                                                
159 La Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios 
reconocidos en el Convenio Nº 169 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo.  
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impression to indigenous communities that they have the right to veto development 
projects on their land. According to a recent study by CAAAP, these observations 
“respond to a political interest with little juridical analysis, clearly opposite of the state’s 
international obligations conferred to it by treaties, and [these observations are] openly 
against what is established in the Peruvian Constitution” (Coronado, Ortega, and Vega 
2010, p. 16). Not surprisingly, indigenous organizations and their supporters have firmly 
denounced Garcia’s “observations” and have insisted that the Peruvian Congress pass, in 
its original form, the Consultation Law (Servindi 2010a).  
 Given the unique political opportunities, there are important reasons why 
indigenous organizations and their advocates should, as they are presently doing, pressure  
Congress to pass this law. However, as I will argue, in spite its relatively progressive 
nature, the Consultation Law, in reality, is only a “first step” towards a decolonization of 
natural resource policy (and, specifically, hydrocarbon policy) on indigenous territories 
and ultimately falls short of any real attempts at decolonization. Before addressing some 
of its limitations, I want to mention a few of the positive aspects of the Law and the 
process:  
• The Consultation Law proposed was the result of an intense dialogue between the 
Peruvian state and indigenous organizations, in which, indigenous organizations 
yielded significant influence over the final product. This signals an important 
advance within the framework and spirit of consultation with indigenous 
communities, something that thus far has been absent in Peru.   
• The final approval of the law would represent an important step in forcing the 
Peruvian state (in the future) to recognize the legality of international accords 
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such as ILO 169 and the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights (2007). These 
agreements provide indigenous groups, as transnational actors, with needed 
leverage to negotiate with the state on many development and human rights 
related issues.  
• Given the history of the state’s exploitative and dehumanizing treatment of  
indigenous peoples, approval of the law might work to improve state/indigenous 
relations simply as a gesture of goodwill from the state towards indigenous 
peoples (Coronado, Ortega, Vega  2010, p. 1) 
This final point is worth restating. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, 
historically, the Peruvian state has denied indigenous peoples the right to exist freely as 
culturally distinct peoples. The state has used natural resources and indigenous territorial 
spaces as fodder for development purposes at the expense of indigenous cultural rights 
and the environmental sustainability of the Amazon region. Thus, the final passage of this 
law would signal a necessary gesture away from this historically oppressive relationship.  
 The approval of this law, as a result, could establish an important precedent in 
relation to the state’s very capacity to understand indigenous claims. Hernán Coronado, 
one of the architects of the CAAAP report and the coordinator of a working group on 
indigenous rights, makes this point:  
The passage of this law would mean that Peru comes to an integral understanding 
of Rights to Consultation that, in addition to a strong legal backing, suggests an 
intercultural understanding that works towards new commitments and challenges 
for the development of additional rights of indigenous peoples (Coronado 2010).  
 
This is an important observation. In order to move towards a decolonization of Peru’s 
natural resource policies it is necessary that the state, at some point, make a commitment 
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to the spirit of ILO 169, which requires a genuine attempt at understanding and 
considering indigenous perspectives.  
The case of hydrocarbon development in Peru, unfortunately, is an example of the 
state’s unwillingness to consider indigenous perspectives on development. As I have 
explained, in reality, the state applies ILO 169 only as an “administrative requirement” 
and a pretext (part of the state’s rhetoric) to claim that Peru supports indigenous rights. 
The passage of the law, in this sense, might then force the state to genuinely consider 
indigenous concerns and perspectives. Again, as a first step, this might work to increase 
trust between indigenous peoples and the state, thus, improving indigenous/state relations 
in the Amazon region and working towards an eventual decolonization.  
The state’s Eurocentric logic and challenges to decolonization 
 
 The debate surrounding the final approval of the Consultation Law is illustrative 
of the significant challenges that the IMPA faces when considering a genuine 
decolonization of public policy. President Garcia’s observations reflect the government’s 
unwillingness to even slightly alter its development plans in the region. As I have argued 
throughout this dissertation, the state’s development ambitions in the Amazon region 
have consistently demonstrated throughout history this same unwillingness to alter (or 
slow down) development when juxtaposed against indigenous territorial claims. It should 
not be surprising that Garcia’s “observations” share this very same 
unwillingness⎯perhaps to the point of obsession⎯to respect indigenous territorial rights 
when places against the state’s development agenda. 
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 In this context, it is worth noting some of Garcia’s concerns relating to the 
Consultation Law. Perhaps most telling, Garcia is concerned that indigenous peoples 
might erroneously assume they have veto rights. He clarifies the intent of ILO 169:  
It is important to recall the ILO manual that explains the application of the 
Convention. In said document, the ILO  expressively states that the ‘Convention 
does not given indigenous and tribal peoples the right to veto.’ It is important to 
mention that this clarification was given because, in many signature countries like 
Peru, NGOs and other organizations have used this ambiguous writing to create 
false expectation in the population, in relation to believing that without consent, 
the State cannot enact legislative or administrative measures, which would mean 
that the right to veto would oppose the democratic law and the sovereignty of 
Congress to approve laws (Garcia and Velásquez 2010).  
 
Garcia, as this observation indicates, seems obsessed that indigenous peoples might get 
the idea (from NGOs and other outsiders) that they have the right to oppose legislative 
procedures (i.e. the legislative decrees) passed by Congress. For Garcia, this is “anti-
democratic” and works against the interests of the Peruvian Nation (Garcia and 
Velásquez 2010).  
  The majority of the observations demonstrate a preoccupation that the 
consultation process might somehow hinder Peru’s capacity to carry out development 
projects on indigenous territories. Garcia, for example, worries that indigenous groups 
might interpret that they have rights to consultation on national development plans, when, 
for Garcia, this would “unnecessarily hamper” the government’s long term development 
objectives. In addition, Garcia is fearful that the law provides too much power to 
international organizations like the ILO and, consequently, the state is forfeiting political 
autonomy. Perhaps most generally, in these observations, it is evident that Garcia is 
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firmly against any notion that indigenous peoples have “special” rights or that they might 
assume that they have any rights that go beyond the “collective” rights of Peru.160  
 Garcia’s observations indicate that his government, under no circumstances, is 
willing to cede power over its development agenda on behalf of indigenous territorial 
rights.  These observations, as mentioned, are yet another example of the state’s 
Eurocentric development logic. This reality is not lost on contemporary observers, 
especially on those that work on behalf of indigenous peoples. According to CAAAP (the 
Center for Applied Anthropology in the Peruvian Amazon), there are two main aspects 
that explain the government’s negative attitude toward the Consultation Law, 1) 
indigenous people are obstacles to Garcia’s larger development model based on private 
capital investments and the extraction of natural resources and 2) the government still 
sees indigenous peoples as “savages and un-governable” and, thus, not worthy of 
consultation (Coronado, Ortega, and Vega  2010, p. 1). 
 It is important, again, to recall that neither the Consultation Law nor ILO 169 
provides indigenous peoples with any real power to prevent unwanted development on 
their territories. Here Garcia is correct. ILO 169, as explained in Chapter III, does not 
give indigenous peoples the right to veto development projects on indigenous territorial 
spaces. The Consultation Law explicitly states that the final decision over the approval of 
legislative or administrative measures corresponds to the “competent state entity” (Article 
15, p. 6). In reality, the law only establishes a framework so that the government might, if 
it deems appropriate, consider indigenous perspectives. Here Alberto Chirif, Peruvian 
                                                
160 The “observations” were written by Alan Garcia, President of Peru, and Javier 




anthropologists, expresses this sentiment: “As good as the proposal for a consultation law 
might be, if there is no political will it is worthless. And now this is the central problem” 
(Chirif 2010, p. 8).   
 This (unfortunate) reality makes evident the fact that, albeit important, the 
approval of the Consultation Law is insufficient to move towards a decolonization of 
Peru’s natural resource policies. This is something that indigenous leaders, advocates, 
and specialists clearly recognize. What should the IMPA do? How should they proceed 
and what strategies should they employ to achieve their goals?  Here I want to be 
especially careful not overstate the role of a PhD dissertation in providing “advice” to 
indigenous peoples, who themselves have struggled for years against the Peruvian state 
and its exploitative natural resource development paradigm.   
The (necessary) framework for a decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policies 
 
 Before discussing particular strategies, I will provide a general overview of the 
key elements that I would argue are necessary to decolonize Peru’s natural resource 
regime on indigenous territories. First, it is important to clarify that these elements are 
based on indigenous conceptualizations of development that I covered in detail in 
Chapters IV and V and, as such, are meant to reflect how the IMPA’s objectives might 
translate into public policies. That said, if a genuine decolonization of natural resources 
policies on indigenous territories is achieved, I would recommend that the following 
three components be included:  
• Indigenous peoples should retain administrative and political control over natural 
resources on indigenous territories.   
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• Some process should be initiated that leads to the progressive recuperation of 
indigenous territorial spaces that work in accordance with indigenous 
conceptualization of territory.  
• A representative and legal framework should be put into place such that 
indigenous peoples, not indigenous individuals or communities, become the rights 
bearing subject and the decision-making entities on development related issues.  
These three components, again, reflect indigenous peoples’ relationship to territorial 
spaces and, I argue, would be necessary for indigenous peoples to pursue their own 
development path. Most importantly, these three components are present in much of the 
literature that indigenous leaders, activists, and supporters have used to articulate and 
frame the difference between indigenous and “Western” conceptualizations of territory.  
 This first component, from the perspective of this dissertation, is the single most 
important aspect to achieve any sort of decolonization of indigenous territorial spaces. It 
is also, as the government’s attitude toward the Consultation Law demonstrates, the 
principle on which the present government is most unwilling to consider. In short, given 
the special relationship that indigenous peoples have to territory, indigenous peoples 
should obtain greater control over the development of natural resources on their own 
territorial spaces, which would enhance indigenous people’s capacity to implement their 
own development model. ILO 169, in this vein, stipulates that indigenous peoples  
shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development 
as it affect their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands 
they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over 
their own economic, social, and cultural development (Article 7, section 1).  
 
The UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights (Article 3), in the very same context, makes 
basically the same argument, stating that indigenous peoples have the right to “self 
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determination” and the right to pursue their own development path. In practical terms, the 
only way to fully achieve this right is that indigenous peoples acquire the right to veto 
development projects that work against their own development goals and aspirations.  
 The second component is related to the idea that indigenous territorial spaces 
should be continuous, contiguous, and undivided. As explained in Chapter II, the state-
led process of titling indigenous lands in Peru has led to a fractionated, disparate, and 
archipelago system that is currently made up of often disconnected communities. Without 
undermining the idea of “collective rights,” it is important to recall that the native 
community is, in reality, a colonial imposition, first by Christian missionaries, then, in 
1974, by the “Native Communities Act,” which, in effect, forced indigenous peoples to 
form communities. While the titling process has provided many benefits to indigenous 
peoples, in order to decolonize, I would argue that it is important to think of alternative 
ways to create larger, undivided territorial spaces. This does not necessarily imply 
“property ownership,” but should create a system whereby indigenous peoples would 
eventually gain greater control over larger territorial spaces and the resources within 
them.   
The third component is complex given the multiplicity of indigenous ethnic 
groupings in the Amazon region. However, if indigenous peoples are to ever retain the 
administrative and political control over natural resources in their own territorial spaces, 
the question of indigenous representation should be to addressed. For all practical 
purposes,  Amazonian peoples in development related issues are represented via the 
figure of “native community.” Both the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights and ILO 
169 stipulate that indigenous peoples should be represented through their own political 
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institutions, yet indigenous peoples, as leaders often complain, are not represented via 
their own institutions before the Peruvian state (see Davila Puño 2005). While indigenous 
representation is a complex issue and, undoubtedly, should be resolved by indigenous 
peoples themselves, figuring out new representative mechanisms that are more 
responsive to indigenous villages and ones that make sense to the Peruvian state might 
help indigenous leaders not only articulate their claims, but provide more effective 
control over the natural resources on their territories.   
Before moving forward, it is important to clarify that these components are only 
meant as a general framework to begin the discussion around particular strategies that 
would work towards a decolonization of natural resource policy on indigenous territories. 
As such, they are not meant to indicate the content of indigenous proposals, which is 
something that indigenous actors themselves (quite capable) have been engaged in for 
many years. They are, however, designed to present a minimum standard for a genuine 
decolonization strategy that is based on indigenous perspectives on development.  
Constitutional and legislative reform  
 
To a certain extent, the three components mentioned in the previous section are 
not new, but represent a framework to engage in the process of decolonization. In reality, 
they would require constitutional reform, similar to the constitutional changes that have 
occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia.161 It is important to note that the process 
of constitutional reform has already been initiated in Peru. In 2004, AIDESEP, the CCP, 
                                                
161 These changes, in some respects, occurred throughout Latin America in 1990s, where, 
according to the ECLA, “a wave multicultural constitutionalism” between 1987 and 2001 
(ECLA 2006, p. 151). While some progress has been achieved, except perhaps in the case 
of the latest Bolivian constitution, these constitutional changes do not represent the 
profound constitutional changes that would be required in this case.  
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the CNA, and CONAP submitted to a special congressional commission a constitutional 
proposal titled the “Proposal of Organizations of Original Peoples and of Peasant and 
Indigenous Communities,” which specifically addresses much of the content that a 
decolonization of Peru’s public policy might entail.  
For indigenous peoples in Peru (not only in the Amazon region) the explicit goal 
is to move from a Criollo state to a multicultural state. The 2004 proposal argues why 
such a move is necessary:  
The defense and self-development of our original peoples and indigenous and 
peasant communities of Peru is our central objective. To achieve this, we reaffirm 
the unity of our organizations through a fundamental act: the sharing of the same 
juridical idea. As a result, we have not lost sight that our ultimate goal is the 
transformation of the Criollo state into a pluri-national state. In other words, the 
change from today’s appearance of democracy, to an authentic government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people (AIDESEP, et Al 2004, p. 8. The italics 
are mine) 
 
The goal of achieving a pluri-national state, to which indigenous groups throughout Latin 
America subscribe, is based to a large extent, on the recuperation of territorial spaces and 
increased participation in the management of Peru’s natural resource base. It is important 
to note that these organizations have put forth this proposal, along with a legislative 
proposals designed to push this process forward.  
 Given the current political opportunities, I would recommend that these 
organizations and their allies re-initiate this process of constitutional change in Peru. 
Many of the proposals set forth in the abovementioned constitutional proposal include the 
necessary elements to engage in a decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policy 
regime. Given the current political opportunities, this might be an opportune time for 
these organizations to push for a national grassroots campaign to debate, discuss, and 
ultimately create the content for a new constitution in Peru. Here the IMPA could initiate 
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a grassroots process throughout the Amazon region to consult with indigenous villagers 
how the specific content of such a proposal might affect indigenous peoples throughout 
the region. As a way to counter President Garcia’s legislative decrees, I would also 
recommend that the IMPA initiate this process by proposing a series of legislative 
proposals (projectos de ley) that work towards the constitutional change. In terms of 
hydrocarbon development, the IMPA might create a series of legislative proposals that 
work around the notion of decoloniality.  
While indigenous groups should provide the content of these legislative 
proposals, here are a few elements that the IMPA might consider. One step, as Finer also 
suggests (2010b, p. 9), should be to create a proposal in which indigenous peoples retain 
actual veto rights on hydrocarbon projects on indigenous territories. While the current 
government is clearly opposed to such a law, international organizations such as the 
United Nations and even the World Bank have hinted that there is a significant difference 
between “consultation” and “consent.” In reality, there are many international 
organizations (Oxfam, the Bank Information Center, Survival International) that might 
support such initiatives.  
Indigenous veto rights, as mentioned, should be accompanied by a search for new, 
innovative legal structures where the figure of indigenous peoples, rather than 
communities or individuals, could make decisions regarding hydrocarbon development. 
This is a complex endeavor, however, the issue of representation is central not only to the 
ability of indigenous groups to halt or alter unwanted development projects, but also for 
the legitimacy of indigenous leaders to make decisions on behalf of the multiplicity of 
indigenous groupings in the region. The task before indigenous leaders, lawyers, and 
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specialists in the field would be to create a framework that is acceptable to the state, to 
indigenous federations, to indigenous villagers, and to international organizations. In 
some respects, this is an urgent task considering that neoliberal advocate Hernando de 
Soto and his organization (the Institute for Liberty and Democracy) are aggressively 
proposing to privatize and individualize indigenous territories as the solution to all 
development problems in the Amazon region. The fact that De Soto is well-funded and, 
to a certain degree, lionized in international venues such as the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank is cause for serious concern.162  
The issue of representation of indigenous peoples cannot be resolved, however, 
without proposals to deal with the recovery of indigenous territorial spaces. If individual 
communities were given decision-making power over hydrocarbon development projects, 
as indigenous leaders have pointed out, oil companies with unlimited economic 
resources, could easily use the opportunity to buy off individual communities to gain 
support for hydrocarbon development. This process has been well-documented 
throughout the years (Sawyer 2004 and La Torre-Lopez 1999). To resolve this issue, the 
IMPA might engage in a process to propose the creation of new territorial spaces similar 
to reserves for indigenous peoples living in isolation (Law Nº 28763) that would respect 
indigenous viewpoints on territorial integrity. This does not mean that indigenous peoples 
need be considered “owners” per se of these territories, but that indigenous groups would 
have decision-making power over these spaces. As a starting point, the IMPA could 
propose the creation of indigenous  territorial space to consider hydrocarbon development 
                                                
162 For specific information regarding the important of the Amazon for the ILD go to 





projects. If the state can create a hydrocarbon concessions map that covers the entire 
Amazon region, then, it is not far-fetched that IMPA counter this map with a map that re-
organizes indigenous territorial spaces based on ethic or other groupings.   
A reframing of the role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development  
 
The process of creating legislative content that works in conjunction with 
indigenous values on development could be included so the IMPA may—in the context 
of the Peruvian state—legitimately push for a decolonization of natural resource policies 
in the Amazon region. However, indigenous peoples and their advocates have been 
striving towards these goals not only in Peru, but throughout Latin America, for years. In 
other words, while decoloniality might help to remind the IMPA of the urgent need to 
challenge the Eurocentric content of the current legislation, this is something that is 
generally accepted within indigenous circles, especially among indigenous leaders.  
Decoloniality, however, I argue, is not merely important in terms of content, but could 
also provide useful suggestions to encourage fresh political strategies. In this context, I 
suggest that the notion of decoloniality might assist the IMPA engage in a reframing of 
indigenous peoples’ role in sustainable development not only as a way to challenge 
Garcia’s misrepresentation of the IMPA, but as a way to find new allies and political 
leverage points to support indigenous visions of development in the Amazon region.  
Why is a reframing important? According to Goodwin and Jasper, “in order to 
attract people to join and remain committed to a movement, its issues must be presented 
or ‘framed’ so that they fit or resonate with the beliefs, feelings, and desires of potential 
recruits” (2009, p. 55). The framing of an issue, however, is not only important for 
recruits to the movement, but to gain potential supporters of the movement. In this 
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regard, I argue that a re-framing of the role of indigenous peoples in sustainable 
development initiatives might be helpful in terms of attracting new supporters and finding 
new leverage points to push forward the IMPA’s objectives.  
As explained throughout the dissertation, the Garcia government has gone out of 
its way to frame indigenous peoples as enemies of development, conveniently tagging 
them as perros del hortelano (gardener’s dogs).  For Garcia, indigenous peoples, like the 
gardener’s dog, irrationally protect Amazonian spaces from all forms of development. 
They, as the logic goes, are easily influenced and manipulated by outside forces, 
especially environmentalists and Marxists, who want to prevent “progressive” forces 
from developing the region. This irrational mentality, says Garcia, is thwarting the 
necessary capital, technology, and foreign investment to utilize Amazonian natural 
resources and bring modern development to all Peruvians. Garcia’s take home message is 
that particular indigenous interests (a few Amazonian “Indians”) are preventing Peru 
from advancing towards (Eurocentric) modernity.  
This framing of indigenous peoples as anti-development is, of course, nothing 
new. Interestingly, the narrative of indigenous peoples as protectors of the forests, as 
“noble savages,” and as a “spiritual” peoples with idealistic, romantic, and supernatural 
connections to nature is still quite popular. The blockbuster movie Avatar (2009) is an 
example of how images of indigenous peoples’ special relationship to nature are still 
utilized by popular media.163 This, of course, is not all bad as director James Cameron has 
proved to be an important advocate for indigenous peoples in the Amazon region 
(especially in Brazil). However, Cameron’s framing of indigenous peoples is not entirely 
                                                
163 Perhaps the best example of this is when the Avatarian “natives” literally hook-up to 
the trees for energy and wisdom.  
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different from the way that Garcia’s frames Peruvian “natives.” Rather than frame 
indigenous peoples as “noble” savages, the difference is that Garcia frames them as 
violent savages, who irrationally protect the forest and long for a time when “Indians” 
lived in harmony with nature and free from development.  
 Garcia’s framing of indigenous peoples as anti-development advocates is not 
merely a critique against environmentalists, but he also suggests that they are heavily 
influenced by Marxist thinking, which he describes as an outdated ideology that, again, 
works against the progress of Peru. This framing works to the benefit of Garcia given the  
history of the Marxist (or Maoist) inspired insurgency groups like the Shining Path, 
MRTA (Movimiento, Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) and MIR (Movimiento de la 
Izquierda Revolucionario).  Independent of his motives, this framing categorizes 
indigenous peoples with anti-globalization, anti-neoliberal, and, historically violent actors 
that are located on the far left of the current left/right political spectrum. Here, one must 
be somewhat careful as the IMPA is clearly against Garcia’s neoliberal development 
agenda in the region and, as in the case of environmentalists, many on the left have been 
strong advocates for indigenous causes. Nevertheless, in spite of these benefits, the 
categorizations of indigenous peoples as anti-capitalist Marxists allows Garcia, again, to 
make the argument they are categorically opposed to modern development. 
How might the IMPA counter these narratives? Here I argue that a re-framing of 
the role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development might offer important 
advantages for the IMPA, especially given the historic political opportunities discussed 
earlier. Thinking strategically, the main question here is how to build a broad-based 
coalition to advance indigenous objectives, which, as Chapter IV and V describe, are 
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based largely on the principles of sustainable development. Given that the current 
government has gone to extraordinary lengths to frame indigenous peoples as anti-
development, I argue that the IMPA should aggressively counter this frame, which could 
be accomplished via a re-framing of the IMPA’s role in implementing sustainable 
development initiatives in the Amazon region.  
 What might a reframing of the role of indigenous peoples in the implementation 
sustainable development might look like? First, it is worth noting that sustainable 
development is a contested term, loaded with contradictions, ambiguities, and problems. 
In a review of the literature on sustainable development, Jabareen notes that definitions of 
sustainability are vague, there is disagreement as to what should be sustained, and it is a 
“confused topic” that is “fraught with contradictions” (2008, p. 180). Such debates about 
the meaning of sustainable development, which simultaneously suggests economic 
growth (or poverty reduction) and environmental protection, are bound to continue. 
However, despite these ambiguities, there is a strong consensus from the international 
community to the importance of moving sustainable development initiatives forward (see 
Dobson 2003, Dryzek 1997).  
On December 24, 2009, the UN General Assembly agreed that the next United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 should consider following 
objectives:  
a renewed commitment to sustainable development, assessing the progress and 
implementation gaps in meeting already agreed commitments, and addressing 
new and emerging challenges.164  
 
                                                





Therefore, in spite of ambiguities, sustainable development still remains one of the most 
important and formidable challenges facing international development community. The 
problem, as often the case, is one of implementation and operationalization. Ten years 
after Rio, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg finally 
agreed on a “Plan of Implementation,” yet still today this remains a fundamental 
challenge. Moreover, as the Johannesburg Declaration specified, most agree that 
indigenous peoples have an important role to play in implementation of sustainable 
development initiatives.165 Scholars and others (especially indigenous peoples 
themselves) have argued for years that indigenous holistic development perspectives 
might offer special insights into the practical application of sustainable development 
(Loomis 2000, p. 893).  
Given that it is now accepted that indigenous peoples have a role to play in the 
implementation of sustainable development initiatives, how is this role currently framed? 
In much of the current debate surrounding sustainable development, indigenous peoples 
from the Amazon are framed as either protectors of the forest or victims of environmental 
injustice. The campaign, for example, against the environmental contamination caused by 
Occidental Petroleum in Northern Peru (and Chevron in Ecuador) has been centered on 
portraying the Achuar peoples as the victims of greedy transnational companies that put 
profits ahead of the health of Amazonian peoples and the sustainability of the rainforests. 
In a similar way, many progressive groups from the US and Europe framed the 2008 and 
2009 protests as Amazonian peoples as the protectors of the rainforest against President 
Garcia and transnational companies who seek economic profit from the natural resources 
                                                
165 This commitment is specified in point 25 of the Johannesburg Declaration: “We 
reaffirm the vital role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development.”  
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in the forest. This is the story of Avatar in which indigenous peoples protect the forest 
against greedy capitalists. It is important to note that, to a large degree, these frames have 
been successful in halting some of Garcia’s most aggressive policies.  
However, in spite of these successes, a re-framing of indigenous peoples’ role in 
the implementation of sustainable development might offer certain advantages in 
advancing the IMPA’s objectives. Here the notion of decoloniality might help the IMPA 
to (re) think strategically around this issue. While it is important to maintain key alliances 
with environmental and progressive left-of-center actors, there might be certain 
advantages in aggressively countering Garcia’s attack on indigenous peoples as anti-
development. The modernity/coloniality lens, I argue, helps to refract these popular 
frames of indigenous peoples. Rather than view indigenous peoples as traditional or 
historical relics, decoloniality suggests that indigenous peoples are just as “modern” as 
anyone else, but they experience modernity from a different vantage point (a distinct 
epistemological loci). There is no need to repeat the arguments made in Chapter V, 
however, the fact that indigenous peoples do not reject modern development initiatives 
might provide an interesting frame for those that otherwise might be reluctant to support 
indigenous claims.   
Here it is important to highlight that such a reframing would only work to the 
benefit of indigenous objectives if the IMPA maintained a strong position concerning the  
decolonization of public policy. Again, first and foremost, with current indigenous 
leaders, I recommend that the IMPA campaign for the rights to control all natural 
resource on indigenous territorial spaces, which would require constitutional and 
legislative reform. However, to achieve these goals the IMPA could create a broad based 
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political coalition. This is where a re-framing of the role of indigenous peoples as 
“modern” subjects in the implementation of sustainable development initiatives in the 
Amazon region might provide a powerful strategy to achieve indigenous goals. One idea 
might be that indigenous peoples should be given an “environmental trusteeship” over 
indigenous territorial spaces. Indigenous peoples could argue that given their special 
relationship to the land, their intimate knowledge about biodiversity, and their particular 
interests in protecting the environmental sustainability of the region, they could provide 
the necessary leadership to manage and control the natural resources on indigenous 
territorial spaces.   
Again, based on the premise that indigenous peoples seek to decolonize Peru’s 
natural resource policy regime, I have suggested that indigenous peoples should work 
towards a legislative framework that allows them greater control over the development of 
all the natural resources within indigenous territorial spaces. One of the immediate 
challenges to such a proposition is that Garcia and others might argue (as they often do) 
that this would eventually lead to a de facto political separation of indigenous territories 
and the Peruvian state. Indigenous peoples, therefore, need a way to obtain political and 
administrative control of resources without invoking fears that they seek the political 
separation from Peru. Here the idea of an environmental trusteeship could be effective:  
indigenous peoples would be entrusted by the Peruvian state to play the leading role in 
the economic, social, and environmental development of indigenous territorial spaces. 
The notion of a trusteeship suggests that indigenous peoples, again, have a special 
relationship to land on which they live, and that their wisdom, understanding of nature, 
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and their desire to forge an alternative modernity might provide real development 
solutions based on environmental sustainability and economic development.  
The concept of “trusteeship” is a relatively familiar and safe term might appeal to 
a wide variety of political actors. According to environmental economist Richard 
Howarth, the idea of a The Public Trust Doctrine (based on ancient Roman and Anglo-
Saxon Law) in the US dates back to Thomas Jefferson, who in 1789, in a letter to James 
Madison wrote, “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.” The definition of usufruct, 
also quite common in US law, is based on the principle of trusteeship: “the right of 
temporary possession, use, or enjoyment of the advantages of property belonging to 
another, so far as may be had without causing damage or prejudice” (2007, p. 656). 
Ironically, the U.S. government used the notion of trusteeship to, in effect, take 
possession of Native American lands for the benefit of particular interests. However, in 
this case, the idea is that indigenous peoples assume the role of trustee (not the 
government) on behalf of the Peruvian population. In other words, indigenous peoples 
assume the role of managers of these spaces. Interestingly, such an idea might work 
within the current framework of the UN Declaration on Indigenous Rights and ILO 169, 
which suggest that indigenous peoples have a special and distinct relationship (from 
mainstream societies) to their territories, that they should determine their own 
development path, that they should govern territories via their own institutions, and that 
they have an active role to play in sustainable development.  
 Furthermore, an environmental trusteeship over territorial spaces is an example 
of an idea that could potentially cut across left (socialism) versus right (capitalism) 
arguments, which tend to reduce the political field into neoliberals against anti-
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globalization activists. Interestingly, Mahatma Gandhi prescribed the institution of 
trusteeship as a way to reconcile the interests of labor and capital, so that, rather than a 
relationship based on violence and exploitation, the economic organization of society 
could be based on non-violence, love, equality, and human dignity. Gandhi thought that 
since rich people could not amass wealth without the help of the rest of society, that they 
should be morally entrusted to used any excess (anything beyond their immediate needs) 
for the benefit of their fellow human beings. This way, according to Gandhi, one could 
fight against the inherent evils and violence of capitalism, yet, at the same time, one 
could guard against the dangers and violence of state power (Makakul 2008, p. 51).  
In a similar way, the idea of an environmental trusteeship might work to challenge 
the notion that indigenous peoples want to cordon off the Amazon region from 
development. Again, here I will not repeat the arguments made in Chapter V in which the 
IMPA seeks to forge an alternative development model that is based on indigenous 
territorial values (or indigenous conceptualizations of territory). Strategically, the 
problem is not related to indigenous viewpoints on sustainable development, which, most 
would argue are in fact based on environmental values. The problem is that indigenous 
viewpoints get framed: “anti-development, protectors of the forests, manipulated by 
Marxist-inspired left of center governments and activists, etc.” Again, while the IMPA 
should be careful not to isolate environmentalists and anti-globalization advocates, they 
might counter such frames by emphasizing the “modern” aspects of indigenous 
perspectives on development.  
Here I return briefly to the argument advanced by ex-president of AIDESEP, Gil 
Inoach-Shawit, to provide an example of the type of framing that might resonate with a 
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broader collation of actors. In a direct rebuttal to President Garcia’s perro del hortelano 
critique,  Inoach-Shawit explains how indigenous peoples from Northern Peru (the 
provinces of Alto Amazonas and Datem del Marañón) took advantage of state-led 
programs in the 1980s that facilitated the development of agriculture in the jungle.  
As soon as they installed the mills in Nauta, Yurimagus and later in Lagunas, 
people from the countryside started to produce corn and rice. . . . The indigenous 
communities in the region did not sit with their arms crossed. They organized 
systems of production and trade in the river basins in Cahuapanas, Morono, Potro, 
Apaga and Yurapaga and were able, in their best moment, to register between 500 
and 700 tons of grain per year. They never asked for a hand out from the 
government, but only needed a market, and from there, under their own power, 
they were able to benefit (Inoach-Shawit 2007).  
 
In this quote, the ex-president of AIDESEP aggressively counters the frame that 
indigenous peoples are against economic development. Moreover, responding to Garcia’s 
claim that indigenous peoples are a burden on the state, Inoach-Shawit emphasizes that 
with the right tools indigenous peoples are quite capable of participating in and benefiting 
in the “modern” economic marketplace.  
These frames of indigenous peoples as protagonists in the economic development 
of the region might be used effectively to counter some of these anti-development frames. 
Here an Awajun leader, countering Garcia’s belief that indigenous peoples are against 
investment, remarks, “We are not against development nor against investment…We need 
an investment strategy that is well thought out, a development model that works from the 
jungle and in favor of the jungle, which will also be better for Peru” (Arroyo 2009). Here 
is how a young Kukamilla leader from the Amazon envisions a “developed” community:  
I would like to see my community with a bunch of mitayo, with plenty of food for 
the community, celebrating our holidays with masato, the forest full of mahogany, 
cedar, and lupanas. I would like to see happy, healthy children. I would also like 
to see us with television, radio, and other things of a modern society, but above 




These responses should not be surprising and, in fact, can be easily found throughout the 
Amazon region. However, this framing does not seem to reverberate outside the region, 
where more often indigenous peoples are framed as the protectors of the rainforest.  
 As a result, a reframing of indigenous peoples’ role in sustainable development  
might emphasize that while indigenous peoples oppose oil development on their 
territories, they do not opposed economic development per se. Furthermore, in some 
cases, indigenous peoples might even support oil development, given that the proper 
environmental safeguards (environmental impact assessments, re-injection, the 
minimization or elimination of roads, etc.) were in place. This type of re-framing could 
focus on the capital investments needed for agriculture projects, the development of fish-
farms, the need to improve marketing techniques for artisan commercialization, and other 
economic enterprises that indigenous peoples, for years, have been engaged in.  
In a somewhat ironic twist, in certain regards, President Garcia is correct: The 
Amazon region does lack the capital and technology to develop. In truth, indigenous 
peoples, as explained here, have never been against capital and technology. However, as 
the protest of 2008 and 2009 demonstrate, they are deeply concerned with the ends that 
capital and technology might be used. Again, a reframing of the role of indigenous 
peoples in sustainable development that argues for an environmental trusteeship based on 
indigenous visions of modern development might be an effective (and practical) way to 
achieve indigenous goals: a decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policies on 
indigenous territories.  
 This reframing might provide certain leverage points that, up to this point, the 
IMPA has been able to effectively utilize. It is necessary to reiterate that these 
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recommendation should be, first and foremost, centered around well thought-out and 
crafted legislative proposals that are based on indigenous viewpoints on development. 
This reframing, again, should focus on the political and administrative control of all the 
resources that are located on indigenous territorial spaces, which, in my opinion, is the 
minimum requirement for a genuine decolonization of Peru’s natural resource policy (at 
least on indigenous territorial spaces). That said, there are three specific venues in which 
this re-framing might provide the IMPA with added leverage to move their agenda 
forward: 1) international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, 2) the US Congress in Free Trade Legislation, and 3) 
Peruvian Public Opinion.  
International financial institutions (IFIs), especially the World Bank (WB) and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have played an active role in financing 
development initiatives in the Peruvian Amazon for years. Today, these institutions are 
funneling nearly a billion dollars in development to the Amazon region (McElhinny 
2010, p. 1-2). Importantly, both the WB and the IDB currently make strong claims to 
support indigenous territorial rights, especially those concerning indigenous peoples role 
in protecting biodiversity and sustainable development initiatives. While these 
organizations have not proven to be strong advocates for the IMPA in the past, it might 
be in their best interest to support an environmental trusteeship on indigenous lands.   
The World Bank, for example, has been actively engaged in supporting 
indigenous projects since 1992. WB support for indigenous rights is a complex topic, 
especially given the fact that historically the Bank has supported environmentally 
damaging extractive projects throughout Latin America and in Peru. However, with 
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regards to indigenous communities, the Bank claims to have switched from a strategic 
“do no harm” approach to a “do good” approach. Independent of whether one actually 
believes that the WB  is “doing good,” part of the Bank’s so called “proactive approach” 
is to demonstrate “the important role that Indigenous Peoples can play in the management 
of fragile ecosystems and biodiversity conservation.” It is precisely this rhetoric that 
might provide the IMPA leverage to force the WB (and other IFIs) to support indigenous 
proposals.166  The Inter-American Development Bank, who has played an large role in 
financing the controversial Camisea natural gas project in the Lower Urubamba Valley is 
Southern Peru, maintains essentially the same rhetoric.    
 Another important leverage point that the IMPA might use is the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the United States. As explained in Chapter III, the Garcia’s 
government consistently made the argument that the legislative decrees were necessary 
because of the FTA with the US. In fact, Garcia often claimed that the indigenous 
protests were putting at risk the integrity of the US FTA. Not only was Garcia’s argument 
bogus, since at no time did any US representative make a claim that the FTA was in 
jeopardy because of the Amazonian protests. Rather, some experts argued that several of 
the legislative decrees were, in fact, in violation of the FTA, especially in regards to the 
language that called for a strengthening of the environmental governance provisions 
surrounding forestry development (see Barandiarán-Gómez 2008b). In fact, LD 1064 
(since repealed) would have weakened (in some cases eliminated) indigenous 
participation in certain community forestry institutions. While indigenous groups have 
                                                
166 For a detailed look at World Bank and the Inter-American Development project and 




traditionally opposed free trade agreements with the US (and other countries), the IMPA 
could potentially use the US Congress to gain support for initiatives like an 
environmental trusteeship on indigenous territories.  
 Finally, the Peruvian public could very well support the idea of an environmental 
trusteeship on indigenous territories. Clearly one of the surprises (especially for President 
Garcia) of the Amazonian protests in 2008 and 2009 was the level of support that the 
general Peruvian public showed for the protestors. Furthermore, Garcia’s approval 
ratings, especially after the Bagua violence, went to historic lows. It seems clear that, to 
the contrary of what Garcia imagined, Peruvians do not value development at all costs. 
Appealing to the broader population, especially in the context of emphasizing indigenous 
peoples’ role in forging an alternative development model that supports both economic 
and environmental development, might work.  
Conclusions  
 
 The strategy that I recommend to the IMPA encourages a reframing of the role of 
indigenous peoples in the implementation of sustainable development initiatives in the 
Peruvian Amazon. I argue that decoloniality might help to counter the current framings 
that portray indigenous peoples, like in the movie Avatar, as the noble defenders of the 
forest against greedy transnational corporations that want to profit from natural resources 
on indigenous lands. Again, it is interesting that Garcia uses a similar frame, but, for the 
Peruvian president, indigenous peoples are not noble, rather they are irrational, easily 
manipulated, and potentially violent. In both cases, indigenous peoples are anti-
development. The risk of reframing indigenous peoples as “modern” subjects that are 
pro-development is that environmentalists and anti-neoliberal advocates might find it 
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more difficult to support the IMPA and that the Peruvian government, transnational 
corporations, and even IFIs could appropriate the rhetoric of indigenous rights for their 
own development objectives. To some degree, this is already happening.  
 However, taking such a risk, I would argue, only makes sense if the IMPA can 
make practical steps towards a genuine decolonization of natural resource policy on 
indigenous territorial spaces. The problem with the new Consultation Law is that, even 
though it is touted by some as a significant achievement, in the end it changes nothing. If 
the state wants to proceed with a development project on indigenous territories, even in 
the case that indigenous peoples vigorously oppose it, there are no legal measures to 
prevent the project from going forward. The historic Amazonian protest of 2008 and 
2009, according to the very objectives of the IMPA, occurred because the state did not 
consult indigenous peoples on the legislative decrees. But what if a “smarter” Garcia 
government would have consulted indigenous peoples? What then? Moreover, to a 
degree, the end result of the protests is the new Consultation Law, which, I repeat, does 
not give indigenous peoples the right to oppose development projects on indigenous 
territories.  
  The strategy I propose, again, only makes sense if it leads to a decolonization of 
natural resource policies on indigenous territories. Here I recommend that the IMPA 
aggressively counter the frame that portrays indigenous peoples as anti-development 
precisely to work toward a legal framework that would give indigenous peoples real 
power over the natural resources on their territories. Interestingly, hydrocarbon 
development might be a good place to start. The US Congress, the IFIs, and even the 
Peruvian population do not necessarily have a strategic interest in developing oil in the 
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Amazon region. For all these actors, finding sustainable solutions (both environmentally 
and socially) in the Peruvian Amazon is  perhaps more important than developing a few 
million barrels of oil.  
 The idea of an “environmental trusteeship” might provide the IMPA with an 
interesting way to reframe the role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development 
initiatives. The key question, however, is would it led to a decolonization of natural 
resources policies? In this chapter, I argue that a decolonization of public policy should 
include a process whereby indigenous peoples (1) acquire political and administrative 
control of natural resources on their territories, (2) begin to recover territorial spaces that 
respond to indigenous concepts of development, and (3) create a representative 
framework so that indigenous peoples are capable of making development-based 
decisions as the rights bearing subject of territorial spaces, rather than as individuals or 
communities. The benefit to the notion of an environmental trusteeship is that it provides 
a framework wherein it is possible to work towards all three of these components. But 





 Conclusion: the IMPA, oil Development, and decoloniality  
 
Throughout this dissertation I have argued that the logic of coloniality is still very 
much present within the workings of the Peruvian state. This, of course, does not mean 
that all state entities or, more importantly, all actors within the state are plotting to 
colonize indigenous peoples and exploit their land and resources. Many state officials  
work actively, each day, to assist indigenous peoples on some of the most important and 
pressing issues in the Amazon region and throughout Peru. The National Ombudsman’s 
office, for example, especially in regards to conflicts over natural resources in the 
Amazon region, has proved to be a valuable asset for indigenous groups. Here I argue 
that the logic of coloniality works in a more subtle way.    
The early history of extractive development in the Peruvian Amazon highlights 
this logic in especially clear, straightforward terms. In the early 1500s, the colonial state 
saw the Amazon region as a space to extract gold, silver, and other precious metals, 
where Europeans could achieve wealth and prestige. In many respects, this is the story of  
European colonization throughout Spanish America, where dreams of richness and 
nobility, unachievable for many in Europe, could be realized in the Americas. The 
Amazon region, however, was always an enigma of sorts to Europeans. Many, to be sure, 
did not realize the Inca Empire had never subjugated Amazonian peoples and, just as the 
Incas found Amazonian peoples resilient, the European conquest of the Amazon region 
proved remarkably difficult. This difficulty undoubtedly reinforced the image of the 
Amazon region as an “empty,” impenetrable space. This sense of Amazonian 
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“emptiness” has remained part of the colonial logic and, to a large degree, has shaped the 
government’s development rhetoric throughout the years.  
This “emptiness,” however, is only meant to convey absence of civilization, order, 
and progress. This image of Amazonia, devoid of civilization, is one that is full of natural 
resources, where a lush and ripe jungle is abundant with exotic species of minerals, 
plants, trees, and animals.  While lacking civilization and progress, the jungle is inhabited 
by indigenous peoples, described throughout history as “heathens and savages” or, in a 
more positive light (Juan de las Casas), as meek, humble, and⎯naturally⎯at peace with 
their surroundings. The image of the jungle, in this sense, is similar to “the state of 
nature,” where before the social contract people lived in or as part of nature. The fact that 
the Peruvian state still today legally classifies indigenous peoples from the Amazon 
region as “natives,” and indigenous peoples from the Andes as “campesinos” is an 
example of how Amazonian peoples are conceptualized as part of (or closer to) nature. 
Historically, this (racialized) categorization of native peoples allowed the state, extractive 
companies, and colonists to treat Amazonian peoples as less than human and, perhaps, 
explains why up until the late 1980s in the Peruvian Amazon there were documented 
cases of indigenous peoples being held as slaves.  
The prevailing logic guiding the development of the Peruvian Amazon region 
today, I argue, is an extension of this (colonial) logic that envisions the region as an 
empty space for national development, but one that is abundant with (undeveloped) 
natural resources. President Garcia’s development plans for the Amazon region are based 
on the notion that, if properly utilized, these resources can bring modern development to 
Peru. In his now (in)famous “syndrome of the gardener’s dog” editorial, Garcia describes 
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the Amazon region the “first resource” for Peru in which there are “sixty-three million 
hectares and abundant rainfall.” Perhaps appealing to the sensitivity of environmentalists, 
Garcia says that the government respects “virgin forests and natives,” but then goes on to 
describe the current chaotic, undeveloped state of the region. He says, there are “eight 
million hectares that have been destroyed because of pillage, cocaine, and savage 
logging.” In other words, the region is still uncivilized, still inhabited by “virgin forests” 
and “natives.”  
Garcia’s inflammatory remarks, which provoked outrage amongst indigenous 
peoples throughout Peru, accentuate a colonial logic in which extractive development is 
the solution to the problem of “Amazonian emptiness and uncivilized natives,” which, for 
Garcia, are apparently the same thing. As this dissertation demonstrates, President Garcia 
has aggressively moved to implement extractive policies in the region and his rhetoric, 
especially towards indigenous peoples, has been no less aggressive. However, an 
examination of the history of development policies in the Peruvian Amazon reveals that 
this same logic has been present in each historical period, independent of political or 
ideological association. Perhaps most telling, during the “progressive” government of 
Juan Velasco, the colonization of the Amazon region continued as the principal strategy 
for the region. Moreover, in 1974, the “Native Communities Law” reinforced the image 
of the Amazonian native and, in a sense, forced indigenous peoples to form native 
communities, tying them to the state’s legal framework and leading to the existence of 
unconnected, disparate, and fractionated “native communities” in the midst of sea of 
development projects (described as “the archipelago syndrome”).  
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Hydrocarbon development policy in the Amazon region is an extension of this 
colonial logic. Garcia’s policies, as explained in Chapter III, represent the most intensive 
expansion in hydrocarbon exploration in the history of Peru. However, a historical and 
institutional analysis of hydrocarbon policies in the Amazon region reveals that, albeit 
aggressive, Garcia’s policies are nothing new. Put simply, Peruvian governments 
throughout history, independent of ideological predilections, have always been interested 
in exploiting petroleum in the Amazon region. Again, even Velasco aggressively pursued 
the exploration of hydrocarbons in the region, hoping to resolve (and pay for) many of 
Peru’s development ills. In fact, the first great oil exploration boom in the Amazon 
region, which did irreversible harm to indigenous communities in the Corrientes River 
Basin, took place largely under Velasco’s watch in the early 1970s. Since Velasco, 
successive governments have all continued to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the 
region. It is true that Fujimori, under a neoliberal agenda, created a legislative framework 
designed to open up the region to foreign, private capital. Toledo and Garcia, 
subsequently, have worked to push this neoliberal agenda forward, subjecting the 
Amazon region to a plethora of foreign oil companies.  However, in reality, oil 
development is not the product of neoliberal policies, rather it is, again, the manifestation 
of the state’s colonial logic, in which oil is just another extractive resource that the 
Amazonian space provides.   
The state’s colonial logic is a critical element for understanding and explaining 
this conflict. However, the most important part of this dissertation is the story of 
indigenous resistance not only to Garcia’s hydrocarbon development policies, but to the 
state’s larger development agenda. In short, the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian 
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Amazon (IMPA) has been remarkably successful in confronting the government’s 
aggressive development agenda in the Amazon region. The 2008 and 2009 Amazonian 
protests, which ended violently in Bagua, in many respects, were a testament to the 
power of the IMPA to impact public policy in Peru. In this context, as a new social 
movement, the IMPA is the story of a successful case of indigenous peoples’ influence 
over the national political scene.  
Undeniably, the single most important factor that explains the emergence and 
success of the IMPA is the defense of territorial spaces and natural resources. As the 
International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) quite succinctly puts it, 
“the indigenous movement in the Peruvian Amazon emerges when the invasion of 
territories and the dispossession of resources becomes intolerable” (1995, p. 21). This 
single fact continues to explain indigenous mobilization and certainly explains the 
IMPA’s consistent opposition to the government’s hydrocarbon development policies in 
the region. However, indigenous organizing in the Amazon is also the result of the 
movement’s impressive capacity to adapt to state institutions and, in the language of 
social movement literature, to take advantage of political and transnational opportunities.  
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the IMPA (most notably AIDESEP) emerged 
from two competing tendencies within the Peruvian government in the 1970s. 
Progressive advocates within the government designed the 1974 Native Communities 
Law, which, at the time, was considered the most advanced legislation concerning 
indigenous peoples in all of Latin America. This helped to facilitate the development of 
an ethnic and political organization and a land titling process that remains fundamental to 
the IMPA’s foundation today. However, indigenous organizing occurred in opposition to  
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the state’s larger development objectives that, based on a colonial logic, sought to 
develop and colonize the Amazon region. Indigenous peoples, understanding that their 
territories were under siege, were successfully able to adapt to state institutions not only 
to protect their territories, but to carve out new territorial rights. In this context, the IMPA 
has carefully framed indigenous conceptualizations of territory that work, strategically, 
within the framework of indigenous territorial rights under ILO 169, the latest UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights, and the Peruvian Constitution. In this context, 
indigenous framing of territorial rights has been used as an effective tool to distinguish 
indigenous from “Western” notions of territory and to articulate alternative development 
notions.   
The IMPA’s opposition to Garcia’s hydrocarbon policies, thus, must be 
understood as intimately connected to the movement’s larger struggle to protect 
indigenous territorial spaces. As argued throughout the dissertation, it is impossible to 
separate indigenous opposition to oil development from the broader claims against the 
government’s development agenda and Garcia’s legislative decrees. Consequently, the 
2008 and 2009 Amazonian protests were in opposition to Garcia’s (neoliberal) 
development policies, but were, at the same time, related to the government’s 
hydrocarbon policy in the Amazon region. Here, in many respects, the hydrocarbon 
industry represented a symbol of the Western development model based on extraction, 
exploitation, and environmental contamination as many of the protesters specifically 
targeted the industry. Interestingly, for the government the petroleum industry also 
represented a symbol of sorts as Garcia, on several occasions, referred to the irrational 
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behavior of indigenous peoples, who wanted to disrupt the flow of oil, thus, preventing 
Peru from “advancing” into the twenty-first century.  
Indigenous opposition to oil development, however, is not merely symbolic. For 
indigenous peoples throughout the region, the experience of oil contamination in the 
Corrientes River Basin, most egregious during the 1970s, has been devastating. It is not 
surprising that the experience of the Achuar living in the Corrientes River Basin 
represents a point of reference for indigenous communities considering the prospects of 
future oil development on their territories. Furthermore, given that (last month) in 
September of 2010 an oil spill in this region affected eleven communities, and between 
2006 and 2010 there have been 78 registered oil spills in lots 8x and 1AB alone (i.e. 
Corrientes Region), it is quite understandable that indigenous groups are hesitant to 
accept Garcia’s claim that modern technology has solved all environmental problems 
related to extractive development (Servindi 2010a, 2010c; Herrera-Gálvez 2010). Even 
the Camisea Gas project, touted by some as a model of environmental sustainability, is 
quite controversial, as environmentalists argue that it has done much ecological damage.    
 Empirically, the case of indigenous opposition to oil development in the 
Corrientes region, as detailed in Chapter IV, provides an interesting opportunity to study 
some of the specific strategies that the IMPA used to achieve its objectives. While the 
repertoire of action and protest, in this case, did not exactly mimic those strategies used 
in the larger protest of 2008 and 2009, the IMPA did turn to a general pattern of protest 
that has consistently been employed. The move to (1) articulate demands to policymakers 
and the public at large, followed by (2) a negotiation process, which, when demands are 
not met (which they rarely are), is followed by (3) direct protest actions is quite clearly a 
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logical and well-orchestrated approach. The fact that in the Corrientes case this led to the 
government accepting Achuar demands (the Acta de Dorissa) is a specific example of the 
power of indigenous peoples to affect public policy (Servindi 2006e)a. Again, this 
contradicts the government’s attempts to frame indigenous leaders as irrational, 
reactionary, and misinformed.  
 Finally, indigenous opposition to oil development is widespread and has been 
clearly expressed at multiple levels of indigenous groupings. While AIDESEP, as the 
leader of the IMPA, has made multiple public statements regarding their opposition to oil 
development, it is important to note that indigenous opposition has not been limited to 
this national federation, again, as Garcia seems to imply. Some of the harshest and most 
clear cut statements against oil development have come from the regional, sub-regional, 
and village levels. Local indigenous organizations (villagers), in some cases, have even 
offered their lives to protect their territories against the encroachment of oil companies. 
As detailed in Chapter IV, indigenous statements against oil development have occurred 
at every level and throughout the entire Amazon region. This, of course, does not mean 
that all indigenous peoples oppose oil development and that, under all circumstances, 
even the larger federations will always resist oil development on indigenous lands. 
However, for Garcia to claim that indigenous opposition to oil development is reduced to 
a few leaders, who are ideologically misguided and under the influence of foreign oil 
powers (i.e. Hugo Chavez) is, to say the least, a misrepresentation of indigenous 
opposition throughout Amazonia.  
The IMPA’s opposition to Garcia’s hydrocarbon development agenda and, more 
broadly to the Peruvian state’s⎯relentless⎯ attempts to develop the Amazon region 
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represents an important case for the study of new social movements in Latin America. In 
some regards, the “success” of the IMPA and the potential for an alliance between the 
Amazonian “natives” and Andean “campesinos” might push scholars to reconsider 
indigenous politics in Peru as a “failed” case. Or, at least, scholars might pay more 
attention to indigenous politics in Peru as a (potentially) promising successful case. 
However, even if the IMPA’s struggle is considered (at some point) a success in relation 
to other indigenous movements throughout Latin America, how might this change public 
policy so that indigenous concerns are met, violent conflicts are avoided, and the 
ecological sustainability of the Amazon region is preserved? Modernity/coloniality, as an 
alternative theoretical approach, I argue, is important precisely because of its potential to 
reframe debates surrounding indigenous peoples and environmental sustainability in 
Latin America, which could, in this context, have a positive impact on natural resource 
policy.   
Modernity/coloniality’s (and decoloniality) most important contribution is that it 
emphasizes the legacies of colonialism in present day political conflicts in Latin America. 
This is especially true for indigenous peoples, for whom the transition from a colonial 
state to a republican, independent state did not fundamentally alter their status as 
“colonized” subjects. While indigenous peoples are, in fact, quite patriotic, it is common 
to hear people in indigenous villages refer nostalgically to the time before the Europeans 
arrived. More than simply anecdotal, however, the study of indigenous pronouncements, 
manifestos, interviews, and literature provides ample evidence that for indigenous 
peoples their relationship to the Peruvian political system, to national society, and to 
dominant culture is categorically defined by the colonial encounter between Europeans 
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and “America’s original” inhabitants.  This relationship is clearly articulated in 
international conventions, such as ILO 169 and the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights, 
that provide indigenous peoples with rights to exist as part of nation-states, but as 
culturally distinct peoples.  
In this context, modernity/coloniality provides an effective tool not merely to 
understand this conflict, but to reshape natural resource development policies on 
indigenous territorial spaces in Peru. In this case, modernity/coloniality offers a way to 
reframe both indigenous and the state’s development perspectives, which, I argue, is 
critically important in order to start thinking about the implementation of alternative 
development policies on indigenous territories. The problem with current framing of this 
conflict (and others) is that too often it becomes a battle between pro-capitalist, right-
leaning neoliberals and anti-capitalist, left-leaning socialists. Indigenous peoples are then 
(conveniently) placed on the left side of the spectrum, along with environmentalists, 
human rights advocates, and others who identify with “progressive” political movements 
in Latin America. The success of left-of-center governments in Latin America like Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Nestor and Kristina Kirchner in 
Argentina, and Luiz Ignacio “Lula” da Siva in Brazil are examples of the success of the 
leftist politics in Latin America and are often identified as allies of indigenous groups.167 
It is important, however, to proceed here with a certain cautiousness. The IMPA, 
for example, is against Garcia’s neoliberal policies, which, without question, work 
                                                
167 Many, of course, would place Evo Morales of Boliva in this same category. While I 
agree that Morales identifies largely with the left and has adopted many left-of-center 
policies, I would argue that the forces that brought Morales to power and the 
constitutional convention that resulted in a new Bolivian Constitution is, in part, a 
decolonial process, or at least contains many elements that cannot be considered as 
merely left-of-center.   
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against indigenous interests and objectives. Furthermore, many on the left (human rights 
workers, labor unions, political parties, etc.) have been strong advocates for indigenous 
groups and often provide important resources. In the case of the AIDESEP, strategic 
alliances with environmental groups in the US and Europe have not only helped to 
maintain the organization solvent, but provide political leverage to take on interest groups 
(oil and mining companies, large international banks, etc.) that otherwise might exploit 
indigenous peoples and their land. As explained in Chapter VI, the IMPA does not want 
to isolate these important political allies.   
That said, the categorization of indigenous peoples as left-of-center opponents of 
neoliberal policies presents certain limitations. Much of this was discussed in Chapter VI, 
but generally speaking, the main problem with the Latin American political left is that 
socialism was born from the excesses of capitalism, all which originated in Europe. The 
political values of the left, therefore, stem from an experience that, in fact, has very little 
to do with the realities of indigenous peoples. Again, as indigenous leader Gil Inoach-
Shawit (the ex-president of AIDESEP) has made clear, the IMPA does not seek 
proletariat-based objectives that revolve around salaries, rather the indigenous struggle is 
based on territorial rights. Moreover, as part of a Eurocentric modern framework, 
socialism is still teleological, where the endpoint is arguably modern industrial 
development. Perhaps this is why Chavez, Correa, and Lula, in spite of rhetorical support 
for indigenous communities, are still drilling for oil and, especially in the case of 
Ecuador, are still immersed in conflicts with indigenous populations.    
Indigenous peoples, furthermore, are too often framed as “noble savages” that 
seek to protect the environment from all development. This also represents certain 
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(political) limitations for indigenous peoples. As suggested in Chapter VI, this framing 
was quite common from the mainstream media during the 2008 and 2009 protests, where 
indigenous peoples were presented as “defenders of the forests” against the evil 
transnational extractive companies. Garcia has often argued that indigenous peoples are 
heavily influenced by environmentalists who, under all circumstances want to prevent 
development in the Amazon region. In fact, for Garcia, the “uncontacted native” (i.e. 
“indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation”) was invented by environmentalists to 
prevent oil development. And, in a somewhat confusing way, Garcia suggested that the 
present day environmentalists, in reality, are just yesterday’s communists. They have 
replaced their “red shirts” with “green shirts.” Again, here one must be careful. In many 
respects, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, indigenous peoples are 
environmentalists and, undoubtedly, environmental groups have been some of the most 
important allies for the IMPA.  
However, in spite of these important alliances, the notion that indigenous peoples 
always have the same interests as environmentalists is problematic. I made this argument 
in the previous chapter and there is no need to repeat it here. Nevertheless, 
modernity/coloniality is useful in this context because it might help the IMPA avoid 
some of the traps of these mainstream framings. The image of indigenous peoples as 
Avatarian “noble savages,” as well as some of the postmodern framings of indigenous 
peoples as “beyond modern” sometimes over-emphasizes their unique cultural 
distinctiveness, which underplays the notion of class.168 As several World Bank reports 
have pointed out, indigenous peoples are consistently the poorest (in terms of economic 
                                                
168 This is something that post-Marxist scholars have pointed out. See Webber (2007).  
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status) groups in the entire world (Hall and Patrinos 2010, 2006). In Latin America this is 
certainly the case, and Peru is no exception. This is especially difficult for indigenous 
peoples who want to deal with issues of economic poverty, but do not want to be used by 
neoliberals (like Garcia and De Soto) who argue that oil development is necessary to 
reduce poverty in the Amazon region.  
Again, without repeating the arguments made in Chapter V, the 
modernity/coloniality approach emphasizes both class and the unique cultural and 
epistemic position of indigenous peoples in relation to the world capitalist system. What 
is unique about modernity/coloniality, is that it looks specifically at the relation between 
capitalism and colonialism. To be sure, indigenous peoples are marginalized because of 
capitalism, thus, the notion that they must assimilate or follow the path of Europe (and 
the US) would only reinforce the past injustices of domination and subordination that 
characterizes the Eurocentric capitalist system today. In this context, implicit within 
modernity/coloniality is a critique of the modern capitalist system, which is currently 
controlled by Eurocentric modernity, based on a colonial logic that is environmentally 
unsustainable and dehumanizing.  
Modernity/coloniality, in lieu of this critique, is also hopeful given that it 
categorizes indigenous peoples as modern subjects. The notion that indigenous peoples 
are, in fact, modern opens up the possibility that indigenous perspectives might be taken 
into account. Indigenous peoples, like other marginalized peoples throughout history, 
have experienced modernity from a different (epistemological) loci than dominant 
society. This does not mean that they have not contributed to modernity, but that their 
contributions have largely gone unrecognized. Perhaps, this explains why United States 
263 
 
history books rarely given credit to the Iroquois Confederation for the very idea of 
federalism or why the Mayan invention of the zero is often underplayed. The theory of 
decoloniality, perhaps above all else, encourages that these marginalized perspectives be 
taken seriously.   
In the case of Peru, I argue that a decolonization of natural resource policy is not 
only necessary, but urgent. A recent report, titled “The Peruvian Amazon in 2021. 
Natural Resource Exploitation and Infrastructure: What is happening? And What does 
this mean for the future?,” states that:  
The Peruvian Amazon region is entering a new cycle of unrestrained exploitation 
of resources in which, not unlike the cases of rubber and petroleum, the social and 
environmental consequences are unknown and the economics are only seen from 
the angle of profit. The difference, this time, is that the resources that investors 
are considering are all of them and that, because of this, they are accompanied 
with infrastructure projects, which, given their number and magnitude, have no 
historic precedent.  
 
The report suggest, for example, there are twenty-six hydroelectric projects that will take 
place in the Amazon River Basin (Dourojeanni et. al 2009, p. 4). The inevitability of 
future development in the Amazon region will undoubtedly increase the potential for 
future conflicts between the state and indigenous groups. The question is, of course, how 
to engage in development projects that are environmentally sustainable and socially 
equitable.  
As I argue in Chapter VI, decoloniality might offer the possibility of reframing 
the role of indigenous peoples in the implementation of sustainable development. The 
notion of an “environmental trusteeship,” or something akin, might provide indigenous 
peoples with the power to shape their own development path, something that the Peruvian 
state⎯given its colonial logic⎯has never permitted. From the perspective of the 
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Peruvian government, decoloniality might push government officials to rethink natural 
resource policy in Peru. If the government were able to recognize the colonial logic 
embedded in its policies then it might see the value in engaging in a decolonization of 
natural resource policies in the Amazon region. To be sure, a decolonization of Peru’s 
natural resource policies on indigenous territories would imply that indigenous peoples 
gain greater political and administrative control over the natural resources on their 
territories. In reality, this is nothing more than a move toward a much more genuine 
democracy, where all peoples have the power to decide their own development path. The 
fact that this would translate into policies that are more environmentally sustainable, 
more socially equitable, and would reduce the possibility of violent political conflict, 
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